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The Publications of the Bulgarian-Hungarian History Commission is the joint 
initiative of Bulgarian and Hungarian historians – members of the 
mentioned Commission that was established in 2006 and since then 
have been successfully functioning as a link between them in academic 
research and scholarship. Its aim is to present the colleagues’ scientific 
results in studying the common historical past of Hungary and Bulgaria 
against the backdrop of the historical processes taking place in the 
regions of Central and Southeastern Europe. 
In its ten-year existence the Commission has realized several joint 
academic research projects and has issued several separate books, 
summarizing their results, among them we can mention “Political, 
Social, Economic and Cultural Elites in the Central- and East-European 
States in Modernity and Post-Modernity” (Sofia–Budapest, 2010), 
Bulgaria and Hungary at War (1912–1918) (Sofia–Budapest, 2013), 
Regions, Borders, Societies, Identities in Central and Southeast Europe, 
17th–21st Centuries (Sofia–Budapest, 2013), Shared Pasts in Central and 
Southeast Europe, 17th–21st Centuries (Budapest–Sofia, 2015), 
(Re)Discovering the Sources of Bulgarian and Hungarian History 
(Sofia–Budapest, 2015).  
The first volume of our newly established series contains the 
collected studies of the Hungarian historian-geographer Gábor Demeter 
who examines the diplomacy of Austria-Hungary towards the Balkans 
and the role of key personalities in it using a geopolitical and economic 
approach to explain the events – an approach which is rather different 
from historians’ view, but was quite popular during the first half of the 
20th century in the contemporary political thinking. The author analyzes 
and for the first time incorporates into research writing some primary 
sources (such as the diaries of István/Stephan Burián and Lajos/Ludwig 
Thallóczy) that offer new input into historical questions, draw a much 
diverse (and not always favourable) picture for Austria-Hungary. The 
chapters trace such historical ’myths’ and problems like the “Drang 
nach Salonika”, the reality of an Austro-Hungarian alliance with 
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Bulgaria (including the promise of Austro-Hungarian military aid to 
Bulgaria in 1913), the internal debates between the different pressure 
groups of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, the “unanimous” support 
of politicians to wage war against Serbia in 1914, the “unconditional” 
German support, and the role of economic interests vs. military aspects, 
the missing economic backgrounds of an active Austro-Hungarian 
Balkan policy, etc.  
 










This volume contains essays dealing with different aspects of 
diplomatic history each using a different point of view or method. What 
is common in each chapter is the involvement of Austria-Hungary and 
Bulgaria – either being passive observers or active participants of 
events. The first chapter is a historiographical comparison of views 
regarding Count Andrássy’s policy towards Russia and the Balkans, 
thus it is not a critical analysis of events, but rather of thoughts. 
The second chapter analyses the aspirations and ambitions of Powers 
in the Balkans from geopolitical aspects. This approach was getting 
more and more popular after the turn of the century in scientific circles, 
but it is questionable to what extent did it appear in high politics. 
Journalists, capitalists tended to emphasize its importance (among the 
Hungarian proponents one may mention the scholar Adolf Strausz or 
the industrial entrepreneur Rezső Havass). This chapter evaluates the 
political events from geopolitical perspective, while analyzing the 
combinations of alliances using sketch maps, diagrams – instruments of 
political geography. 
The third chapter investigates two questions – was there a 
cooperation between Austria-Hungary in 1908 and to whom was it 
favourable; and was the relationship between the two states 
asymmetrical or was it interdependency (compared to the cases of 
Russia and Serbia; Russia and Romania; Austria-Hungary and Romania, 
etc.)? Though diplomats thought that a small and revengeful Bulgaria 
would be better than a Greater Bulgaria realized, as the space for 
manoeuvring decreased, so did the value of Bulgaria in the eyes of 
politicians. 
The next chapter also differs from traditional diplomatic works, as – 
based on archival sources – it focuses on the ’contrafactual’ question 
“what if…”, when it enumerates the chances and solutions for Bulgaria 
to reach an agreement with her former allies in 1913, that would have 
given a more favourable outcome to the events by avoiding the 
outbreak of the second Balkan War. 
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The fifth chapter deals with the different ’topoi’ in connection with 
the political ambitions of Austria-Hungary. First we prove that the 
’Drang nach Salonika’ was not hoax as often claimed, but several plans 
did exist to realize this goal (although both the favourable political 
constellation and the necessary capital was missing). Then, using 
contemporary sources, we prove that Austria-Hungary did have 
colonial plans on the Balkans. Finally, we examine the relation of 
Hungarians towards a war against Serbia, and we prove that the 
annexation of the state, or a long war was against Hungary’s interest, 
which was represented by Prime Minister Tisza’s unwillingness to 
declare war in 1914. On the other hand Hungary wished to mutilate or 
dismember Serbia among her small neighbors, thus to divert their 
attention from Transylvania and Macedonia. Finally the slogan ’the 
Balkan for the Balkan peoples’ (Tisza) was not an acceptance of the 
principle of nationality, but an instrument to exclude Russia’s 
interference. 
The last chapter re-evaluates the long-debated question of Austrian 
help promised to Bulgaria, if it attacks Serbia in 1913, at the same time 
highlighting the events (the internal political situation in Austria-
Hungary and the perception of the Balkan Wars) through the eyes of a 
leader diplomat-eyewitness (Ludwig von Thallóczy), thus drawing the 
attention to one of the most important, though still unpublished source. 
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Count Andrássy and the Attitude of Austria-Hungary 
during the Great Eastern Crisis (1875–78)  
A Historiographical Overview 
 
 
The present study1 deals with the foreign policy of Count Andrássy, 
Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary during the Great Eastern Crisis 
and also with the Austro-Hungarian interpretation of the events based 
on Hungarian sources and contemporary literature. The problem of the 
Great Eastern Crisis and the policy of Andrássy has already been 
analyzed in the Hungarian historiography prior to World War I by 
György Balanyi, Ede Wertheimer and many other participants of the 
events,2 although they could not remain impartial and wrote in a very 
anti-Russian tone, while at the same time they overestimated 
Andrássy’s personality and role. Balanyi even blamed the English for 
the failure of the conservative reform movement initiated by Andrássy 
in 1875-76,3 while accused Gorchakov of deepening the differences 
between rebels and the Ottoman state.4 Russians were also accused of 
encouraging Slavs to resist and refuse moderate reforms, and they were 
depicted as deceitful violators of agreements, that would have brought 
peace. These authors failed to admit that the reform plans merely served 
the interests of Powers and not of local inhabitants, and that Austria-
Hungary was not interested in executing real reforms. From Metternich 
to Bismarck and Disraeli many thought that carrying out reforms in 
                                                          
1  Published originally Demeter, G.: Graf Andrasi i poziciya Avstro-Vengrii po vaprosu Vostochnogo 
Krizisa (1875–1879 gg): Istoriograficheskiy obzor. In: Akulshin, P.–Grebenkin, A. (eds.): General 
M. D. Skobelev i yego vremya: (k 170-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya). Ryazan, 2014. 182–202. 
2    Many of them served as official diplomats close to Andrássy, or were journalists responsible 
for the image of leader politicians. See: Kállay, B.: Emlékek. Budapest, 1898; Sosnosky, Th. von: 
Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866. Bd. 1–2. Stuttgart-Berlin, 1913–1914; Halász, I.: 
Bismarck és Andrássy. Budapest, 1913; Falk, M.: Kor- és jellemrajzok. Budapest, 1903; Hegedüs, 
L.: Két Andrássy és két Tisza. Budapest, 1941; Balanyi, Gy.: A Balkán-probléma fejlődése: a Párisi 
kongresszustól a világháború kitöréséig, 1856–1914. Budapest, 1920; Balanyi, Gy.: Gr. Andrássy 
Gyula szerepe a Monarchia történetében. Budapest, 1924; Wertheimer, E.: Andrássy Gróf élete és 
kora, I–II. Budapest, 1934.  
3     Balanyi, Gy.: A Balkán-probléma fejlődése… 95. 
4     Ibid. 81. 
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Turkey might create a precedent for the Slavs in Austria-Hungary, thus 
these are dangerous.5 
Their one-sided standpoint and conclusions were revised by István 
Diószegi and Emil Palotás in the 1960–70s,6 but owing to the political 
background of that era Austria-Hungary’s policy was depicted very 
negatively, as it was opposed to the “immanent way of history”, and 
tried to hinder the “natural development” of events (national 
awakening, the formation of nation states). This negative adjudication 
had also been adopted by the history-writing of the neighboring states 
(like Bulgaria) that still prevails sometimes.7 Diószegi summarized his 
views once again from another aspect in his work „Bismarck and 
Andrássy” in the 1990s,8 which seems to be the most balanced (and 
detailed) work on this topic in Hungary, but he focuses only Power 
policy and lacks an outlook on the pretensions of Slavic nations of the 
peninsula. Compared to his previous writings it is very analytic, 
obscure and even contains some contradictions, while analyses the 
western historiography as well, in a polemic style.9 Prior to this 
historiographic turn his former works were logically structured (as an 
effect of the dialectic materialism), but one-sided, lacking 
historiographical context. Since then no further progress has been made 
at synthesis-level (studies on partial questions still recur), and it seems 
that the investigation of the question has been concluded. Therefore the 
                                                          
5    Taylor, A. J. P.: Struggle for Mastery in Europe. (I used the Hungarian edition: Taylor, A. J. P.: 
Harc a hatalomért. Európa 1848–1918. Budapest, 2000). 291. 
6     Diószegi, I.: Ausztria-Magyarország és Bulgária a San Stefanó-i béke után (1878–1879). Budapest, 
1961; Palotás, E.: Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia balkáni politikája a Berlini Kongresszus után 
(1878–1881). Budapest, 1982. 
7    A former student of Diószegi, Petar Kamenov uses the same reasoning and tone of criticism 
in the 1990’s as Diószegi did 30 years ago. Kamenov, P.: Graf Andrasi i Balkanite, 1867–1890. 
Sofia, 2001. 
8    Diószegi, I.: Bismarck és Andrássy. Magyarország a német hatalmi politikában a XIX. század második 
felében. Budapest, 1998. The work repeats the title of Hegedüs’ monography, but its tone is 
toally different. 
9   Schmidt, R. F.: Die gescheierte Allianz. Österreich-Ungarn, England und das Deutsche Reich in der 
Ära Andrássy (1867 bis 1878/79). Frankfurt am Main, 1992; Schmidt, R. F.: Graf Julius Andrássy. 
Vom Revolutionär bis Aussenminister. Göttingen-Zürich, 1995; Rupp, G. H.: A Wavering 
Friendship. Russia and Austria 1876–1878. Cambridge (Mass.). 1941; Rupp, G. H.: The 
Reichstadt Agreement. American Historical Review, 30. 1925. 
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literature used here is quite old, but not obsolete. Nevertheless, an 
exclusively Hungarian interpretation of the events distorts reality, but 
our goal is not the reconstruction and evaluation of events, but the 
interpretation of contemporary and recent Hungarian political thinking 
regarding that chapter of Eastern Question, as it determined the policy 
and political instruments for Austria-Hungary over the next 30 years. 
This may contribute to the better understanding of Austro-Hungarian-
Russian relations after 1878. 
All Hungarian historians agree that the main goal of Austria-
Hungary was to prevent the establishment of a Greater Slavic state, 
because it was supposed to be the greatest threat on the existence of the 
Habsburg Monarchy according to contemporary politicians and 
decision-makers. Austria-Hungary was built up of a conglomerate, 
mosaic of territories with different ethnic character. Along its borders 
nation states were evolving throughout the 19th century, that attracted 
their brothers incorporated within the limits of Austria-Hungary, 
exerting a continuous pressure on the multiethnic dualist state. Along 
the western borders this process had more or less been over by 1871 
after the unification of Italy and Germany, and Austria-Hungary was 
expelled from its Central European positions. Therefore the security of 
her eastern border became more precious, as it also became the only 
scene of possible territorial aggrandisement. But soon – side by side 
with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire – new problems arose. The 
Slavic subjects of the Empire managed to form autonomous 
principalities, and politicians were aware of the fact that Austria-
Hungary could only preserve its influence over the region if succeeded 
in hindering the unification of Slavs with each other. Otherwise, the 
same scenario could take place as in Italy or Germany, where Habsburg 
influence remained unchallenged only until many small weak Italian 
and German states existed without tendencies for unification. Therefore 
a declining, but at least intact Turkey was more favourable for Austria-
Hungary then a dismembered one. Everybody remembered Gentz’s 
famous prediction in 1815, stating that Austria would not survive the 
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collapse of the Ottoman Empire,10 because originally Turkey’s 
penetration was the challenge that created the Habsburg Monarchy as a 
counterweight. Unfortunately, Austria-Hungary had another 
neighboring Power, Russia, which was an attractive factor not only to 
the Slavs of Ottoman Turkey, but to those of living in Austria-Hungary, 
constituting almost 50% of the population. Thus, Russia meant a dual 
threat: she could not only encircle Austria-Hungary by gaining the 
benevolence of southern Slavs and blocking Austria’s political or 
economic penetration into the peninsula, but furthermore, as these 
southern Slavic states had brothers incorporated within the boundaries 
of Austria-Hungary, their aspirations meant a threat to the dualistic 
structure and even to the existence of Austria-Hungary. 11 
The above mentioned fears are key elements to understand the 
foreign policy pursuited by Austria-Hungary after 1871,12 as these 
reflected not only the stance of the public opinion, but the official 
opinion of politicians as well. That’s why the prohibition on the 
establishment of any Greater Slavic state appears in the Reichstadt 
agreement in 1876 (in words) and in the Budapest agreement in 1877 (on 
paper). These greatest Austro-Hungarian fears were realized, when the 
Russians created Bulgaria of San Stefano – as the latter not only could 
hinder any Austrian expansion towards the south, but also could have 
exerted a centrifugal force on the minorities of the Dualist State.13  
                                                          
10  Taylor, A. J. P.: Harc a hatalomért… 288. 
11  Similarly to the thesis of Gentz, one may assume that Austria-Hungary would not survive 
the collapse of Tsarist Russia, as Austria was valuable for the other Powers only as a 
counterweight of Russia. 
12   Diószegi, I. Ausztria-Magyarország és Bulgária… 5. 
13   Later, when Serbia became inimical to the Dual Monarchy, the creation of a Greater Bulgaria 
was not totally excluded from the instruments – especially in 1912 – to maintain the 
influence of Austria-Hungary on the Balkans. A Greater Bulgaria could counterweight a 
Russian and Serbian and probably Romanian cooperation. As Austria had lost its buffer / 
satellite states – Romania and Serbia – by 1912, its boundaries became vulnerable, therefore 
it definitely needed the volens-nolens help of Bulgaria. Nonetheless, for Austrian politicians 
it was enough to exacerbate Serbian-Bulgarian antagonism without the realization of 
Greater Bulgaria, therefore they offered Macedonia in 1881 for the Serbs as a 
recompensation for the occupation of Bosnia, which was earlier – in 1870 – promised to 
Serbia. This offer was repeated in 1913 as well, as a recompensation for the loss of the 
Adriatic. Since the control of the Vardar-Morava axis, thus economic supremacy after the 
17 
 
Although the aspirations of Russia on the Balkans can be interpreted 
as a part of an imperial and dynastic foreign policy, which means that 
the promotion of Slavic nationalistic movements for independence was 
not necessary (Russian diplomacy was against revolutions between 
1815–1848 in cooperation with Austria), but experience showed that in 
practice the achievement of imperial goals could be effectively fuelled 
by the support of nationalistic movements. Therefore panslavism 
appeared in the milieu of official policy. For Andrássy the main aim in 
the 1870s remained to hinder the meeting of official Russian foreign 
political goals and the Slavic national aspirations.14 This intention can be 
seen clearly, when he offered an anti-Russian alliance early in 1870 for 
Serbia promising her Bosnia-Herzegovina. „If everybody is convinced that 
the Turkish rule is not followed by a Russian one, then neither Austria-
Hungary, nor other Powers feel themselves to interfere into or hinder the 
natural development of events on the Balkans” – he stressed his view to 
Benjamin Kállay, his trustee, who was sent to Belgrade to promote the 
Serbian-Austrian rapprochement.15 This pretension can be seen behind 
his consent to the „Three Emperors’ Accord” in 1873, although it was 
not optimal for his goals, as he was quite Russophobe (he was sentenced 
to death owing to his revolutionary activity in 1848). This agreement 
freezed the Eastern Question by maintaining the status quo, thus meant 
a renouncement of supporting southern Slavic aspirations from both 
sides.16  
His policy during the Great Eastern Crisis can also be driven back to 
the prevention of a Russian and Slavic cooperation. First he tried to 
convince the rebellious Bosnians with concessions, thus hindering the 
increase of Russian influence, then after the failure of his note on 31 
December, 1875, he engaged into negotiations with Russia in order to 
convince her to refrain from the supporting Slavic aspirations. The 
realization of this policy was the Budapest agreement that pointed out 
                                                                                                                                
political turn in Serbia became impossible, the creation of Albania (and the withdrawal of 
Serbia from the coast) became a key element to secure Austrian economic outlet to the seas.  
14   Diószegi, I.: Ausztria-Magyarország és Bulgária… 7. 
15   Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchenyi Library), Kézirattár (Manuscripts). Fol. Hung. 
1733. Andrássy to Kállay, October 24, 1870. 
16   Diószegi, I.: Ausztria-Magyarország és Bulgária… 8. 
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prohibitions on establishing a greater Slavic state. When the Russian 
intervention became more and more unavoidable due to the Serbian 
defeat and the pogrom sin Bulgaria, he managed to lay down the 
Austrian demand on territorial concessions in a written agreement, also 
accepted by other Powers, like Germany. This logically established 
policy collapsed on 3 March, 1878 by the Treaty of San Stefano.  
In this study I’m going to explain and reason (1) the details of 
foreign policy pursuited by Austria-Hungary (sometimes motivated 
simply by internal fears of Andrássy) between 1872–77 prior to the 
Russian declaration of War. (2) I also aim at analyzing the different 
interpretation of key events like the Budapest and Reichstadt 
agreements, (3) and finally I show how Andrássy found a way out from 
the situation that threatened Austria-Hungary with a Russian 
predominance over the peninsula, thus postponing the collapse of 
Austria-Hungary for 30 years.  
*** 
The opinion of a prominent personality and the official policy of the 
state are two different things, that may not coincide. Although 
Andrássy became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1871, it never meant 
that his opinion was not challenged by other pressure groups (like 
Prince Albrecht or generals Mollinary and Rodich), nor that his views 
were constant or coherent (or that all instructions were executed in 
accordance with his ideas). His views were in permanent 
transformation according to the changes of the external and internal 
political situation including many alternating scenarios, like the 
sustainability or uselessness of Turkey or the repeatedly recurring 
Bosnian question. This could be evaluated either as flexibility or also as 
indecision. Owing to the above mentioned he was labelled a „dilettant”, 
who pursuited a fruitful policy.  
Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy over the Balkan peninsula prior to 
Andrássy was strictly based on status quo and non-intervention 
elaborated early by Metternich.17 Andrássy originally even denied the 
traditional concept that Austria-Hungary had to fill the vacuum in case 
                                                          
17  Diószegi, I.: Bismarck és Andrássy… 202. 
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of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It is true that before 1871 
Andrássy wanted to gain the benevolence of Serbia in case of a Russian-
Austrian war by offering the occupation of Ottoman areas (Bosnia), if 
the latter did not prove to be viable, but that time, prior to the increase 
of Russian influence, Austria-Hungary itself had no territorial 
aspirations on the Balkans. Andrássy even withdrew this idea 
concerning Bosnia, when the Austrian-Russian clash remained 
unrealized in 1871 due to the quick collapse of France under German 
attacks. Even a Russian-Austrian cooperation began to develop on the 
Balkans, after panslavism had become discredited for a decade because 
of crushing of the Polish revolt in 1863, and Russia had temporarily 
turned towards Middle Asia and to the revision of the Paris Treaty 
(London, 1871). Thus, the meeting between Gorchakov and Andrássy in 
Berlin (1872) was based on mutual non-intervention into the affairs of 
the peninsula.18 Therefore Russia first supported the note of Andrássy 
(16 October, 1875) in which he promised reforms for Bosnia, which was 
accepted by the Porte as well (13 February, 1876). But unfortunately 
neither Serbia, nor Montenegro and the Bosnian rebels could be held 
back by this agreement. The Serb ruling circles had a constant fear that 
if they did not support the rebels, while Montenegro did, the Njegoš 
dinasty could take over power in Serbia. And there was another reason: 
the 2 wings of the rebels were ready to unite the controlled territories 
with Serbia (Lubratić) and Montenegro (Pavlović), if the latter 
supported their movement.19 But this was considered a threat now by 
Austria-Hungary: “For Austria-Hungary the existence of Ottoman Turkey is 
needful, as it not only draws the attention of small states (diverting it from 
Austria), but at the same time hinders their nationalistic  aspirations … If 
Ottoman Turkey ceased to exist, we would become the next targets. If Bosnia 
united with Serbia or Montenegro or a new state was established, the game 
would be over for us, and we would become the next sick man of Europe”– 
wrote Andrássy just before the outbreak of the Herzegovinian revolt (29 
January, 1875).20 Compared to his earlier opinion things seem to have 
                                                          
18  Diószegi, I.: Bismarck és Andrássy… 204. 
19  Balanyi Gy.: A Balkán-probléma fejlődése… 79. 
20  Rupp, G. H.: A Wavering Friendship… 39; Taylor, A. J. P.: Harc a hatalomért … 288. 
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changed regarding both Turkey’s integrity and the fate of Bosnia, 
although it still did not mean an Austrian occupation of the latter. 
Bismarck – who considered the escalation of the Eastern conflict as a 
good instrument to ameliorate the position of Germany –,21 gave firm 
support to Andrássy, because he thought Andrássy represented 
Hungarian interests in foreign policy contrary to the revisionism of 
Catholic Austrians, who could have been more dangerous for Germany. 
Bismarck was even against the reforms in Ottoman Turkey, because he 
thought that any concession given to the Slavs in the Balkans would 
increase the activity of Slavs in Hungary, and this would aggravate and 
the Hungarians’ position and thus would encourage Cisleithanian 
revanchism.22 Bismarck even decided to act as a mediator between 
England and Austria and to support Andrássy against to the pressure 
coming from the circles around General Rodich, governor of Dalmatia, 
who wanted to occupy Bosnia. The unfortunate idea of the visit of 
Francis Joseph in Dalmatia in 1875, where he was introduced as a 
defender of western Slavs came from these Austrian military circles,23 
and therefore they were quite responsible for pushing the events in 
Herzegovina to the escalation of the conflict. Their opponents, like Dezső 
Szilágyi from the party of Kálmán Tisza and Andrássy even hinted the 
rumour that these military circles smuggled weapons to Herzegovina.24 
Bismarck had three plans: on 3 January, 1876 he advised Austria-
Hungary to pacify the rebellious provinces, in this way satisfying 
Rodich, then Russia can to get back southern Bessarabia, while England 
might get Egypt. In April 1876, he realized that all the mentioned 
powers were so involved in the question and so distrustful toward each 
other, that an unilateral Austrian intervention would make Russia 
oppose, an unilateral Russian intervention would raise Austrian 
objection, while any joint measures would be questioned by England, 
that did not want Austrian-Russian appeasement over the Balkans at all. 
Up to that very days of 1878, when Russia almost reached the Straits, 
                                                          
21  Explained later. 
22  Diószegi, I.: Bismarck és Andrássy… 207. 
23  Taylor, A. J. P.: Harc a hatalomért … 290. 
24  Szilágyi Dezső beszédei. Budapest, 1906. 137–38. 
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England did not calculate with Austria-Hungary as a factor of 
continental balance or as a counterweight of Russia on the peninsula, 
that is why, the English refused Andrássy’s early plans of cooperation 
in 1872 (pushing him towards accepting the accord of the Three 
Emperors).  
This careful analysis of the situation brought about the third German 
plan: the strengthening of the „accord of the Three Emperors” led to the 
meeting of the leading diplomats in Berlin (10 May, 1876), where 
Andrássy and Bismarck together refused the idea of Gorchakov who 
intended to give autonomy for the revolting Bosnia. The question is 
why? As we have seen, Andrássy originally wanted to give Bosnia to 
his ally, Serbia in order to hinder any cooperation between Serbia and 
Russia. But the outbreak of the Great Eastern Crisis put an end to these 
plans because of the Russian involvement, as any modification of the 
status quo as a result of a direct or indirect Russian interference would 
have weakened the position of Austria-Hungary on the Balkans. A 
possible Russian intervention with a favourable outcome to the small 
states automatically meant that the Austrian policy turned more 
positively to the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey (until it 
remained possible), while in case of a passive Russia Andrássy was 
willing to accept the mutilation of Turkey.  But any unilateral increase 
in the Russian sphere of interest had to be balanced in Budapest 
somehow (if hindering it remained unsuccessful), that is the reason of 
the modification of the original plans regarding Bosnia.25 From that time 
on Andrássy was not opposed to the annexation so ardently. The 
autonomy of Bosnia (similar to that of Bulgaria) as an intermediate 
solution was refused by Andrássy, because he thought that it would 
serve as an ’apple of discord’ among small Balkan nations and 
Ottomans. Autonomy would mean an evergrowing unrest in the 
peripheries. “The next step of the Eastern Question would be the cooperation 
of Serbia, Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire based on the unsettled Bosnian 
question.”26 This prediction of Andrássy was realized later, although it 
                                                          
25  Taylor, A. J. P.: Harc a hatalomért … 289. 
26  HHStA, Wien, PA VIII. England, Fasc. 170. April 21, 1878. 
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was the Macedonian question that finally brought about changes (in 
1912).  
Finally, the Berlin Memorandum contained an armistice of two 
months for the fighting parties and urged the internal reform of the 
Empire. The effectiveness of the note was decreased by the British 
denial on handing it jointly to the Porte. In 1875 the foreign policy of the 
Disraeli government was very controversial: Disraeli-Beaconsfield 
himself wanted a direct British appearance and influence (i.e. Suez 
question), he wanted the maintenance of Turkey and at the same time 
the increase of British political and economic influence over the state. 
But Salisbury wanted an English-Russian agreement, while distructing 
the Three Emperors’ Alliace, therefore he did not accept any initiatives 
coming from these Powers. Lord Darby was distrustful towards the 
Powers and was the supporter of the ’splendid isolation’.  
Andrássy quickly realized that British hesitation and the internal 
political changes in the Ottoman Empire (the dethronization of the 
Sultan) made the former efforts futile. Russia and Austria-Hungary 
once again had to initiate negotiations on the solution of the Balkan 
question. This led to the verbal agreement in Reichstadt. In this 
agreement (detailed later) in case of a Turkish victory status quo ante 
was laid down as a principle. In case of victory of the small states the 
two parties agreed in the annexation of certain territories. Unfortunately 
the two variants of the agreement published in the first volume of 
Krasny Arhiv (1922) and Austrian documents differed regarding the 
extent of areas to be occupied. The Russian version mentions only a part 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Austrian document mentions the 
whole area – later Andrássy had to fight for the realization of Austrian 
version. 
These events did not necessarily mean that Andrássy’s policy was 
aggressive and from the early beginnings he aimed at acquiring Bosnia 
(and Macedonia). When claiming this, Kamenov refers to the work of 
Falk and Hegedüs, who were not historians, rather publicists and 
politicians, furthermore their work is retrospective and often lack 
references to exact dates. Nonetheless, they tended to describe Andrássy 
as a resolute politician who always knew what to do (and created an 
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idealistic anti-Russian national hero), but this is an over-exaggerated 
picture. Kamenov fits the events into his concept by the arbitrary 
selection of sources. It was rather Beck, chief-of-staff who saw it 
important to acquire Macedonia (see figure 4, next chapter), for Andrássy 
an autonomy within the Ottoman Empire was also realistic, such as 
giving minor territorial compensation for Serbia from Macedonian 
territories. This means that Andrássy was not definitely against the 
autonomy as an instrument, he even elaborated a – although not radical 
– proposal for Bulgarian autonomy just to hinder the further escalation 
of the conflict and the increase of Russian influence (but definitely not 
for the satisfaction and sake of local inhabitants). However, the events 
of April, 1876 made his efforts futile, and the plan had to be thrown 
away. Referring to Falk’s biography on Andrássy, Kamenov claims that 
Andrássy gave up the maintenance of Ottoman integrity – it is true, but 
it was only a reaction to the events, and not a proactive policy. As the 
speeches of Dezső Szilágyi evidenced, even Falk, spoke about the 
maintenance of Ottoman integrity as a delegate and the note of 31, 
December, 1875 was based on this. And while the literature usually 
claims that these reform plans were ineffective from the beginning, one 
should not forget that even the Mürzsteg plan of 1903 was not more 
than this with the very exception of the international controlling 
committee.  
In May 1876, after the Berlin meeting Andrássy still denied the 
reality of the annexation of Bosnia.27 We saw that there were cases and 
years, when Andrássy could get along with the European presence of 
Turkey well. Based on Hegedüs, Kamenov claims that Andrássy 
wanted to acquire the Vardar-axis (which really became a key element 
of Austrian foreign policy later), but it was not a directive or necessity, 
jut a possibility, and prior to 1876 (the Russian interference into the 
affairs of the peninsula), he did not have such plans. When Kállay 
mentioned that the acquisition of Macedonia wass impossible, due to 
the demand of the Serb compensation, Andrássy warned that it wass not 
the territorial consequences that were the most important achivements for 
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Austria-Hungary, but the main goal: to keep Russia off the Balkans, and any 
solution that could serve this, could be acceptable. If this was impossible, he 
wanted recompesation for the increase of Russian presence.28 
The fear that Austria may pacify the region led to the emergence of 
the Ristić government in Serbia that pursuited a more active policy, 
knowing that the ’unofficial Russia’ of Fadeev, Katkov and Danilevski 
would support the war against the Ottomans even with loans. This 
exacerbated the difference between the stance of the conservative 
Shuvalov, Gorchakov and the radical Ignatiev. The quick Ottoman 
military successes over Serbia surprised the Powers. Gorchakov 
accepted the status quo laid down in Reichstadt, but once again he 
offered autonomy to Bosnia, which angered Andrássy. Finally the two 
Powers agreed in maintaining the status quo, and an armistice of some 
weeks came into life, while Abdülhamid – who refrained from giving 
concessions – became the new emperor of Ottoman Turkey with the 
secret support of the English diplomacy. Therefore the Austrian-
Russian cooperation once again proved to be fruitless. 
This led to the mission of Sumarokov-Elston on 27, September 1876, 
offering a joint military action in Bulgaria and Bosnia. Andrássy replied 
that Russia had to step forth alone, but offered the benevolent neutrality 
of Austria-Hungary, for which the prize was the occupation of Bosnia. 
This bargain was very advantageous for Austria-Hungary that could 
avoid the declaration of a war or entering into a joint action with the 
Russians, which might cause international calamities, and at the same 
time could avoid internal debates as well (the Hungarian public opinion 
was against any cooperation with Russia).29 The agreement even meant 
that Russia was not allowed to annex the occupied territories and thus 
the military presence of the Russians remained limited, while 
concerning Bosnia this was not the case. Lajos Dóczi, section-chief of the 
Foreign Ministry even thought that Andrássy managed to secure 
Austrian interest regardless of whether Russia keeps its word regarding 
Bulgaria or not. But a contemporary historian, Ede Wertheimer thought 
that Andrássy was simply waiting for the outcome of the events 
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without deep resolution what to do because of the intricate situation. 
Aehrenthal (later Foreign Minister) claimed that Andrássy committed a 
mistake when he bargained with the Russians. In a recent work Schmidt 
(1992) pointed out that Andrássy checkmated the Russians, just as Dóczi 
thought. Diószegi thought (1998) that it was a classical deal with no traps 
in it analysing the agreement. He pointed out that a joint action was 
simply against the interests of the Monarchy, because in that case – even 
if Austria-Hungary gained Bosnia – Russia could occupy Romania (in 
order to reach Bulgaria) which was limitroph with Austria-Hungary, 
and Andrássy wanted to avoid such combinations. An Austro-
Hungarian war against Turkey was impossible owing to the sentiments 
of the public opinion. A war against Russia (while she deploys her army 
against the Ottomans) taking sides with Turkey was also against 
Andrássy’s present plans, because he was thinking of Turkey as a 
cadaver, and feared that the intervention of small states would force 
Austria-Hungary to fight at two fronts at the same time, for which it 
was not ready. According to Hoover Rupp Andrássy hoped that Russia 
could not win an overwhelming victory and became exhausted and 
would not be in the position to fight a war against Austria-Hungary in 
the next decades. But Viennese documents did not confirm this 
assumption,30 indeed they spoke about Austrian fears, that the war 
would turn into a revolutionary war of the Slavs, classical diplomacy 
would be swept away and the agreement of Reichstadt would be 
violated due to the pressure of the Russian public opinion and of 
Ignatiev’s circles. This would mean a war against Russia – without any 
benefit.  
These visions encouraged Andrássy once again to bargain with 
Russia (Budapest agreement in January, 1877). On the other side 
Bismarck also refused the Russian inquiry whether Germany tolerated a 
Russian-Austrian war or not, when Russia handed in the bill for his 
friendly behavior in 1866 and 1870. Bismarck had a fear that a war 
ending with an overwhelming Russian victory would annihilate 
Austria-Hungary: nonetheless the Austrian parts could be incorporated 
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into the Reich, but Hungary alone would never be able to hinder further 
Russian penetration towards the Straits. Afterall Bismarck did not want 
a new combination of Powers because of the Balkans, which was of 
secondary importance for Germany. Thus the alliance of the three 
Emperors finally failed to prevail for the great pleasure of the English.  
During these debates, the conference in Constantinople (from 
December 1876) resulted in a perfect cooperation between Salisbury and 
Ignatiev.31 Based on their accord two Bulgarian autonomous states were 
to be established with centers of Tirnovo and Sofia, regarding Serbia 
status quo ante was accepted, Montenegro was offered some minor 
territorial concessions, while the autonomy of Bosnia was swept away. 
Andrássy happily wrote that it was the first time since December, 1875 
that the Powers were unified as regard to the Eastern Question. But he 
remained sceptic, whether Turks accepted the note, and he was right: 
referring to the newly established constitution the Ottoman government 
refused to obey. And finally the protocol of 31 March, 1877 was 
inadequate, because the British wanted bilateral demobilisation of 
Russian and Ottoman forces, while the Russians decided to demobilize 
their troops only after the Turks had begun this – but the Ottomans 
refused to do so.  
Since Shuvalov in London promised that Russian troops would not 
cross the Balkan Mountains if war became unavoidable, Austria still 
hesitated to step forth to oppose Russian war-plans without the English, 
who were anxious of the Straits question. Without active English 
support (the fleet in the Besika bay was not a real support for Austria-
Hungary) the Habsburg Monarchy refused to operate in Serbian and 
Romanian territories in parallel with the beginning of Russian actions. 
The English calculated that Andrássy encouraged the Russians to step 
forth and then he wanted to use the English to hinder Russian 
intervention, while Austria was astonished by the behaviour of 
England, because Shuvalov was informed about English-Austrian 
negotiations through the indiscretion of Lady Darby, the wife of the 
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Foreign Minister. Thus a cooperation aimed at hindering Russian 
intervention failed and the Russian-Ottoman war finally broke out. 
*** 
It is worth examining the concepts of the two major Austrian-Russian 
agreements and the Russian plans before the outbreak of the war. 
According to Risto Poplazarov,32 the Russian plan of Greater Bulgaria 
was only a fiction, a trick of the Russian foreign policy that knew well, 
that Powers would not promote the creation of such a state, but wanted 
to turn the feelings of Bulgarians against the Powers, thus promoting 
the development of pro-Russian sentiments. Russia only wanted to 
preserve its authority in the eyes of Slavic nations by coming up with 
the plan of Greater Bulgaria according to Dimitar Blagoev. (In his 
opinion it was a pity that the realization of these plans remained the 
main goal of the Bulgarian political elite for the next 70 years). Even 
Gorchakov thought that the Treaty of San Stefano was a premature 
action, and was of the opinion that Count Ignatiev, ambassador to 
Constantinople, who fought for the conclusion of the Treaty of San 
Stefano, should fight for its realization too. The actions of Ignatiev 
caused a great problem for the official Russian diplomacy indeed. 
Shuvalov in London also denied these radical plans of panslavists, 
which were considered irrealistic and against the agreements concluded 
in Budapest and Reichstadt. Nonetheless it is very interesting – and 
somehow characteristic too – that the latter agreement had two versions: 
the Russian and Austro-Hungarian translations differed (such was the 
case in 1912 regarding the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement). According to 
the Russian variant of the Reichstadt agreement (July, 1876), if the 
Balkan nations won a decisive victory in a war against Ottoman Turkey, 
Serbia would acquire Bosnia and Kosovo, while Montenegro would get 
the Adriatic ports and Herzegovina. In case of an overwhelming 
Christian victory Bulgaria and Romania would become independent 
principalities based on their natural borders, while Greece could acquire 
Thessaly and Epiros. But the Austrian verson was different regarding 
this last sentence: Bosnia, Rumelia and Albania would become 
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independent states, Thessaly and Crete would belong to Greece, 
Constantinople would be a neutral city. The term Bulgaria and Rumelia 
were different according to the interpretation of Austria-Hungary, 
while the Russians thought these substituted each other.33 The ’borders 
of Bulgaria’ in Austrian terminology were more or less equal with the 
Danube vilaet of Turkey (north of Balkan Mts. with Sofia and Niš), and 
the term Rumelia probably included Macedonia (as Western Rumelia) 
beyond Eastern Rumelia. The documents evidenced that Andrássy 
accepted the idea of an autonomous Macedonia, but not its unification 
with Bulgaria (as it was also laid down in the conference of 
Constantinople too). 
The Budapest agreement in January, 1877 pointed out the Austrian 
occupation of Bosnia and the Russian occupation of Bulgaria (paragraph 
7), but paragraph 3 of the secret annex mentioned that in case of the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire the establishment of a greater Slavic 
state should be avoided, while Rumelia, Bulgaria and Albania may 
become independent. What is more, Petar Stojanov regards the 
Reichstadt agreement in 1876 as a delimitation of spheres of influence 
between the two Powers:34 Serbia, Macedonia with Thessaloniki was 
incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian zone, Bulgaria and Thrace into 
the Russian. That’s why Andrássy counted on the independence of 
Macedonia and was astonished of the borders delimited in San Stefano. 
Gorchakov even agreed in the secret annex that Russia refrained from 
initiating military operations in Macedonia in case of an Ottoman-
Russian war (and he kept this promise).  
These agreements were quite similar to the plans outlined by 
Catherine the Great and Joseph II in 1772 or to the plan of the 
Frenchman Volney in 1780. The expansion of the Austro-Hungarian 
sphere of influence over Macedonia recur not only in Beck’s concept (in 
1897), but in 1895 and 1896 in the plans of Hohenlohe and Calice 
(ambassador to Constantinople) (figure 1). Unfortunately from Russian 
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point of view, these agreements did not exclude the possibility of an 
English-Austrian cooperation, and Austria-Hungary did not promise to 
support Russia in case of an English intervention. The latter seemed to 
be probable, if the Russians reached the Straits. And with a mutilated 
zone of influence Russia’s positions would be jeopardized, especially 
compared to the improvement of the Habsburg positions. Therefore it 
was evident that the creation of Greater Bulgaria had to be given a 
chance, since the agreements did not mention sanctions against 
Russians, if they tried to penetrate into the Austrian zone. In that case 
Austria would be forced to cooperate with England, and as their 
interests only partly coincided, the Russian foreign policy would still 
have a chance to reach a separate agreement with the English, thus 
leaving Austria alone. It seems that the Russian policy was very 
precarious and shrewd. But Andrássy’s skills were eminent as we will 
see later, and he managed to achieve the support of both London and 
Berlin – although their interests coincided only in one point: not to 
allow any state to obtain exclusive power over the Balkans. 
 





The situation was even complicated further by the pretensions of 
small states contradictong to Power interests. Serbs had already signed 
an agreement in 1868 with the Greeks, in which they claimed 
Macedonia north of Ohrid-Gornja Džumaja (Blagoevgrad) line. They 
wanted to realize their plans in 1876, when they declared war on Turkey 
under the aegis of an independence war. At first sight, this was not 
against the ideas laid down in the Reichstadt agreement, as Serbia was 
more or less friendly towards Austria-Hungary at that time. But such a 
territorial aggrandisement warned Andrássy, who was afraid of 
creating a large Slavic state. 35 The Russians also neglected the Serbian 
demands. Miloslav Protić demanded Saloniki, Katardžiev wanted Vidin 
and River Drin as borders. The proposed plan of Greater Serbia even 
included Lompalanka, Sofia and the Struma-line down to the Aegean 
Sea.36 Nonetheless, both Powers disliked this idea since Andrássy 
wanted an autonomous Macedonia, while Ignatiev a Greater Bulgaria. 
*** 
The circumstances worsened further for Austria-Hungary after San 
Stefano. Up to then she had to fight against the meeting of Slavic and 
Russian interests, but since the aspirations seemed to be realized the 
new job was to disrupt the accord between southern Slavs and Russia, 
which meant a much more difficult task compared to the earlier policy 
of prevention. This required new tactical instruments as well.37 In his 
letter to Beust, then ambassador to London, dated from 14 April 1878 
Andrássy pointed out that two aims had to be achieved: (1) the 
elimination of Russian occupation of Bulgaria as soon as possible and (2) the 
dismemberment of Greater Bulgaria. The first goal was reasoned by the fear 
that the prolongation of Russian presence in Bulgaria – no matter how 
great or small the latter is – may create such circumstances within two 
years that the Russian influence would be stabilized in the region and 
Bulgaria would become a Russian vassal state indeed. In that case – 
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continued Andrássy – Romania would be lost for us too, as Russian 
troops have already nested themselves in Romania and Russia would 
do anything to secure the way to Bulgaria. Austria cannot allow the 
establishment of pro-Russian governments along its borders, that may 
not only block her penetration into the peninsula, but such a complete 
encirclement equals with a geopolitical suicide.38 After gaining the 
sympathy of Bulgarian people Russia won’t withdraw its troops after 
two years even if this is based on international agreement. Therefore it 
is Austria-Hungary’s and England’s common vital interest (owing to the 
closeness of the Bulgarian state to the Straits) to achieve the withdrawal 
of Russian troops after concluding peace as soon as possible – argued 
Andrássy when trying to convince the English to cooperate.39 It seemed 
that finally Austrian and English interests at least partly coincided. The 
second goal – dismemberment of Greater Bulgaria – would serve the 
interest of Greeks and Turks as well as of Romanians, and would create 
a ’balance of power’ on the peninsula, that could prevent the evolution 
of further events. In his communication Andrássy veiled the original 
interests of Austria-Hungary, and claimed that the realization of these 
two points were England’s and Powers’ common interest. Therefore in 
his offer to England, he reasoned the mutilation of the newborn 
Bulgaria in order to give Constantinople a solid hinterland. 
But how could these goals be realized? This was a crucial question as 
Count Ignatiev’s mission in Vienna in March 1878 revealed that the 
Russian offer was unacceptable for Andrássy,40 and the southern Slavs 
were ignorant of entering into negotiations about this question. The 
only Power that jealously looked at the Russian advance was England. 
Therefore Andrássy decided to gain the benevolence of the latter. In this 
respect, his idea offered such a safe outcome of events, that later all the 
foreign ministers of Austria-Hungary wanted to secure – unsuccessfully 
– the cooperation of England, any time they wanted to achieve 
something on the Balkans. In his letter Andrássy saw three intruments 
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for the realization of his goals: (1) war, (2) international congress or (3) 
applying several modifications on the Treaty of San Stefano, that would 
make it useless (Versumpfung). A congress was the most approppriate 
instrument to secure the interests of Austria-Hungary and annihilate the 
results of the cooperation of Russia and the southern Slavs, as a 
congress was also in the interest of England, but not of Russia. 
Furthermore, an unsuccessful congress would not exclude war as a 
solution, but declaring a war first would exclude the possibility of a 
congress. 
Beyond external challenges that the arrangement of a congress and 
the winning of England to his ideas meant, Andrássy also had to face 
with the incomprehension of Hungarian and Austrian parties towards 
his policy. Not only the leftist (Independence Party) and rightist 
opposition parties, but even the supporters of the dualistic system, the 
liberals led by Kálmán Tisza did not understand the deeds of the 
foreign minister.41 Count Albert Apponyi, member of the opposition 
even tried to convince the English to change their policy.42 Many of the 
Hungarians wanted a more offensive policy against Russia as a revenge 
for 1849, and they feared that the annexation of Bosnia would merely 
strengthen the Slavic element in the Monarchy. Even Austrian parties 
criticized Andrássy’s activity. The Aulic Party wanted territorial 
aggrandisement to restore the respect towards the empire, military 
circles argued the necessity of the annexation of Bosnia as the hinterland 
of the defenseless Dalmatia. (This party, which was focusing exclusively 
on Germany as a main threat before 1870, quickly became anti-Russian). 
While the contemporary Hungarian public opinion and history-writing 
considered the Budapest agreement as an evidence of Andrássy’s pro-
Russian sentiments (which was a Russophobia indeed), the Bulgarian 
Panayotov in the 1960s’ takes it as the manifestation of the imperialism of 
Austria-Hungary.43 Diószegi claims that the possibility of the occupation 
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of Bosnia appeared only because no other deal could be arranged with 
the Russians, that would exclude the increase of Russian influence.44 
Economic interests were also behind the reasoning of the 
intervention: the high aristocracy and burgeoisie feared that Russian 
goods would substitute Turkish wares after the collapse of Ottoman 
Empire instead of Austrian goods: the industry of Austria-Hungary was 
searching for new markets. The Constitution Party (Verfassungspartei) 
simply saw the Russian ’tsarist despotism’ too dangerous for and 
liberalism (in this sense it is really interesting that Russia adopted really 
liberal constitutions in the Balkans in order to secure her influence). In 
1877 the most popular policy would have been a war against Russia. 
The question is: why did Andrássy try to give a peaceful outcome of the 
events? 
One argument has already been mentioned above – a war excluded 
any other solutions, why other solutions did not exclude a war later. 
Andrássy himself was not always against war. In his writings from the 
emigration (he was condemned to death in absentia for his activity in 
1848) he calculated with a showdown between Russia and Austria-
Hungary. In 1870 only the quick collapse of France saved Austria-
Hungary from a war against Russia. His first deed as a Foreign Minister 
was to invite England into a military alliance against Russia. The 
reasoning is evident: the dualist state was unable to stop Russia alone. 
But England with his “splendid isolation” refused the deal. Neither 
Germany wanted to fight against Russia. That wass the reason why 
Andrássy finally accepted the idea of the alliance of the Three Emperors 
in 1873.  
In 1878 Andrássy was convinced, that England was still not ready to 
fight against Russia contrary to the radicalism of Disraeli, who anyway 
soon became substituted by the anti-Turkish Gladstone in power. Of 
course England was shocked by the fact that Austria-Hungary was 
ready to enter into deal with Russia securing her interests, thus leaving 
England alone. In this sense the Budapest agreement also served the 
idea to draw England’s attention – Andrássy’s goal to achieve England’s 
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cooperation thus became easier. Getting known the results of the 
Austrian-Russian negotiations, Disraeli immediately turned both to 
Austria-Hungary and Russia separately trying to reach a separate 
agreement and to disrupt the accord. Thus Andrássy was thrown with a 
chance to secure his country’s interests from the other side as well. He 
replied to the English note of 20 May 1878 in seven points. In his 
memorandum Andrássy pointed out the prohibition of Russian 
protectorate over any part of the Balkans, the needful withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the right side of the Danube, prohibition of the 
establishment of Russian and Austrian secundogenitures, prohibition of 
the establishment of a great Slavic state, the Russian occupation of 
Constantinople and closing down the Straits. The two governments 
agreed to respect each others’ interests. Andrássy’s goal was to secure 
the interests of Austria-Hungary without weapons and without 
becoming the instrument of the English Balkan policy. He wanted to 
avoid the outbreak of hostilities, and feared that England would make 
Austria declare a war and finally would leave him alone.45 Although 
Andrássy urged a congress, the shrewd Salisbury also negotiated with 
Shuvalov setting up a trap for Austria-Hungary. The danger was real 
and double: a Russian-English separate agreement could satisfy English 
demands without the realization of the Austrian claims, because the 
English and Austrian interests only partly coincided. Furthermore, the 
Russians acquired almost each English demand with the one exception 
of the Bulgarian borders, that’s why England wanted to use Austria-
Hungary as a „battering ram” in this question.46 For the English inquiry 
whether Austria insisted on the mutilation of Bulgaria Andrássy replied 
with a question whether England was ready to create a casus belli from 
the question. Andrássy still hoped for a joint Austrian-English-Turkish 
war against Russia and wanted to avoid the initiation of a war alone, 
isolated. But soon the English and the Russians made a bargain: 
England acquired the Russian territorial aggrandisement in the 
Caucasus in return Russia refrained from the creation of Greater 
Bulgaria. But soon the British recognised that the main problem was 
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that the Russian troops had already been de facto in Bulgaria and could 
not be compelled to abandon the region without pressure. So, England 
definitely needed the support of Austria.  
From moral aspects, the Austrian positions were good (but in foreign 
policy moral does not count too much). The Treaty of San Stefano 
definitely violated the above examined agreements, and finally the 
Russians had to pay a huge price for Ignatiev’s initiative. The outcome 
of the events was that they had to abandon Bulgaria within nine months 
after the revision of the San Stefano Treaty in Berlin, while the duration 
of Austria’s occupation on Bosnia was not limited. Had the Russians 
been more lenient towards the Austrian point of view, they would have 
kept Bulgaria as Austria kept Bosnia, thus they would have acquired a 
stable base for their future political operations. In this respect the 
diplomatic efforts of Andrássy gave 35 more years for the dualistic 
structure, as it postponed the unification of southern Slavs, and limited 
the Russian influence over the peninsula. 
Austria could also count on Germany’s support, although it was not 
driven by unselfish motives. The German foreign policy also underwent 
significant changes between 1876–77. Bismarck pointed out in the 
Kissingen-memorandum (1877) that Germany had to mediate between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, but not in order to appease them, rather 
to increase discord. Like in his earlier concept (outlined in the Varzin-
memorandum from 1876), he advised the dismemberment of the 
European parts of the Ottoman Empire again. Had England got Egypt, 
Russia the Black Sea, they would maintain the status quo and would 
enter into such a rivalry that would cause a stalemate, therefore they 
could not afford to cooperate in a coalition against Germany– pointed 
out Bismarck. He wanted to use the Eastern Question as to divert 
attention from Germany and Central Europe and his activity in the 
Berlin Congress to promote the conclusion of an agreement as soon as 
possible, and the promotion of Austrian and English interests should be 
evaluated in this way.47  
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During the Berlin Congress Andrássy was consequently against the 
autonomy of Eastern Rumelia (as in the case of Bosnia). He thought that 
an autonomy like that of Libanon or Crete would just postpone the 
unification with Bulgaria, thus it would be a prelude to the birth of a 
greater Slavic state.48 Another key element of his program was that the 
organisation of Eastern Rumelia had to be auspiced by an international 
commission and not exclusively by a Russian one. His goal was to give 
an organisational statute as soon as possible, no matter what it cost, 
whether it would be liberal or serving the interest of Ottoman Turkey, 
whether the local population would be satisfied with that or not. The 
reason of this hurry was that Andrássy wished the retreat of Russian 
troops before they stabilize their positions in the region. In this respect 
an opposition between Benjámin Kállay, Austrian delegate in Eastern 
Rumelia former ambassador to Belgrade, and Andrássy was about to 
develop. Kállay wanted a constitution, that served the satisfaction of 
local people and the English ally as well, because he thought that the 
only way to hinder the recurrence of Russian influence was a deal that 
satisfied both local inhabitants and the English (in a hope of a long-term 
cooperation with the latter). England also wanted a more liberal 
organisation, because she thought that it could prevent both Ottoman 
abuses and unification tendencies towards Bulgaria. But Andrássy 
thought this was a waste of time, and his cooperation with England was 
limited regarding its duration – until the presence of Russian influence 
on the peninsula made it useful – as he did not want to substitute an old 
rival with a new one. Andrássy indeed wished the restoration of the 
rigths of the Sultan in order to hinder unification. Unfortunately, there 
was a contradiction not only between the concept of Russians, English 
and Austria-Hungary, but also Andrássy’s two principles – the 
restoration of Ottoman power in Eastern Rumelia, and quick decision in 
all questions in order to limit Russian presence – were contradictory. If 
Andrássy wanted to achieve result quickly, he should have given 
significant concessions to the Russians, who were trying to emphasize 
the Bulgarian character of the province in the organic statutes, and were 
                                                          
48   HHStA, Wien. PA VIII. England. Fasc. 170. April 29, 1878. Andrássy to Beust. 
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against the consolidation of the Ottoman power. This meant that the 





                                                          












This study50 analyzes the diplomatic affairs on the Balkan Peninsula 
from geopolitical aspects between 1878–1913 focusing on their strategic 
and economic importance. Within this 35 years political alliances 
changed many times, but the situation always remained 
unconsolidated. This instability is worth further examination. Applying 
Mackinder’s and Spykman’s theory to a smaller territory,51 the two 
representatives of the Heartland, Russia and Austria-Hungary were 
competing with each other and later with the small states either to 
secure their predominance or their economic interests by reaching the 
Rimland. From this aspect the Balkan peninsula can be regarded as a 
collision (or buffer) zone between Heartland and Rimland. Both Powers 
tried to create barriers to the opponents and buffers zones for 
themselves for safety reasons. This often meant that the spheres of 
influence overlapped complicating the situation further. Sometimes the 
aspirations of small states coincided with the pretensions of Powers 
resulting in short-term cooperations, but this multi-player situation 
finally ended in creating almost every possible combinations (see figure 
5). As the aspirations of small states were also overlapping, and they 
also had their very own geopolitical goals not always coinciding with 
the Powers’ concepts, this did not promote the stabilization of situation.  
This overlap of zones is indicated by the competition for key points 
of the peninsula. Among the major hot-spots (collision zones) was the 
line between the Otranto Strait (Vlora), Saloniki and the Dardanelles, 
                                                          
50  Originally published in: Demeter, G.: Geopolitical Aspects of Alliance Politics of Powers in the 
Balkans 1878–1913. Mezhdunarodna politika 9, No. 1–2, 2013. 187–212. 
51   Mackinder, H. J.: The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal 23, 1904. 421–37. 
Available online as Mackinder, H.J.: The Geographical Pivot of History. In: Democratic Ideals 
and Reality, Washington DC, 1996, 175–94. Spykman, N.: The Geography of the Peace, New 




corresponding to the ancient Via Egnatia (figure 1).52 (Other conflict 
zones, like Dobruja were of local importance lacking the pretensions of 
any Power). The maritime states of the Rimland: England, Italy, Greece 
and Turkey holding these positions (enabling them to control the main 
trading routes of the Mediterranean) tried to prevent the two 
landlocked powers of the Heartland from changing irreversibly the 
current situation. Beside the rivalry among these maritime states, the 
interference of Rimland Powers into Balkan affairs further complicated 
the situation.  
Ther buffer states of the Balkans had many geopolitical advantages 
and disadvantages that could either promote or hinder the presence of 
Powers on the peninsula. These features are enumerated on figure 1. The 
pretensions of Powers can be best described and were limited by the 
geographical conditions, like main natural routes of trade and transport. 
For example Austria-Hungary had two ’natural’ ways to reach the 
Rimland. One led along the seashore passing the Strait of Otranto,53 and 
the other ran along the Morava-Vardar rivers to Saloniki. The first 
version needed the creation of Albania (from 1913), the second needed 
balanced and harmonised relations with Serbia (1878–1903). Two 
artificial routes were added to these owing to the changes of diplomatic 
situation, but these often included geographical barriers: one was the 
stripe of Novi Pazar up to 1908,54 the other was through a Romanian-
Bulgarian alliance to Kavala (1913),55 both lacking railway connections. 
By the time the railway in the Vardar had been constructed, Austria lost 
the benevolence of Serbia, and Novi Pazar was given back to Turkey in 
                                                          
52  Controlling Via Egnatia was another reason for Greek aspirations beyond the orthodox 
religion of inhabitants in Southern Albania, Ohrid, Bitola. 
53   HHStA PA I. Kt. 493. Balkankonflagration, Liasse XLV/4. Nr. 14. fol. 152–163. Politische und 
wirtschalftliche Erwägungen zur Balkankrise. Handelspolitisches Aktionsprogram; and  
HHStA PA I. 493. Balkankonflagration, Liasse XLV/4. fol. 182–188. Übersicht der bei den 
Verhandlungen mit Serbien und Montenegro vom Standpunkte der politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Interessen. 
54   For the Novi Pazar project see: May, A. J.: The Novibazar Railway Project. Journal of Modern 
History 10, 1938/4. 496–527. 
55  See the plan of Teodor Teodorov, Minister of Finance, preparing Bulgaria for a war to 
acquire an outlet to the Aegean Sea in 1911–12: Hermenegild, W.: With the victorious 
Bulgarians. London, 1913. 25–26. and 95–96. 
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order to promote the realization of the seashore project. The fourth 
version was hindered by the Bulgarian-Romanian dispute over 
territorial compensations in 1913. 
 
Figure 1. The aspirations of Powers, major collision zones and hot-spots on the peninsula. 
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Only those zones are marked where the interests of Heartland and Rimland Powers and local states 
collided. The Balkan between River Danube and Via Egnatia is considered a multi-player buffer zone 
between maritime and landlocked Powers. Geographical advantages and disadvantages are also 
indicated for each buffer state. 
 
This geopolitical concept, including the Austrian ’Drang nach 
Salonika’ or the Russian and German ’Drang nach warmen Meeren’ has 
been contested by many authors. Their main argument was that 
Heartland Powers lacked efficient capital to benefit from such outcomes 
of the events. It may be true, as when Serbia acquired the desired outlet 
to the Adriatic, it failed to construct a railway line that connects the 
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shore with the central areas.56 But on the other hand Serbia also used 
economic argumentation (economic independence from Austria-
Hungary, accession to western markets) to reach its aim, and the outlet 
to the sea was considered a main political goal even if capital was 
missing. (Serbs even manipulated ethnic statistics and maps to 
underline their standpoint). Political geographers of that era (prior to 
World War I) usually advertised the idea of political expansion 
reasoned by the economic needs of the future.57  
Another argument against expansionism fuelled by economic needs 
was that many ideas of different cliques were competing each other, 
and the realization of these plans in foreign policy was influenced by 
the position fight in internal policy. Due to this rivalry the consequent 
realisation of foreign political ideas were often hindered, making 
foreign policy sometimes unpredictable for contemplators. This 
enhanced distrust.  
Beside economic reasons two more theories can be mentioned that 
determined the behavior of the two Heartland Powers: (1) the 
externalization of internal problems. This may enhance cohesion, but 
could ruin as well (i.e. in a war, see both Austria-Hungary and Russia). 
The second reason is the mutual threat or distrust, that forced both 
Russia and Austria-Hungary to response with a counterstep to every 
step of the other Power.58 These are the main factors that determined the 
the overall picture: the routes, railroads created up to 1913 in the 
Balkans rather show the geopolitical concept of the Powers and not of 
the small states’. A comparison of the two maps (figure 1 and 2) clearly 
reveals the similarities. Therefore we appreciate the views of those, who 
consider economic factors as key driving forces in the competition over 
the Balkan Peninsula.59 
 
 
                                                          
56   For this, see maps in: Bíró, L.: A jugoszláv állam 1918–1939. Budapest, 2010. 
57   See the Mitteleuropa Plan of Naumann, Fr.: Mitteleuropa. Berlin, 1915. 
58  This concept appears in Demeter, G.: The aspirations of Small States and the interests of Powers 
during the Balkan Wars 1912–1913. Budapest, 2007 (in Hungarian). 
59  Löding, D.: Deutschlands und Österreich–Ungarns Balkanpolitik von 1912–14. unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung Ihrer Wirtschaftsinteresse. Hamburg, 1969. (Phil. Diss.) 
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The penetration of the two Heartland Powers had many natural ways which were exploited by 
railways resulting in an overlapping comb-shaped interference zone with capital cities in major nodes. 
The existence of the intersections and routes important for both Powers also explain the oscillating 
foreign policy of small states. 
 
From the point of view of Austria-Hungary these 35 years ended 
with failure. While between 1878–1903 Austria-Hungary was 
surrounded by friendly buffer states along its southern borders, acting 
as a barrier for the Russian influence and blocking the way to the Straits, 
by 1913, this buffer zone had drifted southwards forming an 
uncontinuous zone disrupted by the Serb advance towards Macedonia 
(figure 3). Nonetheless, Serbia still could be checked by the recently 
created Albania through hindering its outlet to the sea, and Bulgaria 
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was able to counterweight both Serbia and Romania. After 1913 a 
smaller Bulgaria with dreams unrealised, which made her hostile 
towards a Serb-Russian cooperation, was much more useful for Austria 
than a strong Greater Bulgaria, that did not need Austrian help and 
could turn towards Russia whenever it wanted to.60  
 
Figure 3. The worsening of the geopolitical situation of Austria-Hungary till 1913: friendly 
buffer zone located along its border drifted southwards, neighboring countries became 






But the situation was not so favourable as it seemed at first sight. 
First, the Greek-Serbian cooperation was a serious blow to the interests 
of the Dual State, as it created a leakage in the buffer zone (through the 
Serb-Greek agreement on the free usage of Saloniki). No wonder that 
Germany wanted to convince Greece so much to join the Triple 
Alliance, since Greece’s geopolitical significance remarkably increased 
                                                          
60  Österrech-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. 
Diplomatische Aktenstücke des österreichisch-ungarischen Ministeriums des Äußern. 
Ausgewählt von Ludwig Bittner, Alfred Francis Pribram, Heinrich Srbik und Hans 
Übersberger. Wien-Leipzig, 1930. (Ö-U.A.) VI. Nr. 7133. See also Löding, D.: Deutschlands und 
Österreich–Ungarns Balkanpolitik… 83. 
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after 1913. Second, although the buffer zone was still able to hinder 
Russian penetration into the peninsula towards the Straits, but was 
unable to secure the borders of Austria-Hungary any more: using Serbia 
and Romania, the former Austrian allies, Russia could also check the 
Austro-Hungarian activity in the peninsula whenever it wanted. On the 
following pages the short history of these alliance combinations 
resulting the above mentioned situation are analyzed focusing on 
geopolitical and economic considerations. 
 
*** 
The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 implicitely divided the Balkans into spheres 
of influence between Austria-Hungary and Russia, both representing 
the Heartland, while the Rimland (England and France) was 
compensated in the Mediterranean (Cyprus, Egypt). As Russia was 
unable to defend Serbia from the defeat in 1876–77 (due to the 
reluctance of Austrian diplomacy), Bulgaria began to substitute Serbia 
as Russia’s ally, while Serbia, that reached its territorial aggrandisement 
with the aid of Count Andrássy in Berlin (Niš, Pirot) was attached 
politically and economically to the sphere of interest of Austria. Serbia 
had to construct railways serving Austrian interests at her own costs 
(the state was resourceless, therefore needed loans, and became 
indebted, later economically totally subjected to the Austrian trade 
policy). In 1881 Austria promised not to oppose to the aggrandisement 
of Serbia towards the Vardar valley, to compensate the state loosing its 
economic indepencence (and this movement towards the Vardar could 
also serve Austrian economic interests).61 The Romanians, who were 
promoting Russian interests when declaring war on the Ottoman 
Empire remained unsatisfied with the territorial enlargement, and 
turned towards Austria, thus blocking Russia’s way to Bulgaria and to 
the Straits. In this respect Romania had a crucial role before 1914. 1878 
                                                          
61  See: Palotás, E.: Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia balkáni politikája a berlini kongresszus után 1878–
1881. Budapest, 1982. and Palotás, E.: A Balkán-kérdés az osztrák-magyar és az orosz 
diplomáciában a XIX. század végén (1895–1897). Budapest, 1972; Wertheimer, E.: 
Békekongresszusok és békeszerződések a XIX. és XX. században. Budapest, 1918; Balkanski 
ugovorni odnosi 1876–1996. Tom. I. Priredio: Momir Stojković. Beograd, 1998. 
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was a decisive geopolitical victory of Austria-Hungary especially 
compared to 1856. (The deepest point was the unification of the 
Romanian principalities and the coronation of Cuza in 1866 in the year 
of the Austrian defeat at Sadowa-Königgraetz. It is worth mentioning 
that European power policy usually influenced the situation in the 
Balkans).  
The small states along the southern borders of Austria-Hungary 
became friendly satellite states compared to the previous years when 
they were under Russian influence. Andrássy even hoped for acquiring 
Macedonia. His political goals became the etalon of Austro-Hungarian 
foreign policy for thirty years, up to 1908/1912. Andrássy’s main goal 
was to avoid the creation of a greater Slavic state (whether it be Serbia 
or Bulgaria) as these may easily turn towards Russia, while at the same 
time they could block the routes to the sea.62 Enhancing rivalry between 
Serbia and Bulgaria over Macedonia seemed to be a good instrument (it 
re-appeared in 1913). Contrary to Kállay, who was originally sent to 
Belgrade (before 1876) to offer Bosnia to Serbia, Andrássy was of the 
opinion that the incompetence of Ottomans and the agitation of 
Russians against Turkey made it necessary to occupy Bosnia.63 But it 
was not the original goal, therefore he hesitated as the maintenance of 
Turkey, thus the status quo was another priority.64 The second goal – 
keeping Serbia off the Adriatic – came from the first – avoiding the 
aggrandisement of Serbia. A Serbian outlet to the sea was hindered not 
only because it would have created an economically viable state, but 
rather because it could have hindered the direct outlet to Saloniki via 
Macedonia and it could have hindered Austria-Hungary to reach the 
Strait of Otranto through the Albanian seashore. Andrássy urged for an 
alliance with England, but what was evident in 1878, happened never 
again. 
                                                          
62 Diószegi, I.: Ausztria-Magyarország és Bulgária a San Stefanó-i béke után (1878–1879).  
Értekezések a történeti tudományok köréből. Új sorozat. 23. Budapest, 1961. 
63   As Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia was recompensated by Niš.  
64  Diószegi, I.: Ausztria-Magyarország és Bulgária… and Diószegi, I.: Klasszikus diplomácia, modern 
hatalmi politika. Budapest, 1967. 
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The situation on the Balkans remained fragile and alliances were 
unstable (figure 5) contrary to Austrian hopes. First the pendulum swing 
to favour Austria-Hungary, when Russian-Bulgarian tensions started to 
grow. After the unification of the two Bulgarian principalities (1885), 
Russians committed serious diplomatic mistakes, that pushed the small 
states into the hands of Austria-Hungary. Serbia, being a natural ally of 
the Habsburg Monarchy that time was saved from humiliation in the 
Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885 by Austro-Hungarian intervention, 
therefore its relations with the Dual State were tighter than ever. The 
Russian revenge policy against Bulgaria after the invitation of 
Ferdinand to the Bulgarian throne and the rise of Stambolov, who 
pursuited a peaceful and moderate policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 
created a barrier for Russian aspirations and divided the peninsula into 
two parts along the Budapest-Belgrade-Sofia-Istanbul axis (figure 2). 
This time Romania was also attached to this conglomerate through the 
Triple Alliance. Nonetheless, this cooperation was not a stable alliance 
system, as it was composed of separate bilateral agreements serving the 
interests of Austria-Hungary, linking the satellite states to the dual state. 
The relation between Serbia and Bulgaria or between Serbia and Turkey 
was not the best, therefore this cooperation lacked real cohesive force on 
the long run. The assassination of the Russian Tsar, Alexander, then the 
visit of Emperor Wilhelm in the Ottoman Empire, marked a high-tide in 
the influence of the Triple Alliance. The idea of the Bagdadbahn has 
come up under these circumstances. Even the Italian Prime Minister 
recognised the favourable situation of the Triplice: in 1889 Crispi 
advised Kálnoky to promote a Romanian-Serbian-Bulgarian military 
alliance against Russia, but this was refused, as Austria wanted to 
maintain the status quo, and divert Russia from the peninsula, not to 
strengthen small states. 
After the fall of Stambolov, the Bulgarian political elite was ready to 
appease with Russia. Although the Goluchowski-Muraviev pact (1897) 
brought relief in the sharpening Austrian-Russian diplomatic relations, 
that were deteriorating since 1878 and 1885, the year 1897 also created 
unrest due to the question of Crete and the Greek-Turkish war. The 
small states also wanted to benefit from the weakening of Turkey 
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through the utilization of the Russian support, therefore an agreement 
between Serbia and Bulgaria, and another between Bulgaria and Greece 
was articulated. This alliance was partly directed to block Austro-
Hungarian influence in the peninsula, partly to exert pressure on 
Ottoman Turkey, partly to improve the positions of the small states in 
Macedonia. But the intervention was hindered, because Russia did not 
support an armed conflict, and because Turkey was able to give 
compensations in return of their neutrality (Serbia was allowed to 
establish new bishoprics in order to weaken Bulgaria’s influence). 
Serbia’s links with Austria-Hungary were still strong, and for the latter 
the status quo and the maintenance of Turkey was of vital importance. 
Serbia was also worrying that in a war against Turkey, Austria-
Hungary might occupy Macedonia (through the Sanjak of Novi Pazar), 
and thus Serbia would become surrounded completely. Bulgaria did not 
want a war with Austria-Hungary, therefore the alliance of 1897 
collapsed – Greece lost the war alone.  
The Serbian fears were not without any reasons: the so-called 
Hohenlohe-plan on the dismemberment of Turkey (1895) also contained 
the possible Austrian incorporation of Macedonia. The secret plan of 
Calice (ambassador to Istanbul) from 1896 was more sophisticated:65 it 
created an Austrian zone of influence from Macedonia, Albania and 
Serbia, while Bulgaria together with Thrace was considered Russian. 
This plan on the encirclement of Serbia by an united Albanian-
Macedonian buffer state, which would secure economic outlet to 
Saloniki and to Otranto for the Dual State was repeated by Beck, chief-
of-staff, in 1897.66 But the cautiousness of Austro-Hungarian decision-
makers hindered the realisation of the plan (figure 4). Not to mention the 
disapproval of Goluchowski, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
supported the creation of a Greater Bulgaria, targeting the unification of 
                                                          
65  Palotás, E.: A Balkán-kérdés… See also: Walters, E.: Unpublished documents. Austrian–Russian 
Relations under Gołuchowski 1895–1906. I. The Slavonic and East European Review 31. No. 76, 
1952. 212–32. and Walters, E.: Unpublished documents. Austrian–Russian Relations under 
Gołuchowski 1895–1906. II. The Slavonic and East European Review 31. No. 77, 1953. 503–28. 
66  Demeter, G.: A Balkán felosztására vonatkozó elképzelések a XIX. század második felétől 1913-ig. In: 
Árvay, V.–Bodnár, E.–Demeter, G. (eds.): A Balkán és a keleti kérdés a nagyhatalmi 
politikában. Budapest, 2005. 111–44. 
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Sofia with Central-Macedonia.67 This means that the “Drang nach 
Salonika” was a possibility (a desirable one), but not a necessity for 
Austria-Hungary, as this was supposed by the entente (side by side 
with the German “Drang nach Osten”). While Aehrenthal (Foreign 
Minister from 1906) wanted to reach the Aegean Sea, his predecessor, 
Goluchowski rather focused on creating a viable Albania (which came 
up once again after the death Aehrenthal in 1911).68 The economic goals 
of Austria-Hungary could have been realized by a Greater Serbia 
acquiring Macedonia (but not Bosnia) within Austrian alliance (this was 
a forlorn hope); or could have been secured by the creation of Albania 
(see 1912), or through a Romanian-Bulgarian alliance after a Bulgarian 
victory over Turkey. In that case, as the Bulgarian Minister, Teodor 
Teodorov pointed out later on the eve of the Balkan War (in 1911), a 
railway connection between Romania and Bulgaria through the Danube 
to the port of Kavala could secure Austrian interests, as well as 
Bulgarian goals (see figure 2).  
Austria-Hungary was still able to maintain its buffer zone along the 
southern border, but after the customs war with Romania in the 1890’s, 
the Dual State was unable to restore peaceful relations with the 
neighboring state, although they remained allies within the frame of the 
Triplice. The conservative Romanian politicians remained loyal to 
Austria-Hungary due to their fears of Russia – but when liberals came 
into power the situation changed. The marriage between Elena of 
Montenegro and Victor Emmanuel heir apparent (later III) in 1896 also 
brought closer Italy (Rimland) to the Balkan peninsula. 
One year later, in 1898 the Serbian-Bulgarian debate on Macedonia 
resulted an alienation between the two states. The plans of the Njegoš-
dinasty to acquire the throne of Serbia backed by Russia caused an 
indignation against Montenegro in Serbia. Serbia – being isolated – tried 
to improve its relations with the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the 
                                                          
67  Southern Macedonia with Saloniki was promised to Greece, Southern Dobruja to Romania, 
Kosovo, the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and Skopje to Serbia, Skutari to Montenegro. It was very 
similar to the situation created by the events of 1911–13.  
68  Document cited by Walters, E.: Unpublished documents. Austrian–Russian Relations under 
Gołuchowski 1895–1906. III. The Slavonic and East European Review 32. No. 78, 1953. 188. 
and 208–11. Original: W.S.A. Geheim XXXII. /481.(f) March 2, 1899. 
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year the Russian influence over the peninsula had gained space: 
Romania became disappointed from the policy of Austria-Hungary 
(such as Serbia, but the Obrenović-dynasty insisted on this asymmetric 
alliance as to maintain its power) (figure 5). Bulgaria was an ally of 
Greece between 1895–1901, and the Montenegrin-Bulgarian alliance of 
1898 created an anti-Serb League. 
Russia tried to gain more space, therefore a military convention was 
signed between Bulgaria and Russia in 1902. Bulgaria wanted to secure 
its back from a Romanian attack in case of an eventual war with Turkey, 
while Russia wanted an ally that could check Romania and support 
Russia in case of a war with Austria. (Romania had territorial 
aspirations towards Bessarabia, and remained officially the ally of the 
Triple Alliance).  
But the power of the Triple Alliance had overwhelmingly increased 
once again by 1901: the so-called ’Abbasian Entente’ unified Greece, 
Romania (led by the conservative Sturdza, while the liberals of Bratianu 
were against Austria-Hungary) and Turkey in an alliance with Austria-
Hungary. That was the second peak of Austrian influence. Serbia 
remained more or less neutral up to 1903, Russia could only count on 
Bulgaria on the peninsula. 
But the year of 1903 brought significant changes. The removal of the 
Obrenović-dynasty resulted in an anti-Austrian turn in Serbia bringing 
soon the radicals of Pašić into power, while the Ilinden revolt in 
Macedonia devaluated the Austro-Hungarian alliance with Ottoman 
Turkey. The Mürzsteg convention (1903) meant a consolidation between 
Russia and Austria-Hungary and initiated a forceless reform movement 
in Turkey. Serbia soon (in 1904) signed a treaty with Bulgaria, which 
repeated the clausules of the treaty of 1897. The treaty was targeted 
against the Ottoman rule in Macedonia. This was mainly the interest of 
Bulgaria, while Serbia thought it was better to take part in the 
dismemberment of Macedonia than to skip – and proposed a customs 
union among the two states to get rid of the Austrian tutelage. Serbian 
dreams regarding Bosnia also witnessed a revival. This political and 
economic turn of Serbia alerted Austria-Hungary. As Russia was 
waging war against the Japanese in the Far East and was seriously 
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defeated in 1904–05, and therefore small states could not count on 
Russian support, Austria-Hungary managed to crush the Serbian-
Bulgarian customs union, by threatening the Serbs with excluding 
Serbian livestock from the Austrian markets. By 1905 not only the 
Abbazian entente, but the Russian-Bulgarian-Serbian triangle had also 
been annihilated. But Serbia never returned to follow the political and 
economic interests of Austria-Hungary. One of the buffer states 
changed side. 
Another alerting event was the intervention of other Powers in 
Macedonia. Due to the growing rivalry among Russia and Austria-
Hungary and the incompetence of Turkey to tackle with the 
Macedonian question all the Powers became involved in the reform 
movement. This excited diplomats of Austria-Hungary, though not 
because they did not wish to solve the humanitarian problem in 
Macedonia, but because they considered the Balkans as their own 
sphere of influence. For one thing Austria-Hungary greeted the 
escalation of intervention: England was also among the intervening 
Powers, and since the era of Andrássy all politicians thought that those 
measures, that were carried out by the approval of England could not 
be challenged by any of the Powers later (including Russia). An Austro-
Hungarian–English cooperation should be enough to deter Russia from 
active Balkan policy. The Russian-Japanese War, and the Mürzsteg 
convention still made it possible for Austria-Hungary to pursuit an 
active foreign policy even despite the loss of political control over Serbia 
after the assassination of the king in 1903.  
Two reasons forced Austria-Hungary to change its relatively 
peaceful policy after 1906. First, the behaviour of Serbia and Romania 
became more and more hostile towards Austria. None of the Powers 
could allow hostile buffer states along its border, it would be a 
geopolitical nonsense. Up to 1903 the southern borders of Austria-
Hungary were protected by friendly states. By 1913 this buffer zone had 
drifted southwards, composed of Bulgaria and the recently created 
Albania. But this Albanian-Bulgarian-Turkish bloc was isolated: the 
Romanian-Serbian-Greek block cut it through by reaching the sea. 
Nonetheless, this bloc was still able to hinder Russian penetration deep 
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into the peninsula towards the Straits, but Russia could also check 
Austro-Hungarian activity in the peninsula. The situation was even 
worse than in the proposal of Beck depicting an East-West division of 
the peninsula, and was even worse than Goluchowski ever imagined, 
when he wanted to give Skopje to Serbia. 
Realizing the geopolitical threat, Austria wanted to turn back time, 
and blackmailed Serbia, so that Austria would not import Serbian 
products unless Serbia returned to the old fashion. Serbia quit the 
customs union with Bulgaria, but refused to buy Austrian war material 
as demanded by Austria-Hungary. This was the beginning of the so-
called ’pig war’ in 1906. That time 80% of the Serbian exports were 
consumed in Austria-Hungary, therefore a boycott could have been a 
serious blow on Serbian incomes. But Serbia was able to find new 
economic partners – even the Germans raised their consumption of 
Serbian products – and French, Belgians also appeared at the markets of 
the Balkan peninsula. The Austrian concept failed: Serbia became 
independent not only politically, but economically as well, and the 
Austrian step attracted new Powers into the Peninsula, which was a 
nightmare came true. From that time on the Serbs insisted on reaching 
the sea, which was considered as the ’sine qua non’ of economic 
independence. 
The second reason was the failure of the international gendarmerie 
in maintaining peace and reorganising Christian provinces. It only 
resulted the involvement of all powers in the Macedonian calamities, 
which Austria-Hungary wanted to avoid so much. The Young Turk 
revolution finally alerted Austria-Hungary: frustrated by the violation 
of its economic interest, it tried to settle the question and improve its 
economic and geopolitical positions through the construction of railway 
lines. After the inner political turn in Serbia, Austria had no hope for 
using the Belgrade-Saloniki line, thus had to come up with another 
plan. This plan proposed a railway line along the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, 
and the construction of this railroad necessitated the annexation of 
Bosnia. Neither the Powers nor the Balkan states welcomed these 
railway projects. Not only Russia, but Italy was also opposed to Austria-
Hungary in this question, as the railway constructions offered Austria a 
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way to bypass the Otranto Strait. Since the Sanjak of Novi Pazar or 
Kosovo was located in a collision zone of Serbian (Russian) and 
Austrian interests, Austria-Hungary initiated a third plan to avoid these 
territories: a railway along the seashore, from Dalmatia to Albania. But 
this required an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the 
creation of Albania. Beyond counterbalancing the loss of Serbia, this 
was the main reason of supporting the creation of the Albanian nation. 
While the creation of a multi-religious Albania was successful, the other 
attempt – to create the Bosnian nation regardless of religious differences 
in order to hinder the unification of the Serbian provinces – ended with 
a failure. Without going deeper into the question, why the result was 
different, when the circumstances were nearly the same (one language, 
three different religions), I would emphasize the fact that in case of 
Bosnia entities outside the province borders with well-developed 
historical traditions and statehood also did exist, and could exert 
influence on the inhabitants of Bosnia. In the case of Albanian provinces 
no such circumstances prevailed. 
The Sanjak railway project initiated a counterplan:69 the Danube-
Adriatic railroad through Romania and Serbia. This could improve the 
positions of Russia and Serbia, offering an economic outlet to the sea. 
Italy accepted this plan, because it was afraid of the economic 
dominance of Austria-Hungary, worsening Italy’s positions. This 
concept would mutilate Albania and created a collision zone in Novi 
Pazar or in Kosovo, where the proposed tracks were crossing each 
other. Austria-Hungary recognised that either the Sanjak-railway 
project, or the seashore project was to be realized, a safe hinterland was 
needed, that was de iure the part of Austria-Hungary (not only a de facto 
property). This brought up the idea of the annexation of Bosnia (and 
later the compensation of Italy by Tripoli). The activity of the Young 
Turks urged Austria-Hungary to step forth as it feared the 
strengthening of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore a rapprochement 
between Bulgaria and Hungary began, as both states wanted to benefit 
from the internal changes of the Empire. Austria needed somebody to 
                                                          
69 See: Carlgren, W. M.: Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise. Uppsala, 1955. 
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cover its back against Serbia supported by Russia, Bulgaria needed a 
Power that immediately recognised its declaration of independence. 
Renouncing from the Sanjak of Novi Pazar was then not surprising, 
first, as it could separate Montenegro and Serbia in the future even if 
given back to Turkey, secondly, the seashore railway project made its 
possession unnecessary. Serbia and Russia on the one side, Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria on the other – this could have been a stalemate, 
but the activity of Turkey and Italy made the situation more 
complicated. Iswolsky, being disillusioned by the behavior of Austria-
Hungary, that refrained from supporting Russia in the Straits Question, 
from that moment on tried to create an anti-Austrian alliance on the 
Balkans. 
The calamities between 1906–09 resulted in the following outcome. A 
Serbian-Turkish and Serbian-Russian bloc was formed (while the 
relations between Turkey and Russia remained cold), supported by 
Italy. Romania was hesitating, for a short period Bulgaria supported 
Austria-Hungary against Turkey, but when the former refused to 
promise Macedonian territories, Bulgaria was easily alienated and in 
1910 turned again towards Russia initiating negotiations regarding the 
renewal of the old military alliance against Romania. Russia hoped for 
Bulgarian support if Russia was attacked by either Austria-Hungary or 
Romania, but Bulgaria could not count on Russian support in case of a 
war against Turkey, only if two opponents declared war against 
Bulgaria. While these fruitless negotiations were going on, Romania 
drifted towards Turkey encouraged by Austria-Hungary. The 
Bulgarian-Russian negotiation created once again an appeasement 
between Austria-Hungary and Romania. 
Finally a Balkan League composed of bilateral agreements between 
Serbia and Bulgaria, Greece and Bulgaria, Montenegro and Bulgaria 
was created in 1912. For Russia it served an instrument to prevent 
Austro-Hungarian penetration into the peninsula, for Serbia it provided 
security in case of an Austrian attack through the Bulgarian military 
obligations, for Bulgaria it was an instrument, that finally recognised its 
demands on Macedonia and supported her war against Turkey. When 
Italy (also a member of the Triple Alliance) attacked Tripoli in 1911, to 
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compensate Habsburg aggrandisement after the annexation of Bosnia, 
Austria had to remain silent. Small states also grabbed this opportunity 
(the unpunished violation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire) and 
attacked Turkey, for which they had been preparing for years by 
increasing their budget, initiating military reforms, acquiring foreign 
loans, etc.  
The security that Austria enjoyed after 1878 had slowly vanished by 
1908. Either a new policy on the Balkans had to be formulated – 
abandoning the principles of Andrássy and formally accepting the 
principle of nationality –, or new methods had to be chosen to secure 
Andrássy’s goals. And this was the dilemma for the diplomats in 1912. 
At first Austria-Hungary was expecting the victory of Ottoman 
weapons, not only because the Hungarian public opinion influenced by 
the press was pro-Turkish (or anti-Russian), but also because an 
Ottoman victory would have been more convenient – in this case the 
policy of Austria-Hungary should not have been modified. (Of course, 
the status quo also implied that in case of defeat, Balkan states were not 
allowed to be mutilated or humiliated by Turkey). 
This concept was far away from the policy of desinteressement, urged 
by western powers in favour of Russia (and her allies). Austria-Hungary 
was indeed interested in the outcome of events. Turkey was such a 
stable point in the Austrian diplomacy, that even the plans of Tsar 
Ferinand on creating a viable Albania to keep Serbia off the Adriatic 
were rejected several times prior to 1913 (see the negotiations after the 
1909 Bulgarian declaration of independence in the next chapter),70 
although later the creation of an independent Albanian state became 
inevitable to secure the interest of the Dual State. Bulgaria in turn 
wanted to get Macedonia, and was searching for allies against Turkey at 
that time. But Turkey (better to say: peace) was so important to Austria-
Hungary that it did not accept the plan, however, this triggered a 
Bulgarian-Serbia rapprochement once again after 1904 – which Austria-
Hungary wanted to avoid.  
                                                          
70 Ö-U.A. Bd. I. Nr. 893 and Nr. 895.  
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After the Turkish defeat in the first Balkan War the creation of an 
independent Albanian state became of vital importance – and this 
geopolitical demand of Austria-Hungary (hindering Serbian outlet to 
the Adriatic) could be veiled easily with the term “the Balkans for the 
Balkan peoples” (principle of nationality). Being unable to hold back or 
influence either Bulgaria or Serbia, Austria-Hungary then wanted to 
benefit from the idea of creating nation states. That was the pure reason 
behind the sudden change of her foreign policy (from supporting the 
satus quo to the acceptance of the principle of nationality) – noone 
should think that Austria-Hungary was so generous to accept the 
territorial aggrandisement of Balkan states in 1912 without 
recompensation, or act willingly as the artisan of nationalism. 
But Berchtold, the new Foreign Minister was unable to appease 
Bulgaria and Romania, thus the outlet of Austria-Hungary to the 
Aegean (Kavala) could not be realised, Albania fell into anarchy and 
Germany could not be convinced to support Austrian Balkan-policy. 
This had reduced the peaceful instruments of Austria-Hungary by 1914 
to maintain its influence in the peninsula. 
One may wonder whether it would have been wiser to offer Bosnia 
to Serbia in 1878, and let the Bulgarians realize Greater Bulgaria under 
the aegis of Russia, or not. In this case – though violating one of 
Andrássy’s main principle (the prohibition of establishing a greater 
Slavic state) – the multi-player game on the Balkans could have been 
reduced to less participants, and any of the states could have been 
checkmated by Austria-Hungary supporting the other. It would not 
have resulted in a worse outcome than the events in 1914. If the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman heritage had taken place that way, 
Serbia probably would have been more loyal to Austria-Hungary, but if 
not, Bulgaria still could have been used to regulate it. It seemed quite 
improbable that the Russians managed to get the support of both Slavic 
states at the same time, but if it had happened so, Austria-Hungary 
could have generated jealousy between them (using the Albanian 
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Conspiracy or Coincidence?  The Parallelism Between 
the Annexation Crisis and the Bulgarian Declaration of 
Independence in 1908  
 
 
It is not questionable that the occasion for the declaration of the 
Bulgarian independence arose as a consequence of a series of diplomatic 
conflicts in 1908 – beginning from the failure of the Macedonian reform 
movement under the auspice of Powers through the Austrian-Russian 
dispute on the Sanjak and Danube–Adriatic railways to the Young 
Turk’s revolution and the Reval and Buchlau meetings, and the strike at 
the Oriental Railway Company. But there is still the question, whether 
the Bulgarian declaration of independence was accidental, exploiting 
merely the favourable political conditions – thus can be regarded as a 
parallel action, – or it was a result of thorough planning and 
cooperation. 71 If the latter, then to what extent was it an own initiative 
of the Bulgarian diplomacy and the result of Austrian/Russian 
benevolence?72 
Many historians – like Albertini – were of the opinion that a direct 
agreement existed between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, thus the 
parallelism could not be coincidental: cooperation was suspected 
behind the curtains.73 Contemporary diplomats and statesmen, like the 
French Fallières, or the Serbian Chedomil Mijatovich and Marschall, 
German ambassador to Constantinople were also sharing the same 
                                                          
71  An article with a similar title has recently been published by Peter Mentzel in the East 
European Quarterly, (Vol. 37, 2003), that focuses on the railway strike analysing whether ”it 
could serve as a pretext for Bulgarian independence or was merely a coincident. Bulgarian 
nationalists were in fact convinced that the Ottoman government had engineered the strike in order 
to provide a pretext for meddling in Bulgarian internal affairs. The Ottomans, conversely, believed 
that it was in fact the Bulgarians who had fomented the strike in order to provide a justification for 
their declaration of independence.” Our contribution bearing the same title focuses on the 
development of relations between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria in 1908. 
72  The article was written together with Imre Ress. Conspiracy or coincidence? The parallelism 
between the annexation and the Bulgarian declaration of independence in 1908 – and its aftermath: 
cooperation between 1909–1913. In: Nezavisimostta na Balgariya, 1908 – pogled ot XXI v. 
Sofia, 2010. 162–78. 
73  Albertini, L.: The Origins of the War. London, 1952. 218–19. and Neue Freie Presse, Sept. 23, 1908. 
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opinion expressed also in Russian newspapers (even before the 
annexation took place, on 23 September newspapers wrote about the 
action).74 According to these authors and diplomats, Prince Ferdinand 
would not have risked such a step without bearing the approval and 
even the support of the Dual Monarchy. But the question is more 
complicated. 
Analysing the question of Bulgarian independence in the context of 
Power policy, we used the sources of the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, 
the diaries of István Burián (Minister of Finance, later in 1915 Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) and Lajos Thallóczy (civil governor of the occupied 
Serbia in 1915, then secret counsellor) Hungarian statesmen as well as 
recently published sources from the private archives of King Ferdinand.  
The possibility of the annexation of Bosnia arose seriously first on 13, 
May 1907, when István Burián, that time Minister of Finance and 
governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina in his memorandum advised the 
annexation of the two provinces.75 This idea had already emerged 
several times, but in 1908 the context was quite different from the 
former plans: Burián (former consul in Sofia) visioned a long-term 
cooperation with Bulgaria, in order to weaken Serbian and Romanian 
pretensions. He wanted to ruin (but not incorporate) Serbia, if the state 
decided to oppose Austria-Hungary, by creating a Greater Bulgaria 
with pro-Austrian sentiments.76 His advice was accepted by Franz 
Joseph (17, May) in connection with the annexation.77  
A serious problem of the relations between Austria-Hungary and 
Bulgaria rooted here: Burián (influencing also Aehrenthal, then Minister 
                                                          
74  Mijatovich, Ch.: Memoirs of a Balkan diplomatist. London, 1917. 244. and 248.; Die Grosse Politik 
der Europäischen Kabinette. Bände: XXII-XXXVI. Eds.: Thimme, F.–Lepsius, I.–Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy, A. Berlin, 1927. (G.P.) . XXVI. 87–88; Ö-U.A. Bd. I. Nr. 118. Tel. aus Paris, 
Khevenhüller, 3. Oct., 1908.; Nr. 149. Tel. aus Konstantinopel, 6. Oct. 1908. and Neue Freie 
Presse, Sept. 23, 1908. 
75  Diószegi, I.: A Ballhausplatzi palota utolsó gazdája. In: Hazánk és Európa. Budapest, 1970. 204. 
76   Ibid. 205. 
77 Tömöry, M.: Bosznia-Hercegovina annektálásának történetéből. (Részletek Thallóczy Lajos naplóiból). 
Századok, 1966/4–5. 890; See also Tömöry, M.: Thallóczy Lajos és a Balkán-kérdés. Dissertation. 
Budapest, 1978. For the early period of Thallóczy’s activity see also: Peykovska, P.: Balgariya i 
vanshnata politika na Avstro-Ungariya v dnevnika na d-r Lajos Thalloczy (1887–13. 01. 1909). In: 
Izvestiya na darzhavnite arhivi 103–104, 2012. 367–417.  
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of Foreign Affairs) wanted Bulgaria to be awarded with Serbian 
territories, instead of Macedonian, since Aehrenthal wanted to keep 
Turkey intact after the annexation (if possible). As later in 1913 Burián 
admitted to Count István Tisza, then Prime Minister of Hungary, he 
also wanted to use Greater Bulgaria as a barrier against Romanian 
pretensions on Transylvania. Unlike Tisza or Aehrenthal, who thought 
that Romania, was an ally fearing of Russian penetration, Burián was 
convinced that Romania can be easily diverted against Austria if Russia 
supports the Romanian acquisition of Transylvania.78 Although a 
prominent personalty, Burián was not in power in 1911–13 to promote 
his plans, therefore only elements of them were applied quite 
inconsequently. This resulted many half-measures with long-term 
consequences. 
To trace back the roots of tighter relations between Vienna and Sofia, 
it is useful to take a closer look on the meeting between Prince 
Ferdinand and Aehrenthal on 13 March, 1908. Prince Ferdinand then 
mentioned that he could not count on Russia’s benevolent support in 
his foreign policy. In case of an Ottoman-Bulgarian war79 it is fairly 
probable that Romania and Serbia would exploit the opportunity to 
interfere into the events, and Russia would not hold them back. 
Aehrenthal was asked to exert pressure on Romania, which was 
thought to be eager to seize the Ruse-Shumen-Varna line. As a deal, he 
offered the Dual Monarchy to incorporate Serbia, reversing Burián’s 
concept.80  
Here some remarks must be added. First, the term, ”war” reveals 
that the Bulgarian policy showed strong determination to act, quite 
before the declaration of independence. Second, the Dual Monarchy had 
knowledge on the pretensions of Bulgaria. Third, the Bulgarian request 
for the Romanian neutrality was finally granted in October, 1908. 
Although the Monarchy never promised to hold back Romania, in 1908 
                                                          
78 Diószegi, I.: A Ballhausplatzi palota utolsó gazdája… 205–12. Unfortunately Burián’s plan 
sharpened the Bulgarian-Romanian controversy by promising Southern Dobrudja to 
Romania, if Bulgaria acquired Turkish territories. This concept recurred in 1913. 
79  Whether it is a result of a Bulgarian attack on Macedonia or the result of the declaration of 
independence. 
80   Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 1. March 13–14, 1908. Aufzeichnung von Aehrenthal. 
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the Austrian-Romanian cooperation worked (while it failed in 1913).81 
Fourth, the offer of incorporating or dismembering Serbia was repeated 
several times as a key element of the Bulgarian foreign policy towards 
Austria-Hungary (even in 1913): it would have offered an opportunity 
for Bulgaria to get rid of a rival with the same pretensions on 
Macedonia, but also would have brought closer another one – the 
Habsburg Monarchy. 
Just before the coup d’etat of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
on 6 July, Russia – in order to alienate Bulgaria from Vienna and to 
hinder its interference into the course of events – hinted to Prince 
Ferdinand that a secret agreement was concluded between Ottoman 
Turkey and the Dual Monarchy, in which the Sultan authorized 
Austria-Hungary to occupy some areas in case of unrest, on condition 
that the dual state guarrantees the status quo for three more years. After 
these years elapsed, Austria-Hungary would be the only Great Power to 
auspice the reforms implemented by the Sultan in the mentioned 
territories, and would be given special rights in Kosovo and Monastir 
for her services,82 excluding other Powers from the Macedonian reform 
movement. Evidently, this imposed a threat on the Bulgarian plans. But 
Aehrenthal denied the existence of such an agreement – that could have 
been a revival of the “Drang nach Salonika” – in his private letter to 
Prince Ferdinand.  
This rumour about the Austrian–Ottoman agreement was not the 
only one, which refers to the increasing activity of Russian foreign 
policy: on 5 July – according to Thallóczy’s diary – Forgách, then 
ambassador to Belgrade warned Aehrenthal that the Serbs count on 
acquiring Bosnia with the help of Russia, while in this case Bulgaria gets 
Macedonia. This plan was denied by the official Russia.83 Iswolsky’s 
plans in connection with the Straits had already been known in Vienna 
by the end of 1907.84 Furthermore, in the very first months of 1908 a 
                                                          
81  We should not forget that in 1908 a conservative cabinet ruled, while in 1913 a liberal-
nacionalist one, which also had effect on the behavior. 
82   Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 27. Privatschreiben an den Fürsten Ferdinand. August 5, 1908. 
83   Tömöry, M.: Bosznia-Hercegovina annektálásának történetéből… 892. 
84   Ibid. 
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constitutional crisis developed in Bosnia, prior to the revolution of the 
Young Turks: these events all hastened the decision on the annexation, 
well before the meeting of Buchlau, as Thallóczy’s diary confirms.85 
In order to calm down the feelings Aehrenthal offered concessions to 
the Ottomans: he decided to renounce from the Sanjak of Novipazar, 
because in this case it still could fulfill its geopolitical task, separating 
the two Serb states, while the Monarchy gets rid of this ’apple of 
discord’ and the negative sentiments associated with it (turning the 
hatred of Serbs against Turkey). At the same time the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was also decided.86 These factors led to the 
Semmering Denkschrift, a re-evaluation of Austria-Hungary’s foreign 
policy, in which – beside a tighter cooperation with Bulgaria – the 
annexation of Serbia was also mentioned (as it was offered by Prince 
Ferdinand).87  
These were the circumstances, when the meeting in Buchlau took 
place. When early on 19 August Russia announced that she would not 
oppose the annexation, if Austria-Hungary supported Iswolsky’s 
aspirations to change the status of the Straits, Russia did not mention 
the independence of Bulgaria.88 Later in Buchlau (16 September) 
Austria-Hungary accepted the Russian plans regarding the Straits, and 
that Serbia may extend its boundaries into southern direction, in order 
to satisfy Russian wishes – and to deepen Serbian and Bulgarian 
rivalization for Macedonia. Both Powers agreed that no other 
disturbance of the status quo could be approved. Iswolsky and 
Aehrenthal had the opinion that Turkey should only keep those 
territories, that it de facto possessed, thus as a compensation, and to 
divert the attention from the deal of the two Heartland Powers, the 
autonomous Crete was offered to Greece and the possibility of 
Bulgarian independence together with Eastern Rumelia was also 
                                                          
85   Ibid. 890. 
86  Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 29. Privatschreiben an den österr. Ministerpraesidenten, Freiherrn von Beck. 
August 7, 1908. 
87   Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 32. Semmering-denkschrift. August 9, 1908. 
88  Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 40, Protokoll des zu Wien am 19. Aug. abgehaltenen Ministerrathes... Nr. 75, 
Protokoll des  zu Budapest am 10 Sept. abgehaltenen Ministerrathes...  79. 
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mentioned.89 Putting the annexation and the Straits Question into a 
wider Balkan context, Russia and Austria-Hungary thought that the 
proposed changes would also satisfy England and the other small states. 
Meanwhile in Bulgaria on 24 August, Dobrovich, a trustee of 
Ferdinand, warned the prince to pursuit a precarious, precautious 
policy regarding the independence, but on 29 August Prime Minister A. 
Malinov urged the prince to enhance activity.90 Russia warned Bulgaria 
on 6 September, not to step forth alone, because Russia needed a strong 
Turkey, and advised to let the first step be made by others.91 Ferdinand, 
staying in the Castle of Murány (Coburgs had many estates in Hungary 
because of the family ties with the noble Koháry family) evaluated the 
Russian warning as the unfriendly “old song”, but accepted the advice 
and immediately turned towards Budapest.92 Early on 7 September 
Malinov informed Prince Ferdinand that Budapest supported the idea 
of the Bulgarian independence,93 and soon after the outbreak of the 
Gueshoff-incident (a diplomatic affair regarding the rank of Bulgarian 
diplomats), on 11 September, the Bulgarian Ministers agreed to 
announce Bulgaria’s independence without much hesitatiton.94  
Summing up the events, the Bulgarian leaders even tended to 
declare the independence even before the Gueshoff-affair reached its 
peak, thus the incident was a pretext, an excellent opportunity to exploit 
the situation. In accordance with the arrival of Burián, Beck, (the 
Austrian Prime Minister), and Aehrenthal to Budapest, Prince 
Ferdinand also visited the town on 23 September (which was not 
                                                          
89 Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 79. Aufzeichnung über eine am 16. Sept. 1908,. im Buchlau geführte 
Unterredung... The recognition of the Bulgarian independence first arose in a letter written 
to Bülow on 26 September, after the visit of Prince Ferdinand in Budapest. See: Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 
89. Privatschreiben an Fürsten Bülow. 26 Sept. 1908, Aehrenthal. 
90  Central State Archives, Sofia (CSA). Fond [further F.] 3k, Inventory [further Inv.] 18, archival 
unit  [further a.u.] 25/2. l. 68–70. and a.u. 24/7. l. 9–12. Documents published in Paskova, I.: 
Documents for Bulgarian Independence in the Private Archive of Tsar Ferdinand I. 123–27. Nr. 2, 4. 
Izvestiya na Darzhavnite Arhivi 95–96, 2008. (100 godini ot obyavyavaneto na 
nezavisimostta na Balgariya). 
91   Paskova, I.: Documents for Bulgarian Independence… 131. Nr. 5.  
92   Ibid. 135. Nr. 10.  
93   Ibid. 133. Nr. 6.  
94   Ibid. 139. Nr. 15. 
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accidental), where he was immediately told about the details of the 
Buchlau agreement.95 Tömöry goes further, and – based on Thallóczy’s 
diary – claims that Burián also admitted to Prince Ferdinand that the 
preparations for the annexation had already been arranged.96 However, 
the promises regarding Macedonia towards the Serbian state and the 
proposed date of the annexation were not mentioned, but the necessity 
of the maintainance of Ottoman Turkey within its de facto possessed 
properties was emphasized instead. The representatives of Austria-
Hungary denied any assistance if the Bulgarian declaration of 
independence provoked a war, nor she supported adventures, but 
confessed that ’legitime demands’ would be approved. Since East-
Rumelia was de facto Bulgarian, it meant the opportunity to declare 
Bulgarian independence including Eastern Rumelia.97 
So, Prince Ferdinand did have certain knowledge on Austria-
Hungary’s intentions, and he also knew that the annexation would 
rather stir up the European diplomacy than the Bulgarian declaration of 
indepence – even if it was announced together with Eastern Rumelia. 
He did not tell a word about the timing of his plan to the leaders of 
Austrian diplomacy.  
Those, who deny the tighter cooperation between Bulgaria and 
Austria-Hungary, or just thought that it would be better if Austria acted 
first, quote Thallóczy and Burián, who both were surprised, and they 
evaluated the forthcoming events as „Sofia spits in the soup of Austria”,98 
accusing Ferdinand of exploiting Austria-Hungary’s deteriorating 
situation and declaring the independence prematurely. Their account 
was confirmed by documents of the private archives of Ferdinand: the 
Russians advised Bulgaria that the declaration of independence should 
not precede the annexation of Bosnia and the same was advised by 
                                                          
95  Ö-U.A. I. Nr. 87. Aufzeichnung über dir Unterredungen mit Fürst Ferdinand.... 23–24. Sept. 
1908. 
96   Tömöry, M.: Bosznia-Hercegovina annektálásának történetéből… 894. 
97   The plan of the annexation was so well-known that time, that even the Neue Freie Presse 
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Baron Fejérváry, former Prime Minister of Hungary, the trustee of 
Francis Joseph.99 The problem was not the act, but the timing, since both 
Thallóczy and Burián were aware of the fact that Bulgaria decided to 
declare its independence after the meeting in Budapest.100 
Others claim that for the Dual Monarchy it was important to find 
someone who would act, violating the Treaty of Berlin first – that’s why 
Prince Ferdinand seemed to be a perfect partner within certain limits.  
It is worth examining both possibilities. A strange event seems to 
verify the latter statement. When Khevenhüller, Austrian ambassador to 
Paris informed Fallières in Paris about date of the annexation – 
unfortunately too early, thus ruining the plans of Austria-Hungary –, 
the French president warned him that this step would persuade 
Bulgaria to declare its independence. Khevenhüeller replied: ”No, 
Bulgaria will not follow us. She’ll precede us by one day”.  This account 
confirms Austria-Hungary’s willingness to cooperate.101 Even if Prince 
Ferdinand had not known anything about the proposed timing, the 
French newspapers, spreading the rumour of the annexation, had 
offered him a splendid opportunity to step forth.   
But the question still remains, which was the best solution: (1) 
whether the Bulgarian declaration of independence precedes the 
annexation, or (2) it emerges as a consequence? For Bulgaria, the latter 
would have been more convenient, and Burián had the same opinion. 
Austria-Hungary planned the annexation on the 6th of October, the 
Russians asked it to happen in mid-October. However, the original 
timing became inconvenient for Austria, because the Czech-German 
antagonism and the Slovene-German debate exacerbated the situation 
in Austria early in October. But Burián wrote to Francis Joseph that the 
longer the annexation was postponed, the harder it would be made 
later. Unfortunately, the “premature” Bulgarian step made it impossible 
to postpone the declaration of the annexation. “Ferdinand’s step forced 
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Austria to act immediately” – wrote Thallóczy. As it is written in his diary, 
the Austrian diplomats were excited not only because of the internal 
debates, and not only because of Khevenhüller’s mistake, but also a 
serious debate started between Austrian and Hungarian parts of the 
empire regarding the incorporation of the 2 provinces. Indeed, 
according to Thallóczy, the annexation was ill-prepared on 6 October 
and the date was not favoured by Hungarians.102 Their behaviour 
supports the opinion of those, who – contrary to Khevenhüller’s 
statement – denied that the Bulgarian declaration should have preceded 
the Austrian one. Even if there had been any agreement in the timing, 
due to the problems of Austria-Hungary, 5 October, as the date of the 
declaration of independence became definitely unfavourable for the 
Dual Monarchy. 
A third possibility was emphasized by Cemal Tukin, who was of the 
opinion that Ferdinand considered the meeting in Budapest as an 
encouragement. Certainly, it did not mean that the cooperation rooted 
here, and that the evolution of the Gueshoff-incident was a result of this 
agreement. After the proclamation of the incorporation of the railway, 
Austria-Hungary immediately warned Bulgaria to keep her hands off 
the lines, and according to Tukin, it is fairly possible that the price for 
the Austrian renouncement from the railway concessions was doing a 
favour for the Dual Monarchy, like declaring the independence before 
the annexation. Thus Bulgaria attracted Turkey’s attention and violated 
the Berlin Treaty first, but gained a supporter.  
This might be true as well, but it did not explain the surprise of 
Burián and Thallóczy. According to Tukin, Ferdinand on the 4th of 
October wanted to postpone the declaration, but finally his government 
convinced him not to do this, because if Bulgaria was able to act 
independently, no one could interfere into the incorporation process of 
the railways. So, Ferdinand decided to declare the independence 
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immediately, however, he admitted that originally he wanted to 
announce it weeks later.103  
While the Bulgarian intentions on declaring the independence were 
well-known among the Austrian diplomats after the Gueshoff-affair 
(except the date, of course), even Otto Czernin, ambassador to Sofia did 
not have any knowledge on the annexation itself: he was informed by 
the French on 4, October, only after having read Khevenhüller’s letter.  
Pallavicini, the ambassador to Constantinople was informed about 
the annexation only on 30, September,104 and he feared that the 
Bulgarian declaration of independence would be connected to the 
annexation of Bosnia, and Powers would consider this a joint, 
cooperative step.105 This reveals that even Pallavicini did not know 
anything about an intentional cooperation in timing. His opinion was 
that a parallel (whether intentional or accidental) movement would only 
bring drawbacks for Austria-Hungary, since Turkey would never accept 
the declaration of independence including Eastern Rumelia, while he 
thought that Ottoman Turkey was willing to accept the annexation, if it 
did not coincide with the Bulgarian declaration.106 Pallavicini was 
convinced that Turkey would recover within few years and solve the 
problem of Eastern Rumelia in her favour.  
But for Prince Ferdinand, the declaration of independence without 
Eastern Rumelia was not a deal, he would have never entered into such 
a critical diplomatic situation i.e. to assist the Dual Monarchy, without a 
prize. From the Bulgarian point of view, if the Habsburg Monarchy 
wanted the Bulgarian declaration of independence to happen in 
accordance with the annexation, Vienna had to offer something for 
Bulgaria to make the first step.  
As Kiamil Pasha warned Pallavicini (30 Sept.) that the independence 
of Eastern Rumelia would mean war, and that Turkey could count on 
the support of Romania, Greece and Serbia, for Bulgaria the timing also 
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became a splendid occasion to avoid war with Turkey by securing the 
support of Austria-Hungary.107 For the Romanians the Bulgarian 
declaration of independence (together with Eastern Rumelia) produced 
a dangerous precedent, since it violated the Berlin Treaty, the same 
treaty that gave Dobruja to Romania.108 But as Dimitrie Sturdza agreed 
not to interfere into the case without the approval of Austria-Hungary 
on 2, October, the number of opponents was reduced.109 After Belgrade 
had communicated that Serbia would mobilize its troops in the case of 
annexation (5 Oct.),110 the interdependency of Bulgaria and Austria-
Hungary seemed to be beneficial for both states.111  
After the declaration of independence and the annexation, the main 
problem for the Dual Monarchy remained, that both the English and the 
Turks shared the opinion that Bulgaria and the Dual Monarchy 
cooperated,112 while the Monarchy accused Bulgaria of being ignorant.  
The peculiarity of the situation was that the Turks would have tended 
to accept the annexation, if it had not taken place together with the 
independence of Eastern Rumelia.113 Pallavicini was right: England did 
not intend to recognise the annexation, until the Ottomans did so, and 
the Ottomans did not recognise the annexation because it happened in 
parallel with the Bulgarian independence. So, the sophisticated plan of 
Austria-Hungary – if such ever existed – collapsed, as Thallóczy 
foresaw: the cooperation with Bulgaria seemed to be advantageous at 
first sight, but in fact it produced only problems.114 As Pallavicini 
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interpreted, while for the Ottomans the annexation meant a smaller 
problem, for the Powers the independence of Bulgaria together with 
Eastern Rumelia was of lesser importance. This constellation luckily 
caused that the joint action of the Powers and Turkey to undo the events 
failed, which meant a diplomatic success for Bulgaria and Austria-
Hungary. (In practise this meant that Austria-Hungary had to arrange a 
deal with the Ottomans first, and convince them to accept the 
declaration of independence with Rumelia, the main reason they 
remained reluctant to accept the annexation. And if the Ottomans accept 
the annexation as a fact, England will not challenge it any more). 
The diplomatic duel was lost by Russia, which was unable to reach 
England’s and France’s consent – both opposing the annexation as well! 
– to the proposed changes in the status of the Straits.115 Russia originally 
wanted to secure Austria-Hungary’s support in a conference of Powers, 
while Austria-Hungary interpreted the Buchlau agreement as a bilateral 
agreement (like the Goluchowski-Muravieff pact in 1897) which the 
Powers had nothing to do with.116 This (mis)interpretation resulted in 
the displeasure of England and Iswolsky, and that the latter changed his 
mind on 5 October opposing the idea of the annexation.117 But since 
Bulgaria engaged into action, Austria-Hungary could not let the 
opportunity slip away. 
Russia warned Bulgaria twice that she could not support Bulgaria’s 
independence, if it caused critical situation in the diplomacy, and also 
let the Italians, French and English know about this warning.118 For 
Russia it was evident that Bulgaria cooperated with Austria-Hungary, 
as it enjoyed some diplomatic support – and it did not come from 
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Russia. However, the Bulgarians replied that it was Russia’s change in 
mind, that caused the real tensions. The Monarchy also warned Bulgaria 
not to act without Russian consent, but it seems that Prince Ferdinand 
tricked the Austrians as well, leaving them in an inconvenient 
situation.119 A serious consequence of the events was that while in 1908 
the possibility for a cooperation between Russia, Austria-Hungary and 
Bulgaria still existed, after the annexation Russia’s cooperativeness 
vanished. This also affected the cooperation of the Dual Monarchy and 
Bulgaria in the future. 
*** 
In the following part of our contribution we aimed to examine and 
reveal some myths still prevailing concerning the relations between the 
Dual Monarchy and Bulgaria, like the Austrian plans to reach the 
Aegean Sea by occupying Salonika or the promised Austrian support 
for Bulgaria on the eve of the second Balkan War. Our hypothesis is that 
the political behavior of Berchtold, Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary 
in 1913 deeply rooted in the attempts of Aehrenthal, who tried to create 
a pro-Austrian alliance system on the Balkans between 1908-11 – in 
order to avoid the alteration of status quo which was favourable for 
Austria-Hungary. 
After the occupation of the Sanjak of Novipazar in 1878 the Dual 
Monarchy had two possibilities – (1) whether to continue the march 
towards Saloniki and thus compelling the Balkan States to build an 
alliance against her, or (2) to create an alliance system in the Balkans, 
that helps realize the interests of the Monarchy, but in this case the 
direct control of Vardar valley had to be given up. 
Since the first choice was not a prosperous perspective, the 
Habsburg Monarchy renounced from occupying further territories by 
giving back the Sanjak to Turkey in 1908. The creation and the failure of 
the Abbasian Entente can be regarded as an experiment for the latter 
concept, but this alliance did not prove to be viable. Without including 
or controlling Serbia, the Entente of Abbasia (1901–04) failed to stop 
                                                          




Russia, that was increasing its sphere of influence towards Bulgaria 
with the military alliance of 1902. Serbia also turned against the Dual 
Monarchy in 1903, that led to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1904. So, the 
Abbasian Entente proved to be useless both to hinder Russian 
penetration and to mitigate the rivalry of interests between the small 
states. (After the Russia turn to the East ending in the defeat at Mukden, 
the unripen alliance of Serbia and Bulgaria also failed).  
A similar alliance without Turkey, but containing Serbia, would 
have been a rival for the Monarchy in the Balkans and an enemy of the 
’protected’ Turkey, so the creation of such an alliance system was not 
the best solution. But without controlling Serbia it seemed to be 
impossible to control the Vardar Valley – and also seemed to be futile to 
control an alliance not containing Serbia, because of the lack of physical 
contact. The way to Saloniki led through Serbian and Turkish territories 
– the Sanjak lacked railway connections, – but the Monarchy was unable 
to unite these two states in one alliance on her side. After the annexation 
in 1908 a Serbo-Turkish alliance seemed to be temporarily realistic, but 
it definitely considered the Monarchy as the arch-enemy. So the 
Habsburg Monarchy had to build up another alliance to counterbalance 
the Serbo-Turkish threat and to secure the way to the Sea. Therefore, 
Austria-Hungary tried to establish a Bulgarian-Austrian, or a 
Romanian-Bulgarian alliance early in 1909, and only after the failure of 
this decided Vienna to establish a Turkish-Romanian alliance in 1910-
1911 counterbalancing the formation of the second Balkan League, 
which also ended with a failure. 
The establishment of a Bulgarian-Austrian cooperation in 1909 failed 
mainly because the Monarchy refused to allow Bulgaria to seize 
Macedonian territories. Sofia was promised Serbian lands instead, and 
the Monarchy insisted on Bulgaria giving a compensation to Romania. 
In 1912 the Habsburg Monarchy tried to adopt her previous plan once 
more with a smaller modification. But winning Bulgaria to the Austrian 
cause was not so contradictory in 1909 as it had become by 1913. 
Previously Bulgaria had territorial claims only against Turkey, which 
was not supported by Russia (or any of the Powers). But in 1914, 
Macedonia, the ’Promiseland’ was in the hands of the Serbs supported 
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by the Russians. The Monarchy did not risk to win Bulgaria’s 
benevolence by offering Ottoman areas in 1909, while offering the same 
territories four years later (occupied by the Serbs), would definitely 
threaten with a world war. 
Thus, between 1909–12 the policy toward Bulgaria was ambivalent, 
dual: Bulgaria had to be hindered to make steps alone and seize 
territories without the help and approval of the Monarchy, while other 
Powers had to be deterred from gaining influence in Bulgaria by 
offering territorial compensations. Therefore a friendly relation 
characterised the behavior of the Habsburg Monarchy towards 
Bulgaria, but an alliance with Bulgaria was thought to be unnecessary, 
because – as Tarnowski, the Austrian ambassador to Sofia wrote – it 
was Bulgaria’s ’Lebensinteresse’ to do the job – preventing Serbia to 
occupy Macedonia – even without Austrian support. But, if Austria fails 
to support the Bulgarian claims, the country will turn to Russia. So, 
Austria was about to support Bulgarian territorial growth verbally and 
unofficially between 1909–13. 120 In his letter to Tarnowski, Berchtold 
pointed out that the main policy of the Monarchy was to reach an 
agreement between Romania and Bulgaria and to alienate them from 
Serbia.121 
Nonetheless, the Monarchy never gave up her intentions to reach 
Saloniki, not even in 1913, but after refraining from the incorporation of 
the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Aerenthal re-evaluated his policy. The 
resignation from the Sanjak meant losing the control above Serbia and 
Montenegro and losing also the opportunity to prevent an intervention 
of Serbia against Turkey. The new plan, the Romanian-Bulgarian 
alliance could have equalized this disadvantage, and also could have 
secured the way to the Aegean sea, as Teodor Teodorov, Bulgarian 
Minister of Finance pointed it out (in case Bulgaria reached the Aegean). 
Bulgaria could have been used also to counterbalance the Romanian 
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pretensions on Transylvania.122  The creation of such an alliance was not 
successfully realized until 1912, the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. Then, 
Berchtold hoped that a Romanian-Bulgarian alliance would enable the 
Monarchy to reach the Aegean Sea, if Bulgaria gained Saloniki, or – in 
case Romania opposed a Greater Bulgaria, which was expected to 
happen – through Kavala. If this also became impossible, the Monarchy 
could reach the warm seas through Albania. So, numerous parallel 
alternatives existed: instead of occupying the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and 
cutting Serbia from Montenegro, which would have created an anger 
against the Monarchy, the birth of a Greater Bulgaria was considered 
better – while the Serb relations with the Ottomans would deteriorate 
because of the Serb territorial pretensions on the Sanjak. 
Without being aware of these aforementioned concerns, one might 
think that a real cooperation based on mutual interests of the Monarchy 
and Bulgaria did exist. But this is not true. Bulgaria refused to join the 
bloc built by Austria-Hungary, and to offer territorial compensations to 
Romania, and Austria-Hungary also refused to interfere into the course 
of the events in 1913 with weapons. 
When underlining the willingness of Austria-Hungary to intervene 
in the second Balkan War on the side of Bulgaria, historians claimed, 
that King Ferdinand gave order to launch an attack on Serbian forces 
hoping that after the first shots, the troops of the Monarchy would cross 
the Danube and smash Serbia or settle a peace.123 Some French 
historians believed that Romanian troops after occupying Dobrudja 
would join the Bulgarian forces against Serbia.124 Indeed, Berchtold 
promised to give financial aid to Bulgaria – he spoke about 50 million 
francs.125 It is also true that Berchtold told Tschirschky, German 
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ambassador to Vienna on 9 May, that if the Serbs won a decisive victory 
against the Bulgarians, the Habsburg Monarchy would interfere, though 
not with a purpose of annexing Serbia.126 Bulgarians hoped that an 
intervention of the Monarchy would urge the involvement of other 
Powers who would finally settle the order. Tsar Ferdinand himself also 
claimed that the Monarchy promised support.127 (For new evidence on 
this, see the last chapters of this book). After having destroyed Turkey, 
Ferdinand wanted to annihilate Serbia and share the territories between 
Romania and the Monarchy, and his plans were earlier known by 
Vienna. 128  
Were there any reasons that confirm Bulgarian hopes, the Dual 
Monarchy’s intention to intervene?  In our opinion, the signs show that 
Berchtold’s policy was getting more and more aggressive,129 because he 
wanted to join Bulgaria in her fight against Serbia – he let the dirty work 
be done by others –, but he rather wanted to divert Romania away from 
attacking Bulgaria – thinking that the latter would be able to handle 
Serbia and Greece. But Romania did not decrease her pretensions, and 
since the Monarchy was not able to satisfy Romania’s territorial claims 
on Southern Dobrudja by peaceful means (by increasing the pressure on 
Bulgaria), Berchtold simply could not intervene to help Bulgaria against 
Serbia, because this would have absolutely alienated Romania from the 
discredited Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria thought that Romania could be 
satisfied with Serbian territories. Salabashev, the Bulgarian ambassador 
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to Vienna asked, whether Austria-Hungary would agree if Bulgaria 
promised Serbian territories as a compensation to Romania, in case of a 
war between Serbia and Bulgaria (and if Bulgarians won) – and Austria 
didn’t object.130 Of course not – it would have been a dream come true. 
This attitude of the Dual Monarchy suggested that she would not 
oppose a war – but it neither meant encouragement, nor Austrian 
intervention. 
A war between the members of the Balkan League would certainly 
have some advantage for Austria-Hungary, while settling a peaceful 
agreement would have been disastrous according to Burián’s opinion: 
“Berchtold is in a constant fear of promoting a Serbo-Bulgarian agreement 
under the aegis of Russia. If Russia – as an arbiter – decides to support 
Bulgaria (in the debate between the allies), later she has to give a full 
support to Serbia against the territories of the Monarchy… (The same fears, 
that Forgách mentioned in 1908). Bulgaria can expect from Russia now 
nothing – claimed Burián few days later to convince Berchtold – but she 
can expect Serbian (and still not Macedonian!) land from us”.131 Burián 
wanted to avoid the first aforementioned possibility by forcing the 
second one! Bulgarians might have come to the same conclusion, that’s 
why they thought of Austrian intervention, but Berchtold adapted a 
different plan. 
So, a peaceful outcome of the events that may conserve the Balkan 
League intact, was not the interest of the Monarchy. Tarnowski in May 
1913, when analysing the future policy of the Monarchy, claimed that in 
case of a war ”... Bulgaria winning a victory only by self-effort is not a desired 
solution, because as a consequence she reaches an overwhelming position in the 
peninsula forcing Serbia into her arms and into an alliance led by Bulgaria, 
both freeing themselves from the Austrian influence. The best solution would be 
a Bulgarian victory, but only if it was realised with the support of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. The making of Greater Bulgaria by self-effort might be 
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dangerous, if the state decides to join Russia’s side. It is much better, if 
Bulgaria’s desires won’t be fulfilled now, and due to the circumstances she 
becomes an enemy of the Serbo-Russian coalition, that forces her on the 
Monarchy’s side”132 – without any official contract. Owing to the fear of 
diverting Romania from the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary did not 
risk a military intervention (not to speak of provoking a world war). 
The very last lines of the evaluation above also reduced the possibility 
of a military intervention by Austria-Hungary, but it increased the 
probability that the Dual Monarchy would give verbal support (and 
nothing beyond this) to Bulgaria. According to Löding, Tarnowski’s 
dual policy aimed at forcing Bulgaria into a war with the promise of the 
Austrian support, a promise which would not be realised. In that case, 
the defeated Bulgaria would have no other choice than to join the Dual 
Monarchy.133 On the other hand, although a Bulgarian victory would 
humiliate the Serbs, but would make Austrian support useless in the 
future, excluding Austria-Hungary from the Balkans forever.  
After the rupture of the Balkan League – which was a political 
success for the Monarchy – the Hungarian press immediately tried to 
win Bulgaria for the political concept of Austria-Hungary.  “Our vital 
interest is to hinder the creation of an alliance between Romania, Greece and 
Serbia (which the Germans desired so much) against Bulgaria” – claimed 
Tisza, leader of the Hungarian pressure group within the Habsburg 
Monarchy.134 Thus the end of 1913 resulted in a very complicated 
situation for the Habsburg Monarchy with its shrinking opportunities 
for diplomatic manoeuvring, with its goals contradicting to the German 
interests, and with the growing rivalry between the several pressure 
groups. “We mustn’t bind our forces and ourselves to Bulgaria – warned 
Burián after the Peace Treaty of Bucharest – They’ll complete their ’duty’ 
against the Serbs even without our help – because it is their condition of 
existence and it is their destiny.”135 But the situation was not so easy as 
Burián claimed, since Berchtold feared that if Serbia gave back 
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territories she could count on Bulgaria again, thus creating a new 
Balkan League.136 The fear of the resurrection of a new Balkan League 
did not necessarily mean the need of an alliance with Bulgaria, as the 
only viable choice to avoid the former combination. After the failure to 
hinder an anti-Bulgarian Balkan Coalition (’third Balkan League’) in 
1913, Austria-Hungary also tried to build a new Turkish-Bulgarian-
Romanian alliance once again after 1909.137 The evidence of the 
proposed anti-Serbian contract from the end of 1913 can also be found 
among the manuscripts of the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.138  
This meant a return to the policy of 1909, when Austria-Hungary 
offered Serbian territories to Bulgaria in case of a Serbo-Turkish war 
against Bulgaria and the Monarchy – indicating that the possibilities of 
the Monarchy were basically reduced after the second Balkan War. The 
alliance proposal pointed out that the Monarchy was willing to help 
Bulgaria, if it was attacked by two states – from among them at least one 
should have common borders with the two contracting parties 
(excluding Romania). This meant Russia and Serbia, or Serbia and 
Turkey. Bulgaria was supposed to give help, if the Monarchy was 
attacked by a Great Power and a state, having common borders with the 
two contracting parties. It is fairly probable that a Russian and Serbian 
attack was meant by this scheme. The treaty had been realised only by 
1915 with the same conditions. 
From 1913 on, the Habsburg Monarchy was getting more and more 
isolated and needed the alliance of Bulgaria, which was not evident and 
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326–27. “Falls die Monarchie von einer Grossmacht in Bunde mit einer zweiten Staat angegriffen 
wird, verpflichtet sich Bulgarien zur militärischen Cooperationen vorausgesetzt, dass betreffende 
Staat mit Bulgarien limitroph ist. Falls Bulgarien von zwei Staaten angegriffen wird, verpflichtet 
sich die Monarchie zur militärischen Cooperationen vorausgesetzt, dass wenigstens einer jeder 
beiden Staaten mit der Monarchie limitroph ist.” The next points stated that if the attacking 
state was Romania, the contract would not be valid, and that the Monarchy would support 
Bulgarian claims on Macedonia in case of revising the Treaty of Bucharest. 
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inevitable three or four years ago. But Bulgaria now could not be won 
by offering Turkish territories any more (because now Serbia owned 
them), and could have been converted only against Romania or Serbia. 
Gaining the friendship of Bulgaria would mean an anti-Serbian step, 
that may lead to the escalation of the conflict (as Serbia was supported 
by Russia), which was not so obvious four years ago. This meant that 
the integration of Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance would consequently 
strengthen the political party in the Monarchy, that wanted to destroy 
Serbia – though the original intention of integrating Bulgaria into the 
alliance system was not to serve this scenario in the eyes of the 
Hungarian lobby, but to compensate the loss of Romania as an ally.   
Russians were in more advantageous position in this battle for 
supporters as Moscow could offer both Austrian and Ottoman 
territories for his potential ally in order to avoid the overlapping of the 
territorial claims, while Austria-Hungary hardly could do this. First, 
Vienna refrained from dismembering Ottoman Turkey (owing to the 
fear of a greater Slavic state), second, any Serbian aggrandisement in 










Bulgarian Attempts to Avoid Isolation on the Eve of the 




On the following pages139 I do not want to analyse why Bulgaria chose 
the way of ‘everything or nothing’, and who was responsible for the 
forecoming events in 1913 (leaving it to the Bulgarian historians); I want 
to focus on the possible solutions that might have promised a different 
outcome of the events – including more favourable territorial 
consequences for Bulgaria.  
Our topic gains relevance from three aspects: (1) the behavior, the 
tactics of the small states in the past is instructive for the present (1991-
1999) and future problems; (2) the overestimated trust in international 
treaties and jurisdiction compared to crude force was also a lesson that 
the whole world learnt in the next decades; and from historical point of 
view (3) the diplomatic battle has serious consequences on the balance 
of Powers, especially for Austria-Hungary. 
*** 
The Treaty of Bucharest (10 August, 1913) was crucial not only for 
Bulgaria – which reckoned the failure of creating Greater Bulgaria as the 
nadir of its modern history, and thus this peace settlement had a 
decisive role in Bulgaria’s behavior during World War I –, but it also 
put an end to the optimistic Russian ideas, who counted on a long-term 
agreement and alliance between Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and 
Romanians. The conflict also had deep impact on the balance of Powers, 
resulting in a dangerous situation for the Dual Monarchy. After the 
Balkan Wars Austria-Hungary’s former ally, Romania orientated 
towards Russia, and although Bulgaria’s support seemed to be secured 
for Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria’s failure in realising its territorial 
aspirations determined that Sofia could only be used up for the 
                                                          
139 Originally published in Bulgarian: Demeter, G.: Opitite na Balgariya da izbegne izolaciyata v 
navecherieto na mezhdusayuznicheskata voyna. Istoricheski Pregled, 2012/5–6.  
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annihilation of Serbia, and could be gained for the Austrian cause only 
by promising territories of Serbian Macedonia. Earlier, between 1908–
11, when Bulgaria also tried to gain the benevolence of Austria-
Hungary, the perspective was less complicated. Before 1913 Bulgaria 
had territorial aspirations against the Ottoman Empire, which was not 
backed by Russia or – as the Tripolitanian War proved – any of the 
Powers. After 1913 Bulgaria had territorial demands against Serbia, 
backed by Russia. Therefore a conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria 
might enhance the threat of a world war, which was not evident 
between 1908–11 in case of a conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey. So, 
the value and usefulness of a Bulgarian alliance in the eye of the Austro-
Hungarian politicians gradually decreased. Thus, the Balkan Wars 
influenced the alliance systems and the outcome of the events in 1914–
18. 
The examination of the diplomatic instruments of small states, 
beside the experience on tactics, strategies, methods and aims is still 
relevant due to the events of 1991–99 on the peninsula. The following 
pages focus on the understanding and interpretation of the situation 
prior to the second Balkan War in order to assess the political reality of 
the emerging solutions discussed by Bulgarian diplomatists. Since the 
rupture of the Balkan League had already been analysed by many 
authors, our attempt is mainly based on still unpublished and uncited 
reports of ambassadors found in the archives of Sofia and Vienna. 
After having defeated the Turks, it became clear that – contrary to 
the terms of the Serb-Bulgarian agreement in March, 1912 – there was 
an antagonistic opposition between the allies regarding territorial 
claims. The Serbs had asked for the modification of the agreement 
(demanding the right side of the Vardar River) several times (first early 
in November, 1912).140 Furthermore, the Greek-Bulgarian agreement in 
1912 did not mention any territorial distribution at all, but the aim of 
Venizelos became quite clear in his letter written to the archbishop of 
Pelagony, in which he promised to extend the borders of Greece as 
                                                          
140 The agreement in March promised the greater part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, but as Bulgarian 
troops were fighting against Turks in Thrace, Macedonia was mainly occupied and 
liberated by Serbian soldiers.  
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north as possible.141 It was evident that Serbia cannot remain so small 
after a decisive victory – Powers needed a Greater Serbia to 
counterbalance Austria-Hungary –, and after the Dual Monarchy had 
managed to divert Serbian pretensions from the Adriatic, it was 
inevitable that Serbia would search for remedy in Macedonia after this 
failure. Until mid-1913 noone knew that Austria-Hungary also 
encouraged these aspirations. 
On his way home from the London peace conference, Venizelos 
stopped in Sofia. Here, he renounced from southeastern-Macedonia 
including the cities of Drama, Kavala and Seres, but he insisted on 
keeping Saloniki for Greece. This offer caused a debate in Bulgarian 
diplomatic and military circles, but the government finally refused the 
deal.142  
The Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić insisted on his statement 
expressed in St. Petersburg in April 1913, that he could not allow 
Bulgaria to extend its borders towards Albania between Greece and 
Serbia,143 and claimed that Serbia was willing to go into war, if Powers 
were unable to guarantee the common Greek-Serbian border (which 
meant that the Bulgarians would lose the greater part of Macedonia). 
This was an open denial of the 1912 Serb-Bulgarian agreement.144 
                                                          
141 HHStA, PA I, Balkankonflagration, Kt. 493. Liasse XLV/11. February 11, 1913; and 
Fremdenblatt 67, Nr. 41. 
142 The Bulgarian government was not unanimous in connection with the border question. 
Some thought that if Greeks were able to occupy Asia Minor, then they would resign from 
Macedonia; therefore they forced the attack on the Chataldja-line, and the contribution of 
the Greek fleet to this campaign against the Dardanelles. See: Markov, G.: Balgariya v 
balkanskiya sayuz sreshtu Osmanskata imperiya 1912–1913. Sofia, 1989. 39–40. According to 
Milyukov’s report in Bulgaria certain tendencies did exist to give Saloniki and its hinterland 
to Greece in case Bulgaria gained Florina and Kastoria as a compensation, but Greece 
refused to do so. Bogitschewitsch, M.: Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 1903–1914. Vol. I–III. 
Berlin, 1928–1931. I. Nr. 264. Balugdzitsch aus Saloniki an Paschitsch, January 21, 1913. and 
Ivan Evstratiev Geshov: Lichna korespondenciya. Eds.: Popov, R.–Tankova, V. Sofia, 1994. 248. Nr. 
108. February 11, 1913. 
143 Skoko, S.: Rukovođenje operacijama Srpske vojske u ratu s Bolgarskom 1913 godine. Vojnoistorijski 
glasnik 33, 1982/1-2. 244.  
144 The first Balkan War did not start, when the Serbs had already expressed their intentions to 
acquire the towns of Prilep, Kičevo, Kruševo and Ohrida on the right side of the Vardar 
River (thus to revise the agreement) in a confidential telegram dated to 15 Sept. 1912. This 
was an incorrect step, as Serbs did not know then that Austria-Hungary was opposed to the 
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When the Bulgarians had asked for Russian arbitration on 25 April 
1913 based on the terms of the agreement in 1912, S. D. Sazonov, 
Russian minister of Foreign Affairs (and the Serbs also) insisted on 
inviting the Greeks (with whom the Serbs signed a preliminary 
agreement on cooperation against Bulgaria early in 1913). This was not 
surprisingly refused by the Bulgarian government, as the agreement of 
1912, in which the parties laid down the principle of compulsory 
Russian arbitration in case of debates, did not mention a word about 
Greece. Danev, the president of the Sabranie refused any negotiations 
under such circumstances. 
Therefore it was mainly in the interest of Bulgaria to settle peace 
with the Ottomans as soon as possible, in the beginning of 1913, before 
Serbian and Greek territorial claims grew further. “The Serbs and Greeks, 
analysed the situation Danev, would be pleased, if we turned to the weapons 
again, because they hope to re-negotiate the agreements between the allies (as 
the price of their help), and therefore Bulgaria would be forced to accept the 
Greek point of view (on borders), and the agreement with the Serbs could be 
modified… One solution is to avoid the war, or in case of the renewal of 
hostilities, we have to face the fact that we can only rely on ourselves.”145 
Danev saw the situation correctly, unfortunately he strictly tied himself 
to the second solution, which led to the isolation of Bulgaria. 
Sofia had several possibilities to avoid the second war, and keep at 
least some parts of Macedonia. (1) Bulgaria could have come to terms 
with his allies excluding any interference of Powers. Certainly this 
would have forced Bulgaria to give compensations for Serbia and 
Greece, but the Enos-Midia line may have remained stable in Thrace, as 
well as the left side of the Vardar, and there would not have arisen any 
reason to compensate Romania. 
(2) In the second case – as the compensation of Romania became 
more and more needful after May, 1913 due to the hostile alliance 
between Serbia and Greece, and owing to the behavior of Austria-
                                                                                                                                
Serbian presence at the Adriatic, and later they reasoned their demand for compensation in 
Macedonia with this. 
145 CSA, F. 568k, Inv. 1, a.u. 756, l. 17. Of course, the allies neither wanted Bulgaria to conclude a 
separate or a quick agreement with the Turks, as it was against the agreement of 1912. 
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Hungary – Bulgaria might have reached an agreement with Romania 
and Austria-Hungary, as it was wished by Berchtold, Joint Foreign 
Minister of the Dual Monarchy. A Romanian-Bulgarian alliance might 
have counterbalanced a Serbian-Greek agreement even in case of an 
armed conflict between the former league members. This agreement 
could have secured the left side of the Vardar and the Enos-Midia line, 
though it might have meant the cessation of some territories in Dobruja. 
A Romanian-Bulgarian agreement would have been useful, as there 
were rumours about Serb-Romanian negotiations and such an 
agreement could have totally encircled the isolated Bulgaria. However, 
the Serbian offer of February 1913 was not directed offensively against 
Bulgaria, but it was rather a defensive proposal in order to hinder an 
aggression against Serbia from Austria-Hungary.146  
(3) In the third case Bulgaria might have accepted the arbitration of 
Russia or other Powers. It is important to emphasize that each version 
had political reality, and offered a more favourable outcome than the 
peace agreement in Bucharest finally did. Our task is to describe how 
and why the Bulgarian elite decided to choose the worst solution, and 
what circumstantes led to the total isolation of Bulgaria. 
During the Bulgarian-Romanian negotiations on compensation for 
Romania, Bulgaria came to the false conclusion that the compensation is 
not a bilateral affair, but indeed the joint case of the Balkan League. 
Their assumption was based on the earlier events. The Romanians first 
offered to pay 10 million francs in return for the town of Silistra, and if it 
was not enough, Bulgaria might get compensation from Serbia, the 
town of Pirot. According to the Romanian interpretation they 
negotiated not with Bulgaria, but with the Balkan League, and loads on 
the allies should be shared.147  
Although the Bulgarians remained silent for a long time in 
connection with the above mentioned offer, later they did not refuse a 
similar solution, i.e. purchasing the benevolence of Romania by offering 
Serbian territories. On 6 June 1913, three weeks before the outbreak of 
                                                          
146 Sosnosky, Th. von: Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866. Bd. 2., Berlin, 1914. 352. 
147 CSA, F. 568k, Inv. 1, a.u. 796, l. 4. Later Romania promised to offer 100 million francs and 
soldiers as well.  
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the second war, Salabashev, Bulgarian ambassador to Vienna negotiated 
with Macchio, a representative of the Dual Monarchy in connection 
with the compensation given for the neutrality of Romania. “I asked him, 
how Austria-Hungary would see such an act, if Bulgaria promised Serbian 
territories to Romania, instead of parts of Bulgaria – certainly in case of a war 
won by Bulgaria. He (Macchio) answered that the Dual Monarchy would not 
oppose such a deal, and Bulgaria should negotiate with Romania on this 
basis.”148  
This telegram has revealed many secret ambitions: Austria-Hungary 
wanted a weak, dismembered Serbia, as the Bulgarians did so, but did 
not want to intervene through a direct action against Serbia. Second, 
Bulgaria was not willing to give a preliminary compensation for 
Romania prior a conflict. Romania was offered territories only after a 
war. Bulgarians refrained from a pre-arranged compensation, because 
they thought Romania – after having gained the desired compensation – 
would not support them. This offer was unacceptable for the 
Romanians, as they shared the same fears: if they supported Bulgaria, 
and she won, Bulgaria would give nothing to Romania.149 They felt it 
well – certain Bulgarian circles tried to forget about compensation... 
Third, Bulgaria was not the artisan of peace at all. 
At the end of April 1913 the peace negotiations between the allies 
and the Ottomans restarted, but the coup d’etat in Ottoman Turkey was a 
final blow for Bulgarians hoping for concluding peace quickly. In order 
to put pressure on her former allies, who also delayed the conclusion of 
a joint peace settlement – in order to regroup their forces into 
Macedonia, while the Bulgarian armies were still in Thrace – Danev 
declared that Bulgaria would conclude peace with the Turks 
separately,150 which was against the terms of the agreement in 1912. This 
                                                          
148 CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 219. (6 June or 24 May in old style). 
149 Romanians had other ideas to solve the problems. In Paris Mr. Lahovary, Romanian 
ambassador visioned an alliance or confederation of Bulgaria and Romania referring to the 
fact that in 1886 (when the Bulgarian-Russian relation was quite hostile) they planned the 
same (it would have been a state with 10 million inhabitants, blocking the way to the 
Straits), which was then hindered by Russian objection. Bogitschewitsch, M.: Die Auswärtige 
Politik Serbiens I. Nr. 316; Nr. 355; II. Nr. 832.  
150 CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 7. May 20, 1913. 
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gave an excellent chance for Serbia to depict Bulgaria as the enemy of 
the peace. The Bulgarian general, Savov thought that Powers did not 
appreciate Bulgaria’s potential enough in modifying the balance 
between the two alliance systems. “Therefore it is needful to notify France 
and Russia that we have decided to go to the end in order to validate our 
interests.”151 Savov overestimated the value of Bulgaria for the „entente 
cordiale” versus Serbia and Greece, and this fallacy became accepted as 
policy. Contrary to the above mentioned misinterpretation of Bulgaria’s 
military and geopolitical potential Savov saw it right that the Balkan 
Alliance, as an entity, could not be attached to the Entente, as the 
Russian Sazonov hoped. His second vision was also correct: neither of 
the two alliance systems had reached superiority on the Balkans by 
1914.152 
The Bulgarian ambassador to London, Madzharov also advised 
Bulgaria to conclude a separate agreement with the Turks, even if her 
allies were opposed to this, because in that case they would be forced to 
do the same, after the Bulgarian weapons became relieved in Thrace 
and regrouped in Macedonia.153 
The Bulgarian Army Headquarters did not wait further. It had 
elaborated an offensive plan against Serbia and Greece on 31 May 1913, 
on the very day when preliminary peace in London was signed, and on 
the same day when Greece and Serbia concluded a separate alliance 
agreement with each other.154 The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Geshov 
feared an offensive action, since he thought, in this case Romania would 
ask for compensation. Many were aware of the threat that if Romania’s 
wishes were refused, the country would immediately turn towards 
Bulgaria’s enemies – but no measures were taken to hinder this. “These 
moments are extremely important concerning our relations with Romania. It is 
up to us whether we exploit their willingness to reach an agreement or push 
                                                          
151 Ibid. l. 8. May 27, 1913 (13 May in old style). Serbs blamed Bulgarians for their pro-Austrian 
sentiments. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid. l. 12. 
154 Istoriya na balgarite 1878–1944 v dokumenti. T. 2. 1912–1918. Periodat na voynite. Eds.: Trifonov, 
St.–Georgiev, V. Sofia, 1996. 187. (18 May in old style). In these documents attacks on Serbian 
territories were also drawn up beside attacks against the contested territories of Macedonia.  
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them into the hands of our allies … who won’t ignore such an opportunity, 
after we did so…”, wrote Kalinkov, ambassador of Bulgaria to Bucharest, 
who was informed by Maiorescu: “Tell us friendly: is Bulgaria willing to 
give us, what was promised by Danev in London (compensation)? In that 
case you can ask whatever you want from us.”155 This means that on 29 May 
1913 while the Greeks accepted the offer for demobilisation, and asked 
for the arbitration of the „entente cordiale” in the Greek-Bulgarian 
dispute,156 and just before the signature of the Serbian-Greek military 
convention, there was a chance to gain the alliance of Romania for the 
Bulgarian cause! 
It was not only the ambassador to Bucharest who sent urging 
telegrams, but his colleague in Vienna too. “Berchtold thinks – wrote 
Salabashev – that we have to conclude an agreement with Romania quickly, 
thus securing her support or at least her benevolent neutrality in a possible war 
against Serbia… First Bulgaria and Romania have to settle an agreement on 
benevolent neutrality, and simultaneously they have to sign an agreement on 
Romania’s compensation, and in turn Romania will help Bulgaria in case of 
war. But, in order to reach that goal, Bulgaria has to offer unforced territorial 
concessions to Romania at the seashore around Mangalia … Berchtold is of the 
opinion, if Romania turns against Serbia, the latter can not count on Russia’s 
support, since Bulgaria is a Slavic state as well.”157 Although the latter 
statement did not stand critics, because Russia followed her own policy 
in 1912–13, sometimes supporting Greece or Romania, which were not 
Slavic states, Bulgaria still had the chance to get Romania’s alliance – 
beyond its neutrality.158 
                                                          
155 CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 22. May 29, 1913.  
156 Ibid. l. 23. 
157 Ibid. l. 38. In case of such a Bulgarian-Romanian agreement Romania’s interest would be 
maintaining peace rather than a war on the side of Bulgaria. 
158 Berchtold probably was right, when he claimed that in case of Bulgarian-Romanian alliance 
and war against Serbia (without the intervention of Austria-Hungary) Russia might have 
remained neutral, since Russia wanted to win the benevolence or alliance of Romania and 
tear it away from the Triplice. But the new Bulgarian-Romanian Balkan League necessarily 
should have committed itself on either Austria-Hungary’s or Russia’s side. As the potential 
prey – Serbia – was inimical to Austria-Hungary, Russia might have supported the small 
state, in order to hinder further Austrian penetration into the peninsula, even if Russia 
originally sympatized with Bulgaria or Romania, or the Bulgarian-Romanian alliance would 
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“The Greeks now want Seres and Kavala, although earlier promised these 
towns to Bulgaria, warned Salabashev at the end of his telegram. Italy and 
Austria-Hungary have promised these towns to Bulgaria, it is the Germans, 
who refuse this promising the towns to Greece… England has not expressed her 
opinion in this question, but it is fearful that she would give the towns to 
Greece, just to push her towards France and Russia. If Bulgarians sign a 
separate agreement with Turkey in London, the Serbs will accuse them of 
violating their earlier agreement.”159 Although the Bulgarian ambassador 
hoped for Austrian military aid, Berchtold only promised benevolent 
neutrality, did not even promise to regroup or mobilise troops, stating 
that already too many soldiers had been directed to the southern 
frontiers up to that moment and it cost too much. 
But the situation was not so evident. According to R. von Mach, King 
Ferdinand gave orders to General Savov to attack, because he believed 
that after the first shots Austrian troops would cross the Danube and 
force peace upon Serbia.160 Quite early, on 9 May Berchtold said to 
Tschirschky, German ambassador to Vienna, that in case of 
overwhelming Serbian victory over Bulgaria, the Dual Monarchy would 
                                                                                                                                
have been created under the auspice of Russia. So, an alliance between Romania and 
Bulgaria concluded under Russian aegis could not be turned against Serbia – and 
Bulgarians would rather be interested in Macedonia than in a new, but passive and 
Russophile alliance. This means that the Romanian and Bulgarian aspirations could only be 
realized, if they turned to Austria-Hungary, which would strenghten the positions of the 
Dual Monarchy. 
Therefore it was not Russia’s interest to vitalize a Romanian-Bulgarian alliance. And since 
such an alliance under the aegis of Austria-Hungary could not be stopped by simple 
diplomatic means, but only by Russian weapons – threatening with a world war – Russia had to 
hinder the creation of such an alliance. Therefore it was not Russia’s interest to support the 
peaceful compensation of Romania, unlike earlier, before signing the Protocol of St. 
Petersburg, when Bulgarians were too close to the Straits. 
For Berchtold it was inevitable to hinder a Romanian-Bulgarian alliance under the aegis of 
Russia, because it would mean a deterioration in the geostrategic positions of Austria-
Hungary losing at least one potential ally, while a new Balkan Alliance close to the Straits 
would be formed – while Berchtold was fighting for the dissolution of its predecessor. 
Such an alliance under Russian auspice would not have been acceptable for Austria-
Hungary even if Russia had sacrified Serbia (which seemed to be quite improbable), and 
thus the Dual Monarchy could have reached Saloniki (through Greater Bulgaria). CSA, F. 
176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 38. May 29, 1913 (16 May in old style). 
159 Ibid. 
160 Mach, R. von: Aus bewegter Balkanzeit, 1879–1918. Berlin, 1928. 235.  
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intervene by using military force – though did not plan the annexation 
of Serbia.161 This was told to Salabashev by the German ambassador, 
and this may reason why the Bulgarians did not cease fighting after the 
first reports on the failure of their military movements had arrived. 
Austrian documents also verified that Austria-Hungary was not opposed 
to a Bulgarian attack on Serbia, and Bulgaria reasonably hoped for 
Austria’s aid.162 Berchtold did not refuse financial support for Bulgaria, 
if a war with Serbia became reality – he went up to promising 50 million 
francs163 – and Thallóczy’s diary also mentions the Austro-Hungarian 
promises in connection with the intervention and even the possible 
dismemberment of Serbia (see next chapters). The French later 
expressed irrealistic ideas, that it was Austria who set up for provoking 
a war, in order to dismember Serbia.164  
Tarnowski, Austrian ambassador to Sofia on 23 May 1913 gave a 
thorough analysis on Austria-Hungary’s possible policy towards 
Bulgaria. His point of view seems to be a refutation of the above 
mentioned. Tarnowski stated that Bulgarian victory without external 
help was not desirable for Austria-Hungary, as this would give Bulgaria 
such superiority in power and self-esteem, that she could force Serbia 
easily into his alliance. It was better if Bulgaria’s dreams could be 
fulfilled only with the help of Austria-Hungary – or not at all. A Greater 
Bulgaria as a potential ally of Russia, or a state following her own 
foreign policy, blocking the way to Saloniki was not desirable, while a 
smaller Bulgaria as a potential ally of Austria, with dreams unrealised, 
which made her hostile to any Serbian-Russian cooperation, was much 
more useful.165 As we have stressed it earlier, this interpretation of the 
usefulness of Bulgaria had been questioned by 1913. 
                                                          
161 Hötzendorf, Conrad von: Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906–1918. III. Wien, 1922. 353. 
162 HHStA, Nachlass Baernreithers, Kt. 8. Tagebücher, November 23, 1913, Wien.  
163 HHStA, Ad. Reg. F23. Kt. 64. May 17, 1913. Berchtold an Tarnowski and Popper an Fanta.  
164 Bourgeois, E.–Pagés, G.: Die Ursachen und Verantwortlichkeiten… 356. 
165 Ö-U.A. VI. Nr. 7133. Based on this source the policy of the Dual Monarchy was to push 
Bulgaria into a war. After a defeat – which was quite possible, if the promised Austrian aid 
never arrives – Sofia would be tied to Austria-Hungary. This policy had certain dangers in 
the future explained in the first paragraphs of the article. See also Löding, D., Deutschlands 
und Österreich–Ungarns Balkanpolitik… 83. 
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From the end of May 1913, Bulgarians more or less accepted the 
armed conflict as a possible outcome of the dispute – and they openly 
threatened the Powers with such steps. The Serbs stressed their 
demands in every newspaper, suggesting their point of view for 
everyone. Stanchov, Bulgarian ambassador to Paris warned his 
government not to do so, as these Bulgarian demands would create 
displeasure in the diplomatic circles.166  
The viability of Albania also influenced the extent of planned 
compensation given to Romania. Danev on 29 May 1913 declared that: 
“Up to now Serbia’s behavior was in the centre of our interest first, and 
secondly the fate of Albania, if it is not viable. In the first case, if Serbia violates 
the agreement and attacks us, Bulgaria will get more favourable borders as a 
consequence of this, or in the second case, if Bulgaria reaches the Adriatic, in 
my opinion, we may promise the compensation for Romania (the Tutrakan-
Balchik line), but in the first case Romania may acquire only Serbian 
territories”.167 
On 9 June, 1913 a Turkish delegate confidentially hinted that Greece 
wanted to sign a military pact with Turkey against Bulgaria, but the 
Ottomans refused to do so. “Bulgaria may count on Turkey’s sympathy and 
friendly neutrality in case of a war between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece” – 
pointed out Hilmi pasha.168 The Bulgarian government believed the 
content of the telegram, although it was not true. It was especially 
convincing, that in this letter Ottomans promised 50 thousand 
Albanians to revolt against the Serbs. This telegram was crucial in 
                                                          
166 Thus, the Bulgarian diplomats admitted confidentially, that their claims were exaggerated. 
Another problem arose, when somebody put the Bulgarian concepts on the future borders 
into light. As it did produce a great displeasure in diplomatic circles as Stanchov foretold, 
the idea to publish the map could not come from Bulgaria. On this map Greater Bulgaria 
included whole Macedonia and Thrace to the Marmora Sea. The rest of the liberated 
territories – including the Sanjak of Novibazar and Epirus – was named Albania. Bulgarian 
dreams even went further: “The Montenegrin delegates –  as they were not brave enough to 
complain openly about Serbs – advised to dismember Albania together, so we might get Berat and 
Valona”, wrote Danev from London, where the peace negotiations took place. The 
acquisition of Berat could only be possible if the right side of the Vardar remained 
Bulgarian! CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 147; Cassavetti, D. J., Hellas and the Balkan Wars. -, 
1914. 314–16, and CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 140. June 2, 1913. 
167 CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 53. May 29 (May 16 in old style), 1913. 
168 CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 275. June 9 (May 27 in old style), 1913.  
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influencing the forecoming events, since only three days earlier, 6 June 
(Hadji)Mishev, the Bulgarian ambassador to Athens warned his 
government that Greeks inquired the Turks, whether they could count 
on an Ottoman attack against Edirne (Adrianople) in case of an 
interallied war. The Ottomans demanded compensation in case of a 
Serb-Greek-Bulgarian war for their neutrality, which the Greeks 
refused,169 but offered to attack Bulgaria. 
Thus Madzharov tried to enter into an alliance with the Turks – 
unsuccessfully. Again from Greece bad news arrived on 9 May from 
Mishev. While negotiating about the demarcation line between Greek 
and Bulgarian troops, the Greek king gave audience for the Bulgarian 
ambassador. “During the audience His Majesty took a red pen and sketched 
up the territories, which Bulgaria may get in the future after the distributon. 
This line started at Leftera, passed next to Seres, but both settlements remained 
in Greek hands according to the plan. The king declared that he would not sign 
a convention, that gives further territories for the Bulgarians. It was just 
enough to resign from Kavala and Drama”.170 So, beside Saloniki, the 
Greeks now demanded Seres – but Kavala and Drama still could have 
been spared for the Bulgarians.  
General Hesapchiev, the commander of Bulgarian troops in Saloniki 
also had bad news on 3 June: the Greek government demanded common 
borders with Serbia (beside the Bulgarian renouncement from Saloniki 
and Seres). Hesapchiev drew the attention to the ever increasing Greek 
claims, which aimed at forcing Bulgaria to commit a mistake and attack 
the contested territories. Therefore Hesapchiev advised the arbitration 
of “friendly Powers”.171 
The Greeks, since Bulgaria refused the arbitration of either Russia or 
the Entente, offered a new solution to restore peace.172 According to this 
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171 Ibid. l. 150. June 3 (May 21 in old style), 1913. 
172 Lorey, A.: Frankreichs Politik während der Balkankriege 1912–1913. Diss. Frankfurt, Dresden, 
1941. 108. The Russian proposal, that the Powers of the Entente should decide in the 
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both parties would be unsatisfied with the result, and thus turn away from the Entente, 
furthermore, the Triple Alliance would not accept a decision made without the presence of their 
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plan two arbiters would be selected – one, Russia, representing the 
Entente, the other, Germany would represent the Triple Alliance.173 
Venizelos tried to gain advantage from the fact that his government was 
characterised by pro-entente sentiments, while King Constantine was 
favoured by the German Kaiser Wilhelm. Mishev saw it right that 
Greece was hesitating between the two alliance systems such as 
Bulgaria did, but while Greece was important for both alliance systems, 
thus both supported its territorial claims (similarly to Romania), 
Bulgaria was not favoured by any of the Powers. The Bulgarian 
government also knew that Germans would not support Bulgarian 
claims, but still hoped that the second arbiter, Russia, which – said 
Mishev – might give the right side of the Vardar to the Serbs in the Serb-
Bulgarian debate, would support Bulgaria in the Greek-Bulgarian 
dispute, thus compensating Bulgaria. But this might happen only if 
Russia wanted to counterbalance Germany and not to raise the bid over 
the German offers to Greece. In the latter case Bulgaria will suffer a 
diplomatic defeat at this scene too. While the strategic importance of the 
Greek seashore was too great, Bulgaria’s presence on the Aegean was 
not desired, as it would be too close to the Straits. Therefore Mishev 
proposed to refuse the German-Russian joint arbitration because of the 
unpredictable result. 
Instead of this, the Bulgarian ambassador proposed the joint 
arbitration of all Powers (earlier, on 30 May Serbia also turned to the 
Entente, asking for the joint arbitration of the six Powers), but these 
refused to accept it (remembering the futile efforts of the negotiations in 
St. Petersburg174 and of the conferences in London) – with the exception 
of Germany, represented by Zimmermann. Thus Bulgaria lost another 
opportunity to isolate Serbs from Greeks.  
In the beginning of June Kalinkov sent a telegram from Bucharest in 
which he informed his government that if war broke out, Romania 
                                                                                                                                
representatives. Therefore Pichon thought that parties should turn to all Powers or to the 
Triple Alliance. Sazonov refused this version, as he wanted to exclude Austria-Hungary 
from the decision-making. See: Documents diplomatiques français [further DDF]. 1929-, 3. VI. 
Nr. 611; Nr. 631. 
173 CSA, F. 176k, Inv. 2, a.u. 1369. l. 272. May 27/ June 9, 1913.  
174 Ending in an useless protocol regarding the territorial compensation of Romania. 
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would mobilize her troops, and would not stay neutral.175 Later, on 26 
June Russia also advised to do this. Shebeko, the Russian ambassador to 
Bucharest (just like the French) urged mobilization for Romania in order 
to prevent a Serb-Bulgarian conflict, maintaining the Balkan League 
intact. Beyond these, he advised the immediate occupation of the 
Tutrakan-Balchik line, also to prevent the outbreak of fights.176 It is 
possible that Shebeko thought that after satisfying Romanian demands, 
Serbia could not rely on Romania’s help in a war against Bulgaria. But 
his advice was favourable for the Serbian and Romanian cause indeed. 
(1) In this case, contrary to the Russian hopes, the Serbian-Bulgarian 
conflict would sharpen further, since the Serbs were reluctant to give 
territorial concession to the Bulgarians, if the latter remained without 
Romanian support (and Romania would not be obliged to support 
Bulgaria, if accepted the Russian solution). (2) A Romanian occupation of 
the territories prior to a Serbian-Bulgarian war would rather provoke a 
Romanian-Bulgarian war, which would have been exploited easily by 
the Serbs and Greeks.  
Shebeko probably thought that if Romania gained Southern Dobruja 
with the support of Russia, it could drift more easily to the Russian 
sphere of interest, and the Balkan Leage may survive exchanging 
Bulgaria to Romania in the alliance system. (By that time Russia had 
considered Bulgaria as an ally of Austria-Hungary).177 Furthermore, 
Romania could be diverted against Austria-Hungary by promising 
Transylvania. The combination went further: if the Dual Monarchy 
collapsed, the Serbs might get Albania, and in that case, Macedonia 
could be given back to Bulgaria, thus – on a long run – Bulgaria might 
return to the League.178 
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This plan, mentioned by Sosnosky as the idea of the Russian 
diplomacy, reflects the deepest Austro-Hungarian fears on the one 
hand, and shows similarity to the 1911 plan of Milovanović and Geshov 
on the other, which means that this combination was not an isolated 
phenomenon, and influenced Power policy as well. 
The behavior of Romania was more and more worrying for Bulgaria, 
therefore it is interesting to examine, how diplomats reacted to the 
growing tensions. On 28 May Teodorov, Bulgarian Minister of Finance 
sent a message from Paris: “I think we should not buy Romania’s friendship 
by offering new territories. I repeat that after a victorious (!) war against Serbs 
and Greeks our situation would be more difficult, due to the demands of Turkey 
and Romania … just let them find support at our enemies”179 … “Sooner or 
later we have to make a deal with the Greeks giving a peaceful outcome to our 
debate, rather than accepting the arbitration of Powers or – in worst case –, 
Russia. This won’t be such bad as initiating a war… We have to do everything 
to avoid a conflict – lasting for days – with two states at the same time, since 
after winning a victory over two opponents, we have to count on that a third or 
a fourth will attack us from among our neighbors. The Russians said that they 
encouraged the Serbs for peace.”180 
Teodorov – though overestimated the value of the Bulgarian army – 
saw the Greek question quite well. But we have already seen that the 
following day the Greek offer – which was interpreted by Mishev – was 
refused by the Bulgarian government.  
Teodorov’s opinion on the Romanian question is worth comparing 
with Salabashev’s telegram, dated from 17 May, reflecting the opinion 
of Tschirschky, German ambassador to Vienna. The Germans urged an 
agreement with Romania. “If Bulgaria magnanimously gives something to 
Romania … then Romania will help Bulgaria in a war for Macedonia against 
the Greeks and Serbs.”181 The explicit opinion of Tschirschky was that 
Romania would help Bulgaria with her armed forces. This telegram, 
suggesting a solution completely the opposite of Teodorov’s idea, made 
the Bulgarians reconsider an alliance with Romania. Unfortunately, 
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181 Ibid. l. 107. May 30 (May 17 in old style), 1913. 
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Tschirschky’s opinion was not the official policy adapted by Germany, 
indeed, it is still dubious, whether Tschirschky gave fake information 
intentionally (as Romania was more important for German policy than 
Bulgaria) or was simply ignorant. Bulgaria really calculated with 
Tschirschky’s idea, but a diplomatic mistake of Austria-Hungary 
(mentioned here later) seemed to verify Teodorov’s point of view. 
In the beginning of June the Bulgarian government still found the 
doors opened for any of the above mentioned solutions: (1) an 
agreement with Romania or Turkey, (2) the arbitration of one or more 
Powers, and (3) making a deal with Greece or Serbia. Although 
Teodorov recognised that the gradual increase of the demands was a 
part of the tactics of the former allies, and his views contained the 
elements of Realpolitik – like the necessity of avoiding a war – his 
solution of making a bargain with Greece was undermined by his 
irrealistic trust in Bulgarian weapons, and the Serb-Greek agreement 
also forbade separate agreements.  
Teodorov’s strategy was one of the most viable ideas mentioned up 
to now to fix the problems. Bulgaria could have regained its 
independence from Power policy and ability to manoeuvre, if she had 
made up with Greece by her own will, without external pressure.  
The preliminary peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire signed on 30 
May created a new situation. Madzharov, representing the aggressive 
wing of the Bulgarian foreign policy, which soon became predominant 
openly urged a showdown. “In my opinion the only way to prevent war 
(with Serbia) is to dispatch our troops towards Sofia as soon as possible, then to 
offer a deadline to the Serbs to retreat from the uncontested zone, of course, 
only in case they refuse Russian arbitration. We mustn’t enter to any kind of 
negotiations beyond the principles laid down in the convention. It is time to 
raise our voice, and let the world, especially the Russians, know that we are not 
afraid of a war with Serbia. Any proposal on a conference between the allies is a 
trap. I guess the Greeks have got frightened, that’s why they intend to come to 
an understanding with us… From now on we have to make an agreement with 
Montenegro against Serbia. The behavior of Serbs is so dishonest that it relieves 
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us from any kind of obligation.”182 It is important to emphasize that 
Madzharov did not reject an agreement with Greece. 
Another telegram – different from the above written – arrived from  
I. S. Geshov, Bulgarian ambassador to Berlin. The relative of the former 
Prime Minister wrote that the Romanians would be happy to grab more 
territories beyond Silistra (given officially to Romania by the protocol of 
St. Petersburg) and would not let such an opportunity slip away, as 
“more or less everybody is dissatisfied with the result of the Protocol of St. 
Petersburg. If there won’t be armed conflict with Serbia, the Romanian 
discontent may remain within the frame of inner policy, without any 
international importance. But if war breaks out, Romania will demand 
compensation, therefore our interest is to settle a preliminary agreement with 
Romania and promise something … Serbia has already made her offer twice to 
Romania.”183 According to the ambassador, Bulgaria had to make up 
with Turkey. (The German interests – an alliance with Turkey, an 
agreement with Romania and Greece, potentially establishing a new 
Balkan League – also appear here between the lines). Geshov warned 
that the Germans – although they sympathized with Bulgaria – would 
not interfere into the course of events, while Greece was backed by the 
Entente.  
Although both parties were lacking trust towards each other, 
Austria-Hungary’s dreams about a Romanian-Bulgarian agreement 
were thwarted by an unexpected diplomatic event. On 8 June, A. Toshev, 
Bulgarian ambassador to Serbia warned the Bulgarian government that 
a Power was planning compensation for Serbia in Macedonia, if she 
retreated from the Adriatic. Toshev suspected that Nikolai Gartwig, the 
Russian ambassador made the offer, but he refused the accusation. 
From a letter sent to I. E. Geshov (then Prime Minister of Bulgaria) on 28 
May it became evident that it was Austria-Hungary who offered the 
Vardar-valley to the Serbs for their deliberate withdrawal from 
Albania.184 
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Pašić, the Serbian Prime Minister thought they had obeyed; therefore 
Serbia had the right to get the compensation and to revise the 
Bulgarian-Serbian agreement of 1912. This step of Austria-Hungary 
created distrust in Bulgaria towards Austria-Hungary, and thus a 
contract with Romania also became suspicious. The game was won by 
Serbia, as implicitely – through her offer – the Dual Monarchy 
supported the revision of the 1912 treaty. Berchtold’s objection, that the 
offer was not valid, as the Serbs left Albania under the pressure of 
Powers and not deliberately, was futile, and from that time on the 
Bulgarian-Austrian relations were deteriorating. 
An alliance with Romania therefore became an undesired solution 
for Bulgaria. One of the Russian proposals similarly shocked the 
Bulgarian diplomacy: when on 31 May, a day after signing the 
preliminary peace in London, Sazonov proposed Struga, Kratovo, Veles 
and Krushevo – towns located in the southern part of the contested 
zone, or even beyond that, in the uncontested zone – to be given to the 
Serbs. This meant that in case of a Russian arbitration Bulgaria would 
not only lose the full contested zone, but territories beyond.185 This 
increased Bulgarian distrust towards a Russian arbitration. 
Mishev’s account from the same day was even less calming. The 
ambassador wrote that Venizelos wanted to meet Geshov in order to 
settle the territorial questions. If it was impossible, he offered all the 
four allies186 to travel to St. Petersburg. Mishev’s personal opinion was 
that such an arbitration may cause serious harm to the Bulgarian cause. 
“Today the Russian ambassador openly agreed with the demands of Pašić, 
stating that he will always find an opportunity to promote the cause of the 
common Serb-Greek border, which we have interpreted that we should 
renounce the Lake of Ohrid, and the territories to the east of the lake.187 
Sazonov admitted that morally the Serbs had the right for the revision 
of the treaty of March 1912. This was another proof for Bulgaria that the 
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186 The Serb-Bulgarian agreement about the Russian arbitration was valid originally for these 
two states, therefore the interference of the further two states was annoying the Bulgarians, 
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Russians would not keep the principles of the 1912 agreement, therefore 
they lost their belief in that solution too. So, nothing more remained, 
beside a separate agreement with the former allies.  
Bulgarians emphasized that their policy is based on confidence of the 
the given word laid down in the treaties, but indeed they trusted 
nobody: “If Bulgaria had not been so resolute to be faithful to her allies, and if 
her deeds had been driven by egoism and opportunism, Bulgaria would have 
found several ways to defend her interests. And she wouldn’t have remained 
isolated surrounded by the bloc of her neighbors.”188 Although the frankness 
of the sentence (as of the Bulgarian policy) may be questioned, at the 
end of May 1913 Bulgarians realized that they had isolated themselves 
by their maximalist policy.  
The Bulgarians refused the first two solutions, i.e. an alliance and a 
deal with one of their neighbors and the arbitration. Neither were they 
able to secure the support of the Powers, as the latter would suppose the 
realisation any of the first two mentioned solutions. That time the 
influence of the Powers over the peninsula was present only indirectly, 
by supporting the aspirations of their satellite-states, since the direct 
interference of the Powers would only lead to a counterstep from 
another, thus escalating the conflict. This circumstance was neglected by 
the Bulgarian government, which committed a serious mistake. The 
direct involvement of Powers into the events was now missing, unlike 
in the case of Skutari or Durrës, as the distribution of the occupied 
territories was not a primordial interest of any of the Powers, unlike 
maintaining peace, (if possible) between the two great alliance systems. 
The decision-making in the Bulgarian government was delayed by 
the lack of proper selection of the arriving information. Salabashev on 6 
June reported another interesting opinion from Tschirschky. According 
to the German ambassador to Vienna “Austria-Hungary will support 
immediately, to the bitter end Bulgaria’s interests against Serbia and Greece. 
Italy has already arranged everything with Austria. Germany agrees with 
Austria-Hungary, and accepts that she is entitled to lead the Triple Alliance 
politically in any question arising on the Balkan Peninsula.”189 
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Reading these lines one may wonder what goals these words meant 
to serve, because almost nothing was true, what Tschirschky pointed 
out. Was it an intentional disinformation (especially compared to 
Tarnowski’s concept)? Did the Germans believe – what Thallóczy also 
mentioned in his diary – the rumours of intervention under certain 
circumstances? Was it a betrayal of the Austro-Hungarian concept and 
interests? Or an attempt to influence the official German Balkan-policy? 
Or Salabashev simply misunderstood something and gave fake 
information in order to to influence the Bulgarian foreign policy? 
Salabashev continued: “Beyond these, Germany is of the opinion, that a 
strong Bulgaria is needed to step against Serbia. Germany should attempt to 
isolate Greece from the Entente, and to elaborate a Turkish-Romanian-
Bulgarian-Greek alliance against Serbia. From this purpose, Bulgaria has to 
make up with Greece and renounce from Saloniki, but any other settlements 
should fall into Bulgaria’s hands. Thus Bulgaria’s war against Serbia will be 
easier.”190  
The quoted text contained only partial truths. It is true that Germans 
wanted to create a new Balkan League – with Turkey, but without 
Bulgaria. Thus, German plans were against Berchtold’s idea. The 
German ambassador openly encouraged Bulgaria to wage war against 
Serbia, which was also against the official German policy.  
It was also true that an agreement between Greece and Bulgaria was 
not only a German interest, but Bulgarian as well. But it is also well-
known, that later at the Bucharest peace conference, Germany did not 
support Bulgaria, even Kavala was given to Greece. The German 
ambassador refused Berchtold’s Bulgarian-Romanian agreement, as it 
was against the German interests. Although Tschirschky was convinced 
that Bulgaria and Turkey had to shake hands as Germany needed 
strong states to promote her economic penetration towards Baghdad – a 
Turkish-Bulgarian alliance was not welcomed by the official German 
foreign policy. 
Beside this, the Bulgarians had one more chance. Salabashev wrote 
that Hussein Hilmi Pasha warned Austria-Hungary that Turkey would 
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attack Greece, if the Aegean Islands were given to Greeks by the Powers 
at the London conference of ambassadors.191 But the Powers were 
working slowly, and no decision was made before the end of the second 
Balkan War.  
The Bulgarian ambassador to Bucharest, Kalinkov warned his 
government in May that Bulgaria either had to come to terms with 
Romania, or had to negotiate with all of her neighbors on a broadened 
base – the latter seemed to be more difficult. According to him, the 
broken balance of the Balkan League can be restored with the support of 
Romania, and if the Balkan Alliance collapsed, in case of external threat 
Bulgaria could still rely on Romania’s support.192  
The Bulgarians were informed that the mobilisation of Romanian 
troops was proposed by Russia and France. The opportunity of an 
agreement in which Bulgarians could count on Romania’s active 
support slipped away. Having supporters among the Powers, the 
Romanians could step into action more energetically to satisfy their 
claims. At the outbreak of the war, on 29 June, Danev wrote: “everything 
shows that Romania does not want to reach an agreement with us, hoping that 
in case of war, she may increase her demands, since she neither wishes a strong 
Bulgaria, nor the maintenance of peace.”193 On the one hand this was true, 
but Bulgaria was also responsible for this situation. Romania’s interest 
was to wait, who “pays more”. In this situation the Bulgarians needed 
Romania’s help and not contrary. Romania had nothing to lose in a war 
on the same side with Greece and Serbia. 
Bulgaria was thrown with a chance once more. On 5 July Romania 
informed Danev that in the following 10 days the troops would not 
cross the border, therefore Bulgaria had two solutions to avoid the 
consequences of the events. Sofia could either suspend military actions 
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and accept the arbitration of the Russian Tsar (on a widened base!) or 
could offer a compensation to Romania (Tutrakan-Balchik line). But this 
time the latter did not imply a Romanian intervention on Bulgaria’s 
side, just neutrality. Bulgaria decided to choose a third solution: she 
wanted to defeat Greece and Serbia within the given ten days, before 
the Romanian attack.194  
According to the information of Kalindero, Romanian ambassador to 
Sofia, Romania would have been satisfied with the Tutrakan-Balchik 
line even on 8 July, and in that case it would have stopped mobilisation 
(but this would not help Bulgaria, since it had lost the battle of 
Bregalnica by 8 July). Owing to the rumours of Bulgarian defeat, the 
second part of the telegram was full of threats that Romania would 
dictate peace from Sofia, with different terms – demanding the Ruse-
Shumen-Varna line. 
The Bulgarian response was harsh (and futile): “Bulgaria is not afraid 
of any threat from Romania, she should understand that until the fortune of 
Macedonia is endangered, Bulgaria is ready to sacrifice anything”195 - 
anything, except sacrificing Southern Dobrudja. Although S. Bobchev 
from St. Petersburg warned Bulgaria that in case of Romanian attack, 
Russia would remain neutral, and that St. Petersburg denied help based 
on the agreement of 1902, Danev agreed to initiate negotiations with 
Romania only after the defeat (on 9 July, 1913). It meant that Bulgaria 
had now nothing to gain, and its goal was to minimize territorial losses, 
while Romania increased her demands. Bulgaria had no other 
possibility to avoid total humiliation, as to turn to Russia (Austria-
Hungary did not help). An earlier step would have been welcomed by 
Russians and Bulgarians of Macedonia as well... 
The conditions of armistice were the following: (1) Bulgaria 
immediately renounces from the Tutrakan-Balchik line, thus Russian 
could play the role the savior of Bulgaria overshadowing Austria-
Hungary. (2) Bulgaria immediately suspends military operations 
(saving Greece from a defeat under Simitli), (3) Romania will play a 
decisive role in solving the disputed questions on the Balkans (here 
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Russia gave chance to Romania to play a leading role in the peace, in 
order to avoid the interference of Austria-Hungary into the events).  
*** 
The above written all evidenced that the Bulgarian government was 
aware of the dangers threatening its aims, and had ideas about the 
possible outcomes, risks and consequences. The two point of views ”За 
Македония ще дадем ръка на дявола” [“for Macedonia we would shake 
hands even with the devil”] and ”Политиката на всичко или нищо е 
политиката на авантюристите” [“the policy of everything or nothing 
is the policy of adventurers”] clashed during these months, but the 
political elite was unable tie itself consequetly to a firm solution. 
Overestimating her military success, Bulgaria thought that she could 
force the realization of the agreement of 1912 in favour of her demands, 
although several Bulgarian diplomats warned the leaders that even a 
military victory over two enemies could not solve the crisis.  
Bulgaria probably thought that a military conflict among the former 
allies might endanger the maintenance of the balance of power between 
the two alliance systems, and might result an European war, therefore 
the Powers would never let the escalation and prolongation of hostilities 
between the former allies happen. But Bulgaria forgot about the fact that 
this fragile equilibrium of Power policy could only be guaranteed by the 
strict non-intervention of the Powers.  
The Bulgarian policy was oscillating (’politique d’oscillation’), 
searching for both Russia’s and Austria’s friendship without 
undertaking any serious obligations.196 This inconsequent policy of 
adventurers (everything or nothing) was a complete failure. Bulgaria 
was unable to sign an alliance either with Romania or Turkey, lost the 
opportunity to reach an agreement with her former allies without the 
arbitration of one or more Powers, refused a bargain with the Greeks to 
weaken Serbia, and alienated herself from the Powers. The mesmerised 
Bulgarian diplomacy trusted nobody, but a paper (the accord of 1912) 
and an idea (the principle of nationality) which were questioned (or at 
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Bukarester Frieden. Hamburg, 1936. 176. 
112 
 
least its interpretation) not only by her allies, but by the arbiter as well. 
The political elite was fully responsible for the forthcoming political 
isolation of the country. Hungary committed the same mistake in 1918. 
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Expansionism or Self-Defence? The Plans of the Austro-
Hungarian Diplomatic Circles towards Serbia (1913–15) 
 
 
The present study investigates the changes in Austro-Hungarian 
concepts related to Serbia after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.197 The two 
extremist concepts mentioned in the title clearly mark the range of 
diverse opinions in Austria-Hungary regarding the Serbian problem. 
After 1903 Serbia was considered not only as a barrier to the Austro-
Hungarian economic penetration into the peninsula, but as a growing 
threat to the existence of the Hungarian statehood – according to 
Hungarian politicians. The attitude towards Serbia varied from 
conquering the state to temporary occupation, mutilation or total 
division of the country between her neighbors (with or without the 
participation of Austria-Hungary), including economic subjection as the 
least aggressive plan. The relevance of these plans depended on the 
relative strength of the numerous competing pressure groups and was 
also influenced by the situation on the battlefields between 1912–15.  
This study focuses only on the activity of the ’Magyars’ including the 
imperialistic tendencies of press, and the attitude of a certain 
(conservative)198 group of decision-makers Baron István Burián and 
Count István Tisza. The numerous pressure groups had different 
concepts regarding foreign policy, and their rivalry did not increase the 
efficiency of executive power. The mentioned group deserves our 
interest due to the fact that from being quite underinformed in 1913 
without consolidated, influential positions, by 1915 it had managed to 
control almost all key positions in decision making. In 1912 Burián – 
who had great experience in Balkan affairs after his mission in Sofia and 
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Athens199 – lost his position as Joint Minister of Finance. This meant the 
weakening of Hungarian influence in foreign policy and in Bosnia too. 
His colleague, Lajos Thallóczy, as a civil official was forced to balance 
between Bilinski, the new Joint Minister of Finance and the Hungarian 
pressure group. Although István Tisza visioned a foreign political 
concept serving Hungarian interests, he lacked proper information and 
power until mid-1913. After having been appointed to the position of 
Hungarian Prime Minister again, Tisza immediately employed Burián 
as Mediating Minister between the Emperor and the Hungarian 
government, thus restoring the formal positions of the pressure group 
and the accessibility to confidential information. Burián finally became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1915 after the fall of Berchtold – whose 
policy was continuously being criticized by Burián (partly because of 
his dismissal from Bosnia, partly because their intentions regarding 
foreign policy were in opposition). And finally, Thallóczy became the 
civil governor of the occupied Serbia in 1915. 
It was the death of Francis Ferdinand and the failure of Berchtold in 
the two Balkan Wars that contributed remarkably to the emergence of 
this pressure group. Nonetheless, their opinion did not coincide in all 
cases. Burián was a supporter of an appeasement with Russia,200 while 
Tisza neglected this question and focused on the Balkans. In order to 
counterbalance Romanian aspirations towards Transylvania, he wanted 
to use Bulgaria. This meant that his ideas were in contradiction with the 
plans of the allied Germany: the latter wanted to establish a Greek-
Romanian cooperation on the peninsula. 
The ideas of other groups, including the political circles of Francis 
Ferdinand, or the army (Beck, Conrad, Krobatin, Hoyos, Sarkotić) or 
those, who supported the German policy (partially Berchtold) are not 
discussed here (for their plans see figure 4, Chapter 2), the focus is on the 
activity of the above mentioned triumvirate. But it is worth mentioning 
that the constant rivalry between these groups decreased the efficiency 
                                                          
199 Consul in Sofia, later ambassador to Athens between 1887–1903. 
200 From 1849 on the Hungarians’ and Andrássy’s greatest fear was a Russian takeover in the 
peninsula, promoting the self-consiousness of Slavs in the Dual State and checkmating 
Austria-Hungary. His successor inherited this fear of panslavism. 
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of the foreign policy – both the Joint Minister of Finance, like Kállay and 
Burián, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs tended to pursuit his 
own foreign policy on the Balkans – instead of reinforcing it. 
Extremist expansionism was not a typical feature of this group. 
Nonetheless, they believed in Hungarian political and cultural 
superiority over the Balkans, but their imperialistic tendencies were 
’only’ of economic character. The Eastern Academy of Trade and 
Commerce (Keleti Kereskedelmi Akadémia) was the institutional 
background of these ideas. The politicians’ activity was rather driven by 
certain fears than by territorial expansion. The political elite considered 
Serbia as a constant threat to the integrity of the Hungarian statehood 
due to the Serbian propaganda. Thus they agreed in the necessity of a 
possible preventive war – in this respect they took a similar stand to 
Conrad – but the conquest and annexation propagated by the latter 
(figure 4) was against their interest.  
The propagation of expansionism came from the ’Magyar’ middle 
class, not from the political elite and was expressed through popular 
publicistics in the press. The famous economic entrepreneur, Rezső 
Havass was one of the founders of the Hungarian political geography 
and geopolitics. He wrote the following: “we have not any colonies yet, and 
we have not enough power to compete with other nations in distant continents 
to gain economic supremacy over our rivals, but the neighboring Balkan 
peninsula can offer us hegemony in this economic space ranging from the Black 
Sea to the Aegean.”201 Generally he was rather thinking of economic 
penetration and gaining cultural supremacy in this region: “Budapest 
should be the Paris of the Balkans, let us spread the Hungarian economic and 
mental forces over the peninsula.”202 The arguments of the editor of the 
Vasárnapi Újság (Sunday News) Pál Hoitsy were of scientific character, 
but aggressive. In his rhetorics popular science was used to support 
political ideas. He argued that the Carpathian Basin203 is opened 
                                                          
201 Quoted by Ábrahám, B.: A Balkán képe a 19–20. századi magyar geopolitikai és tudományos 
gondolkodásban. Regio 18, 2007/2. 47–78. 
202 Ibid. 
203 This term was quite unknown in European geography (Pannonian Basin was more 
common) and was applied mainly in geology (although the theory of Tisia-block – which 
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towards the South hydrogeographically, so who established a state here 
would be forced for expansionism forever.204 “Nature itself delimited the 
necessary boundaries of the Hungarian states towards the watershed of the 
Alps, including the territory of Dalmatia, Bosnia and Serbia, and towards the 
Balkan Mts. including Bulgaria and the lower basin of the Danube towards the 
Danube-delta. The country will not expand beyond this line.” 
The teacher of the Academy of Eastern Commerce and Trade205 
(which could be considered as the institutionalization of Hungarian 
imperialistic tendencies) Dezső Szegh pointed out in his work that “the 
Berlin Congress did hinder international calamities, but could not settle the 
Eastern Question and with its hidden thoughts, doors opened, created the acute 
Balkan Question… The economic positions of the Dual Monarchy were 
deteriorating since the Berlin Congress, with no advances gained, but with 
positions abandoned. Therefore it is not surprising that in political actions this 
state functioned only as stuffing. In order to realize Hungarian claims we have 
to fight with Austria too. If finally the Ballhausplatz recognised that Austria-
Hungary should turn into a Great Power while looking to the East, then the 
realization of this idea could be carried out together with securing the 
Hungarian interests, which is also in the interest of the Dual State.”206  
Similar thoughts were expressed by Lajos Lóczy, the leading 
Hungarian physical geographer. “Lóczy now expressed his pleasure that the 
Balkan Wars put an end to this pending Turkish question. A great area has 
been liberated for the purposes of economy and science. We have iron ore only 
for 80 years. We still have coal, but we need the coalfields in Bosnia for the 
Hungarian industry. Salt and petroleum can also be found in Bosnia” – wrote 
Thallóczy in his diary. Capital for the exploitation could have been 
supplied by Leo Lánczy (banker with relations to the Rimamurány Iron 
Co.). The debate over the exploitation of the iron ore in Prijedor and the 
direction of Bosnian railway lines is another testimony of this internal 
                                                                                                                                
this term relied on proved to be false later). Nowadays this term is not used by neighboring 
countries (successor states) due to its implicit political meaning. 
204 See: Hoitsy, P.: Nagymagyarország. A magyar történet jövő századai. Budapest, [1902], 26. 
205 Among its teachers we may mention Ignác Kúnos or Adolf Strausz, the Hungarian 
propagator of the Mitteleuropa Plan, and among the students there was Mátyás Rákosi, the 
later communist leader too. 
206 Szegh, D.: Magyarország a Balkánon. Gazdaságpolitikai tanulmány. Budapest, 1908. 
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rivalry between the parts of the Habsburg Monarchy.207 The Hungarian 
lobby208 could count on more and more officials with pro-Hungarian 
sentiments in Bosnia due to the activity of Joint Ministers of Finance of 
Hungarian origin. 
The country was mesmerized by its imaginery superiority. But from 
the political left a different tone arose. László Rubin, the comrade of the 
leftist Ervin Szabó interpreted this “scientifically confirmed superiority and 
’chosenness’ that gave authorization to intervene into Balkan affairs” as a false 
indoctrination and refused these ideas emerging to the rank of political 
doctrines (re)presented by Havass, Hoitsy or Lóczy. As a witness of the 
attempt of the Dual Monarchy to create the Albanian state, he wrote the 
following: 
“We wanted to establish a colony. Our megalomaniac dreams have almost 
been fulfilled. This masterpiece of the art of violence, hurry, clumsiness and the 
lack of principles was observed by the author of these lines from the first row, 
because he was appointed as civil governor of the area in the name of General 
Können-Horák, who rather acted like a twit ’Tischlermeister’. The main goal 
was the establishment of bureaucratization. The new statehood was manifested 
indeed in bureacratization. Albania soon became flooded by so many military 
officials that the proportion of officers reached one for each hundred of sheep. 
The highest levels of administration were immediately established. In Scutari 
hundreds of k.u.k. officers were deposited and garrisoned who grew ideas and 
produced documents. You could see them hurrying in the streets, holding plans 
under their arms, each was ’Albanienkenner’, who arrived from the West 
yesterday to solve the Eastern Question by tomorrow. For these plenty of 
officers new palace-like barracks were erected to store these documents. The age 
of documents has arrived to a country where nobody could write and read. 
                                                          
207 Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchenyi Library). Néhai Dr. Thallóczy Lajos osztályfőnök 
hátrahagyott iratai sztenographalt részének átírása (The Diaries of Ludwig von Thallóczy). Fol. 
Hung. 1677. Bosniaca VIII/7. 303, 320–329, 254, 330–331. November 21, 1912. For the debate 
over Prijedor iron mines see Burián’s diary, 82. For the debate regarding railways see: 
Sándorffy, M.: Bosznia-Hercegovina vasúthálózata és új vasútépítési tervezete. Magyar Katonai 
Közlöny, 1914/2. 152–56. 
208 This included officials-propagandists like Zoltán László, economic theoreticians of the 
Academy for Eastern trade, Dezső Szegh, the orientalist-adventurer Adolf Strausz, Ödön 




Hundreds of orders were issued, which were not executed, because nobody 
could read them, and noone dared enter the central parts of the country called 
’Sauland’. The structure of administration was similar to an upside-down 
pyramid. … In Scutari each case, like collecting turtles, forestry or mining had 
a special reference person, but nobody collected frogs and turtles, nobody dared 
go to the woods, and the mines did not exist at all.” 209 
This ’testimony’ was one of the rare overt expressions of the colonial 
plans of the Dual Monarchy (often refused by historians). Although the 
word colonization had already been put down by civil officials a decade 
before,210 but the picture drawn by the Austro-Hungarian way of state-
building, which was “bureacratization at first, second and at last”, was 
rather sad, but funny. 
“The good people looked upon us as the bearers/manifestations of impartial 
justice and rigour. And we flooded the land with the Hungarian gendarmerie, 
who were sniffing spies everywhere and political opponents in everyone. While 
the robbers and burglars were running away, Hungarian policemen were 
creating artificial political trials together with the Czech auditors, and the most 
occupied person happened to be the ketch.”211 
*** 
The above mentioned thoughts did not mean the necessity of a conquest 
against Serbia, but definitely meant its economic subjection, forcing the 
country to return to its former policy (before 1903).  
Baron István Burián, then minister appointed to the king 
summarized the political situation after the Bucharest Peace Treaty (10 
August, 1913) with the following words:212 “Berchtold is tainted by the 
thought to exploit the situation – when Bulgaria is so pleading and Serbia is so 
exhausted – to enter into a showdown with the latter (whatever this means) 
saying ’within few years people will blame me, that I failed to exploit this 
possibility.’ Taking into consideration the problems of our internal affairs I 
                                                          
209 See: Rubin, L.: Albánia állammá alakulása. Huszadik Század, 1919. 135–41. 
210 The term ’colonization’ also appeared after the death of Kállay, but prior to the annexation 
of Bosnia (in connection with Kállay’s failure in creating the „Bosnian” nation in order to 
decrease Serbian influence). Gratz, G.: Bosznia Kállay halála korában. Huszadik Század, 1904/1. 
376. 
211 Rubin L.: Albánia állammá alakulása… 
212 See: Báró Burián István naplói… 69. July 28, 1913.  
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would not consider this as a good political idea, even if Bulgaria would be in a 
different situation, as we originally calculated. We cannot attack and 
dismember Serbia, because we cannot put our part of the deal to anywhere, 
while the justness of Bulgarian aspirations would not be acknowledged by 
anyone in Europe.” 
 




                                                          
213 Source: Sándorffy, M.: Bosznia-Hercegovina vasúthálózata … 
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This short note on the events enlightens that (1) the Hungarian and 
Austrian plans did not coincide; (2) the two Balkan Wars did not 
ameliorate the positions of Austria-Hungary; (3) a showdown with 
Serbia gave plenty of space for the different combinations. This 
included (a) a war without annexation to smash the military potential of 
the country, (b) the annexation of Serbia, (c) mutilation or total 
dismemberment of Serbia without the participation of Austria-
Hungary, (d) mutilation or total dismemberment of Serbia with the 
participation of Austria-Hungary, (e) economic subjection of Serbia. 
Between 1913–15 each was a relevant alternative, and their realization 
depended on the foreign political situation and the relative power of 
different pressure groups. 
Burián’s opinion was that although the declaration of independence 
of Albania and the withdrawal of Serbia from the Adriatic Sea was a 
success, the second Balkan War resulted in a huge loss of prestige for 
Austria-Hungary.214 “The only possible solution of the events would be now 
(after the Bucharest Peace Treaty), when the Powers are against any 
revision, an attack on Serbia (following the Romanian example on Bulgaria) 
forcing it to withdraw from Bulgarian inhabited territories. Probably this 
would not mean a war. But such an act would require ability to react: good 
diplomatic leadership, subjection of military aspects (annihilation of Serbia) 
to political decison-making… and financial readiness.”215 Each of these 
circumstances were missing and it was well-known by Burián. His 
assumption – that an attack on Serbia could not initiate a world war – 
might be dubious, but it was evident that he did not feel the time 
opportune for the destruction of Serbia  
If anyone wanted to destroy Serbia a good pretext, a provocation 
had to be found, which would give at least an ostensible justification to 
the Austrian step.216 
 
                                                          
214 Báró Burián István naplói… 71. August 16, 1913.  
215 Ibid. August 14, 1913.  
216 For a thorough analysis of the Hungarian stance during WWI see Imre Ress for the late 
periods. Ress, I.: Das Königreich Ungarn in ersten Weltkrieg. In: Die Habsburgermonarchie. 
Band XI. Teilband 1/2.: Vom Vielvölkerstaat Österreich-Ungarn zum neuen Europa der 
Nationalenstaaten. Ed.: Rumpler, H. Wien, 2016. 1095–-1163. 
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The dismemberment of Serbia was not a new concept (see figure 4 in 
chapter 2). We know Bulgarian maps from 1913 that completely 
dismembered Serbia between Romania, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary 
(figure 2). The diary of Lajos Thallóczy also gives account on promises of 
Austria-Hungary towards Bulgaria in case of Bulgarian-Serbian clash. 
Tsar Ferdinand was promised military aid even in case of defeat from 
Serbia. But – unlike Tsar Ferdinand’s offer – even this straightforward 
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diary did not contain further details on the mutilation or 
dismemberment of Serbia after the Balkan Wars.217  
However, a military aid contradicted to the interests of Austria-
Hungary. “We cannot bind our forces and alliance to Bulgaria. They will 
fulfill their function as the enemy of Serbia – which is important for us – even 
without support, because it is their destiny. But working together with 
Bulgaria – which ruined everything – is impossible.”218 This concept of 
Burián was soon overshadowed by the reluctant Romanian behavior 
towards the Dual Monarchy, and Tisza became the propagator of a 
cooperation with Bulgaria.  
Serbia could play a key role in the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary 
not only because of its propaganda in Bosnia or in Vojvodina, which 
enhanced the centrifugal tendencies in this multiethnic empire, and not 
only because of the economic interests of the Dual Monarchy – several 
plans existed to isolate or bypass Serbia economically. It was the 
changing geopolitical situation and the increasing Russian penetration 
that overvalued Serbia and Bulgaria. Prior to 1903 Romania and Serbia 
were lining up along the southern frontiers as buffer states of the Dual 
Monarchy. By 1913 these had become hostile towards Austria-Hungary, 
which had to create a new buffer zone. This gave an opportunity for 
Bulgaria to appear in the political map again: the Hungarian pressure 
group – having no trust in the future behavior of Romania219 – became 
the propagator of an autonomous or independent Albania and a closer 
cooperation with Bulgaria. “Berchtold remains silent about the weakening of 
our positions, supposing that there was no change in the relative strength of 
Austria-Hungary on the one side and Romania and Serbia on the other”220 – 
summarized Burián.  
This also means that the plans of the investigated pressure group 
were in contradiction with the official policy of the Triplice. 
                                                          
217 See: Thallóczy, IX/1. 500. April 19, 1913. and XI/2. 581. July 4, 1913. Here the reoccupation of 
the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and a joint border with Albania was also mentioned.  
218 Báró Burián István naplói… 71. August 24, 1913.  
219 “Rumänien ist durchgegangen” – admitted Burián in his diary. 
220 Báró Burián István naplói… 79. November 18, 1913.  
123 
 
This involuntary path in foreign policy coincided with the economic 
needs of the Dual State: the isolation of Serbia was important not only 
because of military reasons, or to economically weaken the enemy, but 
the Dual Monarchy proposed its new railway lines towards the Aegean 
Sea along the Albanian seashore in order to bypass Serbia and the 
Otranto Straits in order to reach the Via Egnatia through Valona and 
Monastir. This concept – including the will to control river Danube 
down to the Danube Delta and together with a proposal aiming at 
connecting the Danube with Saloniki through the construction of a 
channel between the Morava and Vardar rivers – was summarized by 
the theoretician Adolf Strausz (teacher at the Eastern Academy of 
Commerce) in 1917.221  
This was the fourth combination of Austria-Hungary. The first – 
economic outlet through the Belgrade-Saloniki railway line – failed in 
1903 after the Serbian political turn. The second was the Sanjak railway 
project abandoned in 1908 and hindered again in 1913 by the allied 
Germans, because Austria-Hungary refused to accept the German 
conditions on the necessary loans. The third failure was the Romanian 
attack on Bulgaria, which crossed the plans to reach the port of Kavala 
through Romania and Bulgaria. 
In order to realize the fourth concept to reach the Via Egnatia a 
friendly Albania and a landlocked Serbia left without maritime outlet 
was required. It is not surprising that the Dual Monarchy did not 
hesitate in October, 1913 to stop the Serbian advance in Albania. “What 
would we do if Serbia was to occupy – even temporarily – Albanian territories? 
We would occupy a part of Serbia as a counterstep. I heard many oppositions, 
especially that the soldiers would only march if the annihilation of Serbia was 
in question. I guess this is not necessary, but would be a political mistake 
indeed” – wrote Burián.222 Before analyzing the Hungarian fears behind 
this “relatively peaceful” attitude (especially compared to the behavior 
of the ’war eagles’) it is worth mentioning that during the two Balkan 
Wars the k.u.k. army was mobilized four times meaning a 1 billion 
                                                          
221 Strausz, A.: Grossbulgarien. Posen, Leipzig, Budapest, Warchau, Konstantinopel, Sofia, 1917. 
180–90. 
222 Báró Burián István naplói… 73. October 7, 1913.  
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francs surplus in expenses reaching 16% of the total budget!223 The 
Habsburg Monarchy was poor in capital, it was only able to cover these 
expenses from credit. But the inland banks were no more prone to 
finance an army that had not shot even a gun. (The Balkan Wars cost 
twice as much for the Bulgarians fighting for eight months). A foreign 
(German) financial support would have serious political and economic 
consequences reducing the manoeuvring ability of Austria-Hungary. 
Behind the militant attitude of the army this economic aspect has also to 
be taken into consideration. Attacking Serbia without any territorial 
gains was simply not profitable, at least some economic consequences 
should have been achieved. 
The concept of the economic subjection of Serbia was not a new one, 
since prior to the “pig war” of 1906 Serbia was bound economically to 
Austria-Hungary. A desire for the reinstallment of a strict control over 
Serbia emerged again in 1913 as a compensation for the Serbian 
territorial aggrandisement. If we analyze these demands (official 
renouncement from Bosnia; the disbandment of the Narodna Odbrana; 
territorial compensation for Austria-Hungary in the Sanjak of 
Novipazar around Plevlje and Prijepolje as a hinterland of the Sanjak 
railway project; the acquisition of the Montenegrin Lovčen mountain to 
secure the planned railway lines and the harbors towards Albania; the 
creation the Užice-Vardište railway line to connect Bosnia with Serbia, 
with a junction towards River Morava; free trade till 1917, then customs 
union; the creation of the Sarajevo-Mitrovica-Saloniki line under the 
auspice of Austrian entrepreneurs within six years), then we may come 
to the conclusion that many of these had economic character, and their 
realization would have been equal to the complete economic subjection 
of Serbia.224 If we compare these demands to the ultimatum of 1914 
hardly any differences can be seen from economic aspect. 
Burián thought that the Austro-Hungarian neutrality should have 
been sold at a high price in 1912–13, and then all these demands could 
                                                          
223 Thallóczy, XI/1. 486. 
224 Thallóczy, XI/1. 398–400. January 9, 1913. 
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have been realized.225 Berchtold had right aims (Albania), but his 
instruments and measures were not adequate for this purpose.226 
Although he was sure that an Austro-Hungarian intervention would 
not result in the escalation of the warfare, this assumption remained 
untested. In 1913 all six Great Powers wanted peace. It was the 
contradiction of interests emerging during the peaceful settling of the 
debated questions, that proved indeed that the concert of Powers did 
not work any more. In 1914 in a similar situation neither of the Powers 
considered non-intervention as a solution to the stalemate any more. 
But the main problem laid not in the unsatisfied economic demands. 
The public opinion saw Serbia as a constant threat to the integrity of the 
dual state. In Bosnia and Croatia the opinion that the next king would 
be named Petar spread quickly:227 a conflict with Serbia seemed to be 
more and more realistic day by day, and it was supposed to be a 
struggle for the survival of the Monarchy even within political circles. 
Therefore, the attack on Serbia in 1914 was labelled as self-defence, even 
if it was a preventive attack indeed. “The showdown will begin immediately 
as soon as we are prepared to it. It will be a struggle for survival both for the 
Dual Monarchy and for Hungary as well”228 – wrote Burián.  
                                                          
225 Burián was forgetting about the contradictions and asymmetric interdependence in alliance 
politics of Austria-Hungary: the German support was not unconditional. To realize the 
Sanjak railway and other plans Austria-Hungary needed credits owing to the lack of 
internal financial possibilities. In 1912–13 the Germans offered a loan and their diplomatic 
support, if German materials were to be used during the construction works. But Austro-
Hungarian circles protested against this – the Salgótarján-Rimamurány Iron Works and the 
banker Leó Lánczy claimed that the construction should be based on domestic raw 
materials and had to rely on domestic firms (as they were also able to carry out such a 
project). Politicians were angered when Germany wanted to enforce similar financial 
conditions on the Dual State as they did on the small states in the Balkans. Finally, the 
Germans withdrew their proposal for loan, and the Dual State had to refrain from the 
raiway plan wihtout diplomatic and financial support. 
226 Báró Burián István naplói… 79. November 24, 1913.  
227 Ibid. 100. May 22, 1914. The Hungarian side severely criticized the official foreign policy and 
Berchtold personally. Burián had a crucial role in doing this, as he felt himself insulted after 
his removal from the position of joint Minister of Finance. He thought that Francis 
Ferdinand was behind Berchtold (but this was only partly true), therefore Burián attacked 
both.  
228 Báró Burián István naplói… 106. July 1, 1914.  
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So, most of the diplomats saw a fight with Serbia unavoidable, 
although the date, the pretext, the goals and its consequences remained 
unclear. What was then the original reason for Tisza to oppose the idea 
of war, and what made him change his mind? In his letter to Francis 
Joseph dated on 1, July he warned that he would consider war as a fatal 
mistake and did not want to share the responsibility for it. “Up to now 
we have no evidence to consider the Serbian state responsible (for the murder 
of the heir apparent) … we would initiate a war under the worst 
circumstances. … I think this is a very inadequate timing, since we have been 
unable to substitute the loss of Romania, and the only state we could count on, 
Bulgaria, is exhausted.”229 
The Hungarian pressure group (Tisza, Burián, Thallóczy) considered 
Bulgaria much more important as a counterweight to the Romanian 
aspirations towards Transylvania than to sacrifice it as a consequence of 
settling the Serbian question, while Berchtold did not refrain from such 
an act. “I warned Berchtold – wrote Burián – to refrain from the idea of 
giving free hand to Romania against Bulgaria, if – in turn – Romania gives us 
free hand against Serbia.”230  
Diószegi wrote that Tisza had been afraid of the modification of the 
balance between the two constituents of the Dual State.231 Both a 
victorious war and a failure could have disturbed the equilibrium, and 
this could have threatened the position of the Hungarians and the 
system of the dualism itself. Tisza did not consider the murder of the 
heir apparent serious enough to create a casus belli, until the complicity 
of the Serbian state was proved. Vermes went further, when he claimed 
that Tisza thought, an anti-Serbian coalition still could be realized, and 
this would ameliorate the positions of Austria-Hungary without 
warfare.232  
We cannot fully agree with this opinion, since the Germans only 
tolerated an alliance with Bulgaria in order to make Tisza change his 
                                                          
229 Tisza István írásai és beszédei 1888–1918. Vol. 5. Budapest, 2011. Nr. 433.  
230 Burián’s letter to Tisza, June 16, 1914. MREZSLT 44 a fond, Tisza István iratai 47. 66–67. 
231 Tisza was against of the annexation of Serbia, because – as he admitted in his retrospective 
speech at the Parliament in 22 October, 1918. – “it would have meant weakening and 
complications for the Monarchy instead of strengthening it”. Diószegi, I.: A Ballhausplatzi palota… 
232 Vermes, G.: Tisza István. Budapest, 2001. 246. 
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mind regarding the question of war. In case of peaceful outcome of the 
events Germany would have never supported such a pro-Bulgarian idea 
of Hungarian circles.233 Conrad von Hötzendorf wrote that Tisza’s 
hesitation was caused by the fear of a Russian attack, and that Germany 
would not come to reinforce the Monarchy if this happened.234 
Berchtold thought that Tisza had feared a Romanian attack on 
Transylvania in case of war.235 Therefore, in order to ease Tisza’s 
anxiety, Berchtold convinced Francis Joseph – who was also willing to 
enter into fight – to write a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm on 5 July containing 
the principles of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policy. 
The letter had two aims: to win Germany for an alliance with 
Bulgaria, and to make it clear whether Austria-Hungary could count on 
Germany in a war against Serbia or not. Tisza was noticed by Berchtold 
on 6 July about the position of Germany in these questions. “We can 
count on the wholehearted support of Germany against Serbia. Russia is 
unprepared. We should not let this favourable opportunity be unexploited.” In 
his diary Thallóczy added: the Kaiser wrote that Austria-Hungary 
should not fear of the Romanian attack, but at the same time warned, 
that this was possibly the last chance, because after the death of the old 
King Carol noone would be able to deter Romania from intervention 
without offering territorial compensations236 (Which meant 
Transylvania, as the offered Bukovina proved to be too small).  
Despite these assurances, prior to the joint Ministerrat on 7 July Tisza 
still maintained that “everything has to be done to avoid the violation of the 
sovereignity of Serbia, which could lead to a war. If You want the latter, the 
emperor has to find a new Prime Minister for it.”237 During the Council of 
                                                          
233 The Greeks would have never accepted such a coalition of the Triplice in which Bulgaria 
was included, and Greece was important for Germany. There was another confrontation 
between the German policy and Tisza’s attempts: in order to win Romania Germany would 
have sacrificed even Transylvania (not only Bukovina!) to his cause against the Entente, 
while Tisza wanted to keep the province, that is why he was searching for a counterweight 
against Romania. 
234 Conrad, Feldmarschall: Aus meiner Dienstzeit. Vol. IV. Wien-Berlin, 1921–1925. 34. 
235 Tisza István írásai és beszédei 5…. Nr. 433. 
236 Hauptmann, F.–Prasch, A.: Dr. Ludwig von Thallóczy. Tagebücher. 23. VI. 1914–31. XII. 1914. 
Graz, 1981. 36. July 7, 1914. 
237 Tisza István írásai és beszédei 5… Nr. 433.  
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the Ministers he also refrained from the immediate attack prior to any 
diplomatic intervention, recommended by Berchtold and Krobatin and 
also supported by Bilinski. Having the German support behind his back 
Berchtold remained surprisingly stable and steady contrary to his 
hesitative behavior during the Balkan Wars. He had nothing to lose: he 
knew that another failure against Serbia would be his last – the 
Hungarian lobby would enforce his dismissal. Contrary to Berchtold, 
Tisza was thinking of diplomatic steps first: “we have to express our 
demands against Serbia, but an ultimatum is only necessary, if these are 
refused. These demands have to be hard, but not humiliating or unacceptable. If 
Serbia accepts them, then we gain diplomatic success and our prestige on the 
Balkans will be restored.” Tisza probably had in mind the economic 
demands outlined above. If the Serbian promises did not meet the 
demands, Tisza accepted to support the military solution, but only 
under one condition: the attack could not be aimed at annihilating 
Serbia, only a mutilation could be acceptable.238 The members of the 
council opposing Tisza claimed that “a mere diplomatic success, even if it 
resulted in the humiliation of Serbia, would be useless /would increase only 
revanchism/, therefore it would be wise to come out with demands that could 
not be fulfilled, thus paving the way to the military intervention.”239  
The Austrians – criticizing the alliance policy of the Hungarian 
conservatives – were of the opinion that the ’simple’ humiliation of 
Serbia would not change anything: neither its relationship towards 
Austria-Hungary, nor the relationship of other Balkan states towards 
the dual state and Serbia. Bulgaria still would have aspirations 
unfulfilled towards Macedonia, and Austria-Hungary could lose control 
over Bulgaria as a year before,240 while military expenses would be too 
high without any results. So, the Dual Monarchy could gain (again) 
nothing, therefore the Hungarian Balkan policy was considered flawed. 
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240 “Tisza sees the diplomatic success as an instrument to strengthen our position in the Balkans, while I 
am of the opinion even regarding the diplomatic successes of 1909 and 1912, that these were futile on 
the long run, and contributed to the deterioration of our relations with Serbia, therefore I am very 
sceptic about the results of another pure diplomatic success … and Stürgkh agrees with me.”  
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Burián was balancing between Tisza and the others – his opinion 
was that the annihilation of Serbia was unnecessary, but the policy of 
Austria-Hungary should be based on securing the way towards 
Albania, thus the points laid down early in 1913 could be renewed 
together with the claims on the Sanjak of Novipazar. But Berchtold 
thought it would only anger Serbia further, which could still count on 
Russians, even if the country was mutilated.241 Therefore the only 
solution was the annihilation. This could be carried out by the 
annexation of Serbia, which would immediately trigger Hungarian 
opposition, or by the dismemberment between the neighbors, which 
was not refused by Hungarians. 
However, the editor of the text of the ultimatum, Alexander Musulin 
pointed out that the concept of moderate demands had won. So 
everybody at the Ballhausplatz thought – with the exception of some 
pessimists – that Serbia would be willing to accept these.242 Thallóczy 
gave detailed account on the behavior of the ’war eagles’, who feared 
the fulfillment of the demands. Burián himself admitted that even if 
Serbia was willing to accept the ultimatum, the Dual Monarchy would 
not have any coercive measure to control its execution – with the 
exception of the army, but this would also mean war.243 When Sándor 
Popovics mentioned that the deficit of the budget would be 400 million 
francs even without any military intervention,244 constituting 6% of total 
expenses, and the costs of the mobilization of an army corps for three 
months would mean an extra expenditure of 1100 million francs 
reaching 16% of the budget, it became clear that the events of the 
previous year could be repeated. Mobilization without war was a waste 
of money and time. If Serbia refused the ultimatum (and without 
preliminary mobilization it surely did so), the only coercive measure 
would be an attack or a mobilization. Therefore – due to military-
financial purposes – everbody was sticking to the one-step procedure 
(ultimatum at first and at last), with the exception of Tisza, who wanted 
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243 Hauptmann, F.–Prasch, A.: Tagebücher…  59. July 20, 1914.  
244 Ibid. 23. 
130 
 
a two-step method. The mediating Burián had an idea to solve the 
financial problems. If the Serbs acctepted the ultimatum only after the 
mobilization, they had to pay the costs. If they refused to do so – the 
above mentioned costs ranged up to the six-year budget of Serbia – 
Austria-Hungary would occupy territories neighboring Albania and the 
Lovčen mountain245 until Serbia repaid the costs. This could satisfy 
those, who wanted territorial aggrandisement, while at the same time 
would promote the realization of the Hungarian political-economic 
concept as well. 
“Tisza pointed out that he would give his consent to the one-step method 
/ultimatum/ under one condition: if the Council of Ministers declares – before 
the ultimatum is delivered – that Austria-Hungary does not intend to gain 
Serbian territories with the exception of minor modifications of borders” – 
wrote Berchtold to Francis Joseph. The report of the German 
ambassador Tschirschky reveals Berchtolds insincere behavior in this 
question: “if the Serbs accepted our demands, this would result a very 
inconvenient situation for him /Berchtold/, therefore he was constantly 
thinking of new demands, unacceptable for Serbia.”246 
Tisza’s stance went through major modifications between 3 July 
(when he only wanted the humiliation of Serbia) and 14 July (when he 
accepted Serbia’s mutilation), although he still did not agree with the 
annexation of Serbia. We have already enumerated his arguments in 
connection with the refusal of war, now we enumerate the arguments 
that forced him to accept it. 
In Galántai’s opinion the German approval to the Bulgarian alliance 
and Berlin’s promises to hinder the Romanian entrance to war made 
Tisza accept the violent solution.247 Vermes claimed that Tisza feared the 
loss of Germany’s friendship.248 This could have meant that the Dual 
                                                          
245  Without declaration of war it seemed to be impossible as this was Montenegrin area! 
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Monarchy and Hungary would become politically and militarily 
defenseless (Therefore Tisza himself also supported the renewal of the 
Triple Alliance in 1913). Berchtold manipulated Tisza,249 when he 
interpreted the German point of view that Austria-Hungary’s hesitative 
behavior would influence the future alliance policy of Germany.250 
Diószegi pointed out that the Hungarian Prime Minister (or a 
Hungarian Foreign Minister) had only space for manoeuvring in this 
dualistic system, if he could rely either on the Court or on the 
Parliament. But both the former and the Hungarian public opinion took 
side with the war party during the crisis in July 1914. Everybody was 
convinced that if the Hungarian Premier resigned, his successor would 
immediately support the ultimatum (and the war).251 We may add 
another argument: the position of Austria-Hungary among the southern 
Slavs of the empire was weakening. The patriotism of the Croatians 
shrank to their anti-Serbism (owing to their rivalization over the 
contested areas). The Hungarian government did not want to weaken 
further its diminishing prestige with a tolerant attitude towards the 
Serbs. The Bosnians also attacked the Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary 
during the internal debates in 1912, claiming that while autonomy was 
promised to the Albanians, and the principle of nationality – “the 
Balkans for the Balkan peoples” 252 – was generally accepted by Tisza, 
but the southern Slavs within Austria-Hungary did receive nothing 
similar.  
As a result of the next Council of Ministers on 14 July, the text of the 
ultimatum changed. “Berchtold accepted it, but Stürgkh, Forgách and me felt 
it too soft” – wrote Burián. The final text was accepted on 19 July. As 
Tisza wrote to the historian Henrik Marczali on 25 January 1918, he 
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accepted the idea of an ultimatum, but it was him who tried to 
moderate its text.253 
Berchtold finally decided – since the Hungarians came up with the 
Russian card – “to warn the Powers immediately in case of outbreak of a war, 
that Austria-Hungary did not fight for territorial aggrandisement, and did not 
plan to incorporate the Serbian Kingdom. But this did not exlude border 
corrections based on strategic considerations, or the concession of Serbian 
territories to other states, and temporary occupation of Serbian areas.”254 But 
Berchtold was incorrect, when he forwarded the ultimatum. He 
delivered an arbitrary interpretation of the text to St. Petersburg and 
added: “until the war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary remains localized, 
the Dual Monarchy does not think of territorial conquest.” With this step 
Berchtold simply wanted to secure the Russian neutrality, but this 
meant an additional condition indeed, which was refused by the 
Russians. Furthermore, he meant something different under border 
corrections than the Hungarians. Thallóczy’s diary mentions that 
Berchtold and Bilinski advised the acquisition of Belgrade (!) and Šabac 
as border corrections on 19 July, 1914 (which was also against the plans 
of regaining the Sanjak of Novipazar), and did not forget to compensate 
Romania and Bulgaria with Serbian territories.255  
Those, who were supporting the idea of energetic steps argued that 
“Serbia could not pursuit a fair policy toward us, because she was convinced 
that she could do anything because Russia would defend her. This belief or 
legend has to be tested, because we cannot live longer under these 
circumstances. … a new era will begin, as it was at Valmy.”256 This means 
that they were aware of the possible consequences, including the 
Russian intervention. “Hoyos who was sent by the Emperor’s letter to 
Germany ’caught fire’ and annexed Serbia. Tisza poured cold water on them (at 
the Joint Council of Ministers) and led them back to the realities. The King 
agrees with your ideas to avoid the annexation of any Serbian territories.”257 
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This statement was necessary not only to decrease the possibilities of the 
Russian intervention, but also to moderate the Italian demands on 
compensation.258  
So, the politicians of Austria-Hungary primarily wanted to break out 
from the diplomatic stalemate by an attack on Serbia, secondly, they 
wanted to punish the unruly state for the murder (this was the 
ideological basis of intervention). Territorial consequences were not 
among the major goals – this was confirmed by the fact that the 
standpoints regarding the territorial claims were not consistent! 
The analyzed group of Hungarians did not calculate with the 
annexation of Serbia at all. There is no sign of this in the diaries of 
Burián or Thallóczy prior to 1914: whenever they mentioned plans 
regarding the partition of Serbia they immediately added that this was 
not their idea, or it should be executed by other small states of the 
Balkans. At the outbreak of the war their ideas were quite moderate 
compared to the others. This changed radically only after 1916. It is true 
that the annexation of Mačva and Negotin appeared in the diary of 
Burián early in November, 1914, but it was a small area regarding its 
extent, although geostrategically significant.259 This territory was to 
secure the connection between Hungary and Bulgaria (even the plans of 
railway connection to Turkey were elaborated), while at the same time 
it separated the inimical Romania and Serbia. The region was rich in 
natural resources (ores), which were needed by the army and industrial 
circles of Rimamurány-Salgótarján Iron Company, furthermore it 
facilitated the control of the traffic on river Danube. The annexation of 
Serbia to Hungary remained an unpreferred outcome as it would have 
strengthened the Slavic element in the country and weakened the 
’Magyar’ supremacy. The incorporation of Serbia into the Austrian part 
was also an undesirable outcome, because it could have led to the 
federalization of Austria, and later to that of Hungary, or it would have 
promoted the way to trialism, which was refused by this pressure group. 
It could have also resulted in the change of the settled equilibrium 
between the constituents of the Dual Monarchy, which was the basis of 
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legitimation for the Tisza party against the radical 48-ers. Such a change 
might have removed the Tisza-party from political power. 260  
But a war without any result was against the interests of soldiers and 
banks. So, this Hungarian group had to articulate a coherent and 
executable Balkan policy contrary to the conventional trends, that 
would make it possible to ameliorate the worsening geopolitical 
situation of the country (creating a new buffer zone to counterbalance 
the loss of Serbia and Romania along the southern borders), and could 
be viable and profitable at least economically (as annexation was 
refused by this group).  
This lobby did not oppose the idea of territorial aggrandisement, but 
wanted to realise it not at the cost of Serbia. This was the core idea of the 
Albanian-Bulgarian buffer zone concept. In his memorandum (15 March 
1914) Tisza explained that the only viable way to ameliorate Austria’s 
position was the incorporation of Bulgaria into the Triple alliance, and 
the creation of a new Balkan League led by Bulgaria.261 The realization 
of this plan could have prevented a war against Serbia. But this plan 
was neither supported by Germany, nor by Hoyos, Conrad and 
Berchtold in peaceful circumstances, until the death of the heir 
apparent. 
Therefore this Hungarian group propagated the dismemberment of 
Serbia between her neighbors instead of its annexation. Burián wrote to 
Tisza on 27 July 1914: “The Romanian king is frightened and hesitating 
/whether to support Austria-Hungary or not, thus losing the 
opportunity either to get Transylvania or the Negotin district/. He is 
hungry for the Negotin district, but the Bucharest Peace Treaty forbade 
changes. For the future we may promise only that we will consider the balance 
                                                          
260 The Hungarians were sticking to the agreement made in 1867, because any changes like the 
above mentioned trialism could create a multiplayer bargaining position, in which any two 
parties could cooperate against the third (which would be Hungary knowing the feelings of 
Francis Ferdinand). In order to avoid isolation, Hungary would have to give rights 
continuously to the Slavs in Hungary. Tisza wanted to avoid such constellations. He even 
refused the the immediate broadening of suffrage and wanted to implement it only after the 
proportion of ethnic Hungarians grew over 66% (in 1910 it was 50% without Croatia). He 
considered twenty-thirty more years enough to reach this, thinking that such an ethnic 
pattern would stabilize the country’s position (and his party’s power as well).  
261 Ö-U.A. VII. Nr. 9482. 
135 
 
of power between the Balkan states. So – in case we have the opportunity –, not 
only Bulgaria can get a piece of Serbia, but Romania, Greece and Albania 
too.”262 
Paradoxically, the mutilation of Serbia arose in 1914 because of the 
Italian ally. Italians wanted compensation even in case of temporary 
occupation of Serbia, even if there were not any territorial concessions 
given to Austria. The compensation for Italy would have been the 
Albanian Valona, which would have enabled Rome to close the Otranto 
Strait. “I guess we may give Valona to Italy, if Serbia loses Macedonia,263 its 
Albanian territories, Šabac, or the northeastern parts of the country – inhabited 
by Romanians. In that case Macedonia could be given to Bulgaria, southern 
Albania to Greece, and we could create a viable Albania around Skutari with 
Antivari acquired from Montenegro including the Sanjak of Novibazar. An 
independent Albania having common borders with Austria-Hungary would be 
a good compensation – together with the sharpening of the Greek-Italian rivalry 
– for the Italian rise in power after their acquisition of Valona” – wrote Tisza 
and Burián.264 However, Thallóczy claimed Valona to be the key of a 
viable Albania and also a key position against Austria-Hungary, thus – 
in his opinion – the loss of the Otranto Strait could not be compensated 
by the acquisition of the Sanjak of Novipazar. 
In this latter concept the mutilation of Serbia was not merely an 
element of the compensation of the small states any more, it became the 
integral part of Austria-Hungary’s Adria-policy to promote her interests 
against Italian penetration. The desire to create a Greater Albania clearly 
marks this change – the Balkan states get compensation in turn of the 
creation of the new state, or to counterbalance the Italian ’Vordrang’, the 
punishment or mutilation of Serbia is only a secondary effect, not the main aim 
any more.  
This meant that the Italian problem – which made the temporary 
occupation of Serbia futile and unreasonable owing to the necessary 
territorial concessions given to Italy – also influenced Austria-
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Hungary’s behaviour, which then shifted more likely towards a war 
with territorial consequences. The regaining of the Sanjak had been a 
permanent question since 1908 due to its geostrategical significance (it 
was demanded as compensation or punishment in 1913 during the 
interallied war and during the Serbian advance in Albania in October 
1913): it could detach the two Serbian states from each other, while 
securing the economic outlet to Albania and the Macedonian railways). 
The 20th of July 1914 brought new combinations: the unification of 
Montenegro and Serbia arose enthroning the Njeguš-dynasty after the 
dismissal of the Karadjordjević.265 After the occupation of Serbia the 
question became more problematic. Conrad urged the annexation of 
Serbia at any cost, he was not bothered by the consequences it might 
cause in the structure of the empire. General Sarkotić also shared his 
opinion, but Khuen-Héderváry (ban of Croatia) and Tisza refused the 
idea. Burián, as recently appointed Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
stuck between the two groups. He wanted an independent, but weak 
and mutilated Serbia and the acquisition of the Sanjak of Novibazar to 
have a common border with Albania. He argued that Serbia and 
Montenegro should be separated. 
Contrary to him Count Gyula Andrássy (representing the Hungarian 
political opposition) came up with the idea of creating a Switzerland in 
the Balkans, which would be comprised of Serbia, Montenegro and 
Albania – presumably under Austrian influence (similar to the plans of 
Calice and Beck in the 1890s). But Burián thought it would be 
impossible to establish longlasting Austro-Hungarian influence in such 
a state conglomerate weakened by internal tensions.266 Furthermore, the 
hunger of the Bulgarians also began to grow: they wanted to delimit the 
spheres of influence between Grocka and Smederevo after the Serbian 
defeat in 1915. Burián replied that due to the economic significance of 
the region it would be better to realize the common Hungarian-
Bulgarian border through Hungarian territorial gains (instead of 
Bulgarian). Since Bulgaria also demanded the Niš-Priština-Prizren line, 
which endangered the Austro-Hungarian outlet to Albania through the 
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Sanjak of Novibazar, Kosovo again became an ’apple of discord’ this 
time between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. 
We have heard the opinion of some politicians, but how did the 
Hungarian public opinion relate to the Serbs? Paradoxically, it was the 
Serbians – being accused of endangering the integrity of Hungary – who 
removed a person, who also meant a constant threat to the Hungarian 
state concept – Francis Ferdinand. The Hungarian elite gained success 
in short term, while on the long run it lost everything by initiating “a 
war without territorial consequences”. 
The indoctrination of the war towards the public opinion at first 
glance seemed to be quite problematic owing to this paradox. However 
average people did not know too much about the aspirations and plans 
of the heir apparent, therefore the whole frustration was poured onto 
Serbia. We are going to show how this worked – through a small 
provincial paper, called ’Eger’: 267  
The mood was enthusiastic, but not free of contradictory acts. The 
press exaggerated the moral superiority of Austria-Hungary (the 
superiority was constantly expressed earlier as well, sometimes in 
peaceful ’paternalistic’ way, but was hardly ever put into the field 
of ’morality’), emphasizing Vienna’s “tolerance”, as Austria-
Hungary did not attack Serbia immediately, but gave opportunity 
to investigate and settle the question by diplomatic measures. (It is 
definitely not tolerance, as everybody who is accused of something 
is entitled to have independent investigation and jurisdiction 
before he is claimed to be guilty). Enrolled soldiers sang the 
famous ’Kossuth-song’, which was not only anacronistic, but had 
nothing to do with the Serbs. Another song, the ’Beware doggish 
Serbia, You won’t get Bosnia’ was popular too, revealing that 
average people might think, the bid was only Bosnia and not the 
existence of Greater Hungary or the maintenance of the structure 
of the dualistic state and its vertical (classes) and horizontal 
(nationalities) social system (which was well-known in political 
circles). The leader of Heves County, Viktor Majzik spoke about a 
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war of self-defense, and antagonistically called it “war for rest, war 
for peace”. The “si vis pacem, para bellum” mood was abundant 
everywhere. Majzik stated that the Serbs “attacked our land”, 
which was not true – the attack was targeted to the dynasty. Lajos 
Szmrecsányi, the archbishop of Eger called the hated Francis 
Ferdinand martyr, and drew parallelism between the recent 
Serbian behavior and 1848. From historical perspective, this was 
not the best comparison, as in 1848 the Serbs rather defended the 
dynasty’s interest. Hysteria spread (and was spread by agents) 
everywhere: “Serbian spies” were arrested, molested. In Eger even 
an old lady, being unable to speak Hungarian, was beaten up: later 
it became clear that she was the new French teacher just arriving 
from Debrecen. 
Of course, these words were needful to enhance the morale and 
motivation of the troops – the politicians were sure that the soldiers did 
not want to die for the Balkan interests of Austria-Hungary (and for the 
interests of the Hungarian political elite). Without the murder of the 
heir apparent it could have been difficult to expect enthusiastic mood. 
Early on 18 October 1913 when the first ultimatum was delivered to 
Belgrade268 due to the Serbian advance to Albania during the Balkan 
Wars, Burián expressed his feelings that “the war would not be popular in 
Austria-Hungary, if we did not target great aims to achieve” (like territorial 
aggrandisement, annihilliation of Serbia). Thallóczy’s diary also reveals 
the apathy, fears and impotence in political and civil circles during the 
two Balkan Wars (see next chapter).269 But the murder of the 
’Thronfolger’ made it possible for the Hungarian elite to come up with 
the idea of the “war without territorial consequences” – without this it 
could have been difficult to explain why to wage war and die for 
’nothing’. This ’nothing’ – the maintenance of the power of the political 
elite and the structure of the state – was not too attractive for the 
masses, while the ’Schlagwort’ “territorial integrity” could still mobilize 
thousands – although not everyone. 
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Hesitation, Indecision or Astuteness? The Foreign Policy 
of Austria-Hungary in 1912–13 Based on the Diary of 
Ludwig von Thallóczy  
 
 
Lajos Thallóczy, this late theoretician of Hungarian foreign policy 
entered into the political life in 1886, when he began to work as a 
secretary of Benjámin Kállay, who was then Austria-Hungary’s Joint 
Minister of Finance and thus governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
experience determined his political views. He was appointed Head of 
Department at Austria-Hungary’s Joint Ministry of Finance in 1908; 
during the Balkan Wars he was promoted to the rank of Real Internal 
Privy Counselor. Soon he reached the 3rd rank – the highest level for a 
civil servant in the Monarchy. In 1915–16, he was the civil governor in 
occupied Serbia.270 He was lucky enough to die before the collapse of 
Austria-Hungary in a train accident, when he was traveling back to 
Serbia from the funeral of Francis Joseph in 1916. 
Although he was a civil servant of the joint ministries, he also tried to 
promote the foreign political interests of a Hungarian pressure group 
represented by Count István Tisza, Prime Minister from 1913 and Baron 
István Burián, Joint Minister of Finance 1903–12, successor of Kállay.271 
He was clever enough to remain in shade and influence politics behind 
the scene. As a disciplined historian and well-known albanologist, he 
had unchallenged merits in creating the independent Albania and the 
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Albanian national consciousness.272 He wrote the first concise Albanian 
history (also used by pupils at schools!) translated by his agent, Zef 
Zurani to Albanian. He was the first western scholar, who tried to create 
the myth of Skanderbeg as an anti-Turkish Christian hero (after the 
attempt of Albanian Pashko Vasa in 1879),273 serving as an instrument 
for the unification of the Albanian nation. The idea to create a nation 
based on common language, thus diminishing the role of religious 
differences and in this way diverging Albanians from the Ottomans was 
also his initiative. Geographer-adventurers with good local connections, 
like Baron Ferenc Nopcsa,274 who collected information about the 
internal situation in Albania, were among his students.275  
He also had substantial field experience: when the soldiers and civil 
servants of Austria-Hungary were sent on holiday, their task was 
regularly to collect as many data as possible from the visited area. He 
participated in creating the network of secret service on the peninsula. 
His talent as a conspirator was discovered after his first trip to Albania 
early in the 1880s, when he managed to organize a small rebellion. In 
the summer of 1913 his task was to describe Albanian internal 
situation:276 in order to avoid any suspect, he travelled through Russia 
(where he collected statistical data on Łódz and other Polish industrial 
cities)277 to Constantinople, passed around Greece with his agents to 
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275 Csaplár-Degovics, K.: Az albán nemzettéválás kezdetei... 176–77. 
276 That is why he did not follow and comment the diplomatic achievements of the Bucharest 
Peace Treaty. 
277 See: NSZL MS. Néhai Dr. Thallóczy Lajos osztályfőnök hátrahagyott iratai sztenographalt részének 
átírása. Fol. Hung. 1677. Bosniaca, IX/3. 608–09, 613. The following data may illustrate that 
he considered his secondary task seriously: Łódz had 569 industrial units with 1 539 000 
spindles, 36 384 looms and 81 000 workers. The total product of silk industry was 16 441 000 
rubles, while industrial output of textiles was 187 million rubles (2300 rubles/person). In 
1910 other forms of industry produced only 10 million rubles with 8000 workers (1200 
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reach his final destination. His mission was so confidential, that he did 
not put down the achievements in his diary, which – compared to other 
talkative parts – happened rarely.  
Beyond the scientific circle an unofficial ’secret service’ was working 
around him.278 The above mentioned Zurani contributed to the 
smuggling of weapons into Albania with the knowledge of Austrian 
authorities. Thallóczy’s talent was also appreciated by Rappaport and 
Ippen (also members of the diplomatic corps with field experience), 
official delegates of Austria-Hungary in London sent for the 
delimitation of Albania in 1913.279 Thallóczy contributed to offering 
proposals for the Albanian border and for possible territorial 
concessions to the neighboring countries.280 
The ’triumvirate’ of Tisza, Burián and Thallóczy was following the 
concept of Andrássy and Kállay. As an albanologist, Thallóczy had a 
crucial role in creating a political program for this lobby: while the 
Austrian war-party of Conrad was focusing on the destruction of Serbia 
(and Italy), the Hungarian group wanted to shift Austria-Hungary’s 
sphere of influence from the Morava-Vardar axis to the Albanian coast. 
Due to the strong Russian support of Serbia, this group refrained from 
the annexation of the neighboring state, thus reaching Saloniki that way 
(anyway the incorporation or annihilation of Serbia would have meant 
trialism, that the Hungarian elite feared more than a war with Russia). 
They thought that the creation of Albania and its connection to the 
Bosnian railways might also secure Austro-Hungarian economic outlet 
and in that case Italy would be unable to close down the Otranto Strait.  
                                                                                                                                
rubles/capita; steel industry was leading among them with 4 million). 13% of workers was 
children, the proportion of adult males reached only 55%. The salaries reached 29 675 000 or 
333 rubles per person (16% of the output). In Russian cities the per capita budget reached 
4.36 kopek, in Polish territories only 1.8. The proportion of educational and charity costs 
from the budget reached 4,6% in Warsaw, while in Moscow it was 18% and in St. 
Petersburg 24%. In Poland 49% of the lands were peasand landholdings, meaning a 7.2% 
increase within two years, large estates represented 36% of the cultivated land, showing an 
8% decrease within two years. Lower classes of nobility owned 6%, towns 3%, the state 6%. 
278 See his staying in Constantinople, Thallóczy, 641. Description of his Albanian travels in 1913 
has been found recently in a separate dossier. 
279 Thallóczy, IX/1. 544–45. 
280 Ibid. VIII/8. 365. 
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The creation of Albania became of primary importance during the 
Balkan Wars, that is why Austria-Hungary insisted on Serbia’s retreat 
from the coast. As a recompensation Macedonia was offered, because 
the exacerbation of Bulgarian-Serbian antagonism was also another 
instrument which was utilized by this group.281 Unfortunately the 
competition between the different pressure groups decreased the 
efficiency of Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy in 1912–13. 
Thallóczy’s diary is of primary importance for the examination of the 
diplomacy of the Dual Monarchy, because he was present not only at 
the official assemblies of the delegations, but was also invited to informal 
meetings, where most of the brainstorming took place. Through his 
friends he was able to collect information about many rumours, 
personal interests and even antagonisms that formed the official policy 
of Austria-Hungary behind the curtains. In this sense his diaries 
provide us much more, that can be reconstructed from officially 
published documents, like the „Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik” or 
the notes on the Ministry Councils. He was not impartial: as a member 
of a political pressure group that temporarily lost its influence in 1912–
13, he could not remain objective when writing his accounts and giving 
an analysis of decisions made.  
Contrary to Burián, who wrote his diary to himself in order to 
explain and confirm his thoughts and deeds, and definitely not to the 
broad publicity, Thallóczy decided to write his memoirs as a publicist. 
Being disappointed from the internal and external political failures of 
Austria-Hungary, he dared criticize his opponents and political 
comrades in a sharp and sarcastic tone, although he knew it well, that 
his documents (after being deciphered by his secretary) would be used 
by the forthcoming generation as a valuable document of that era. His 
writing is full of anecdotes, stories alternating with strict facts and 
numbers. This uneasy personality was a ’real Hungarian’ regarding his 
psychical features – he wrote very pessimistically.282 Reading his 
                                                          
281 Báró Burián István naplói…  
282 By 1912 he had become mentally and psychically tired, and constantly blamed others for the 
failures. In his diary he not only offended and insulted the Balkan nations with his strict and 
unjust words, but also his colleagues, senior and superior officers– even the heir apparent. It 
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detailed accounts one may come to the conclusion that the collapse of 
the overbureaucratized Austria-Hungary was necessary and inevitable. 
*** 
When Berchtold became the Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1912 
after the sudden death of Aehrenthal, it also meant that the Hungarians’ 
political influence lost ground and they were pulled out from decision-
making (none of the three joint ministers represented Hungarian goals 
then). The growing conceptual and personal difference between the 
Hungarian pressure group and Berchtold soon became evident. 
Berchtold criticized Aehrenthal’s policy regarding the annexation and 
the railway-question, claiming that these adventures had ruined the 
prestige of and trust toward Austria-Hungary,283 and that Aehrenthal let 
himself be influenced by the concept of Burián, that time Joint Minister 
of Finance and Governor of Bosnia.284 After the death of the previous – 
in a very critical period –, and the dismissal of the latter (he was 
substituted by the Polish Bilinski)285 nobody represented ’Hungarian’ 
interests at the highest levels. When finally Count Tisza became Prime 
Minister of Hungary in 1913, he was suffering from lack of information 
in foreign political questions. Although he had a clear concept to win 
Bulgaria as an ally, thus compensating the loss of Romania, he had no 
instruments to realize this, until Burián was appointed as a Mediating 
Minister between Francis Joseph and the Hungarian government. In this 
way the direct influence on decision-makers had been restored by mid-
1913. 
                                                                                                                                
is worth further investigation how a well-trained diplomat and official became frustrated 
under the heavy burden and the lack of success, and what threats it may impose on 
collective work. Thallóczy even used antisemitic tone owing to the frustration that his social 
position did not change within the last ten years, however his talent and knowledge was 
utilized and exploited as well. But hardly any of his advices was realised. His desire was to 
become a baron, but he did not obtain the title (he was born as a protestant and was not a 
nobleman). Remaining unrewarded, he felt his social position unstable as he experienced 
that many of his rivals overtook him in the competition for social safety and recognition 
when they became members of the high-society. 
283 Thallóczy, VIII/5. 213. 
284 Ibid. IX/1. 445. 
285 As Berchtold was de iure Hungarian, and 2 Hungarians were not allowed to serve at the 
same time within the three joint ministers, Burián had to be dismissed. 
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For Thallóczy it seemed that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs had 
no clear concept on what to do in case of the probable collapse of 
Turkey. In his opinion Berchtold lacked strong will and was to pursuit a 
reactive and not a proactive-preventive foreign policy. This annoyed 
Thallóczy’s circles.286 According to the malicious Hungarian Berchtold’s 
idea was simple he wanted to put as many soldiers as possible along the 
border, but for this he needed money.287 Unfortunately, Berchtold did 
not recognise that the question of military power was determined partly 
by the calamities of Hungarian internal affairs (the 48-er opposition 
being in power between 1905–10 refrained from voting extra military 
expenditures).  
The first rumours about the Balkan League reached Thallóczy very 
late, on 19 September, 1912. Austrian diplomats were erroneously 
convinced that it was an anti-Turkish alliance created by Charikov (!),288 
and they did not know anything at all about its anti-Austrian character. 
On 1st October Thallóczy admitted that the Balkan states tricked not 
only Austria-Hungary, but Russia, the creator of the Balkan Alliance 
too.289 Although the occupation of Belgrade immediately arose in certain 
Viennese circles to stop the further evolution of events, Thallóczy and 
his colleagues thought that it would mean a war with Russia, therefore 
refrained from advising preventive measures. They were convinced that 
a showdown between the two great alliance systems would come next 
after the Balkan war. The fear of Russia (including the Hungarian 
Minister of Defense, Baron Samu Hazay) and the war mesmerized the 
Austrian diplomacy.290 Thallóczy recognized that Berchtold was unable 
to endure the burden: neither he wanted to undertake the responsibility 
for initiating a war, nor to be labelled as the one who did nothing at all. 
“Berchtold is a great lord, but a weak hand” – summarized Thallóczy his 
conversation with the foreign minister. Although the soldiers were not 
zealous for the reoccupation of Novipazar calling it a ’foxtrap’, 
                                                          
286 Thallóczy, VIII/5. 214. 
287 Ibid. 213. 
288 Ibid. VIII/6. 247. 
289 Ibid. 258. 
290 Ibid. 262. 
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Thallóczy warned that linking Novipazar to the Bosnian railways 
(which were just under negotiation) would be advantageous in the 
future either to enhance connections with Albanian lands or to promote 
the way to Saloniki bypassing Serbia.291  
Thallóczy realized quite early that Turkey have collapsed by 
November, 1912292 and this required the reorientation of Berchtold’s 
foreign policy which did not calculate with the Turkish defeat.293 He did 
not believe that the localization plans of the Powers and their insistence 
on status quo would work at all, because Bulgaria would never accept 
this after a victorious war. Powers could only block the sea, but not the 
inland, and an unilateral Austrian action only would be possible against 
Serbia, which Russia would never tolerate, but not against Bulgaria.294 
Thallóczy argued that the concert of Powers (1) had never really 
worked, (2) and it always resulted in territorial losses for Turkey. Thus 
accepting collective initiatives would immediately mean the 
abandonment of status quo (mostly propagated by Austria-Hungary) as 
well.  
Having free access to secret military reports Thallóczy gives a typical 
example for the demoralization of Ottoman troops. The unpaid Moslem 
soldiers of Plevlje sold more than 25 thousand weapons to the 
Montenegrins (non-believers and future enemies) just before the 
outbreak of hostilities, as accounted witnesses from the starving Turkish 
troops numbering 1300 men who retreated to Bosnia early in 
November, 1912.295  
Berchtold finally admitted that the status quo could not be 
maintained any more, but he was still unable to give a clear concept. 
                                                          
291 Ibid 247. August 19, 1912. 
292 When the newspapers wrote that the Turks had won –Thallóczy ironically criticized the 
press – one could be sure that the Bulgarians were the real winners (November 3, 1912). 
Thallóczy, VIII/7. 290. The reasons for the Turkish defeat were given by the consul in Janina 
as follow. (1) The Ottomans dismissed large number of soldiers, who had been serving for 
many years in the Tripolitanian War, just before the outbreak of the Balkan War. (2) Young 
Turk and conservative quarrels ruined the moral of the army. (3) Military supply was below 
any standard. Ibid. IX/1. 520. 
293 Thallóczy, IX/2. 571. 
294 Ibid. VIII/6. 262. 
295 Ibid. 395. 
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Thallóczy wrote sarcastically that Austria-Hungary was the first one 
giving up the status quo unofficially, but the last one which accepted it 
officially.296 “We cannot bind ourselves to a cadaver” – summarized 
Thallóczy – “Austria-Hungary has lost her defense line by the collapse 
of Turkey, the southern borders became more vulnerable than ever, as 
the new combinations are always more dangerous than old ones”.297  
During the days of brainstorming on how to secure Austrian 
interests the question of the occupation of Albania – among many ideas 
– arose opposing the Serbian advance to the Adriatic.298 A possible 
Albanian and Montegrin union was refused by Thallóczy, such as 
giving Scutari to Montenegro.299 Rappaport warned that cutting all 
connections between Ottomans and Albania might anger Moslem 
Albanians, therefore instead of independence the autonomy of Albania 
was proposed. The Germans warned that the renouncement from the 
Sanjak of Novipazar in 1908 was a mistake, because it made impossible 
to reach Albania through Bosnia.300 “Everybody was saying in the Foreign 
Ministry what had to be done instead of telling what is to be done now“ – 
wrote Thallóczy, although he admitted that the Germans were right.301  
Another interesting episode regarding the Albanian question and the 
shortage of qualified and capable decision-makers was also mentioned 
by Thallóczy in May, 1913. He criticized sharply the idea that the 
consuls of the six Great Powers were proposed to be the head of the 
controlling committe in Albania, because it would only result in rivalry 
and indecision.302 Neither Rappaport nor Ippen had any ideas how to 
create a temporary government in Albania with real executive power, 
without basic institutions, lacking social support. Thallóczy offered to 
keep the government in Valona, expanded and supervised by the 
delegates of the Powers.303 He claimed that Ippen had no elaborate plan, 
                                                          
296 Ibid. VIII/7. 295. 
297 Ibid. VIII/7. 296. 
298 Ibid. 297. 
299 Ibid. VIII/8. 374. 
300 Ibid. VIII/7. 290. November 2, 1912. 
301 Ibid. 303–04. 
302 Ibid. IX/1. 533. 
303 Ibid. 535. 
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he was just an executer of decision-makers, who also did not have a 
clear insight of the events. Berchtold finally called Thallóczy to ask for 
his proposals. Somebody advised Berchtold to search for a Catholic 
ruler for Albania and not a Protestant, arguing that Moslems would 
rather prefer faithful believers to heretics. Thallóczy warned Berchtold, 
that most of the Albanian Moslems were bektaşi, which – according to 
’eager Muslims’ – almost equaled with ’free masonry and heresy’.304 
Furthermore, Albanians living in the north were Catholics only on 
paper, they were very far away from real confession. A catholic ruler 
would mean nothing for these tribal people, who would only listen to 
the local priests, but could exacerbate religious differences suppressed 
up to now. Middle Albanians were rather patriots than Moslems, but 
each wanted to be the leader of the country, while orthodox southern 
Albanians could become Serbs or Greeks easily, depending on who 
would pay more. Berchtold was astonished by the account of Thallóczy, 
who also warned him that the positions of Prince Wilhelm von Wied 
were very weak, and he would soon be expelled from the country. 
Thallóczy pointed out ironically that a woman would be the best 
solution, because – according to their traditions – Albanians would not 
harm her. Berchtold complained that Ippen wanted to work on 
international basis which hindered the promotion of Austrian interests, 
while Thallóczy replied that Ippen had told him just the opposite. 
Berchtold was surprised, and finally it turned out that nobody gave him 
proper information about what was going on at lower levels (31 May, 
1913). 
The above mentioned episodes prove that diplomats were quite 
embarrassed – it was rumoured that the heir apparent wanted war with 
the Serbs, but peace with the Russians, which seemed to be an 
impossible combination. Diplomats feared that if Serbian presence at 
the Adriatic led to war, it would cause Russia’s intervention leading to 
the escalation of the conflict (7 November, 1912).305 The Serbian victory 
over Turkey even contributed to the settling of the long disputed 
                                                          
304 Ibid. 544. 
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Bosnian railway question between the Austrian and Hungarian party 
(both wanted to secure the iron-mines themselves).306 
Contrary to the opinion of the Ballhausplatz, Count Tisza did not 
consider the results of the Balkan War dangerous for Austria-Hungary, 
indeed he thought it was quite useful, because it ended a stalemate and 
made the realization of the plans regarding Albania possible. But the 
public opinion was very pessimistic, since the spiritless hesitation of the 
diplomats influenced the public opinion through the press.307 Conrad 
claimed that the hesitative policy of Berchtold would ruin the moral of 
the army.308 The financial agony even worsened the situation. The 
mobilization in Bosnia cost 240 thousand francs daily with no result, 
except the loss of prestige, internal and international trust. The constant 
governmental crisis made Hungary ridiculous in the eyes of 
Austrians.309 “The Tatars are eating up each other” – wrote Thallóczy about 
the Hungarian elite.310 The dilettantism and the lack of cooperation 
among high-rank officials angered the publicity further: the Joint 
Minister of War, Auffenberg, increased the number of soldiers contrary 
to the will of Berchtold, therefore he was soon dismissed.311 Even the 
bankers began to think that a war would profit more than a peace like 
this:312 the mobilization of the forces cost altogether 1 billion francs for 
Austria-Hungary in the two Balkan Wars without any materialized 
result, while the whole budget of the state reached 6 billion.313 The spent 
amount almost equaled with the costs in Bulgaria, which fought two 
wars! The German ambassador, Tschirschky pointed out on 9 
November, 1912 that the leading diplomats were still saying what they 
did not want, instead of telling what they wanted.314 “The country was so 
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308 Ibid. IX/1. 511. 
309 Ibid. VIII/8. 378. 
310 Ibid. 381. 
311 Ibid. 365. 
312 Ibid. VIII/6. 264, VIII/8. 380. Financiers refused to give the required 950 million francs credit 
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powerless and apathetic, that an energetic conqueror could take over power 
easily as it happened to Turkey” – wrote Thallóczy.315  
The group of Conrad and Krobatin wanted war against Serbia, 
partly to restore prestige, partly because the moral of the army declined 
quickly, but according to Thallóczy Berchtold resisted “since no Power in 
Europe wanted war and plundering the carcass is not honor”. Finally, in 
November, 1912 the soldiers decided themselves to occupy the Sanjak of 
Novipazar in order to create a common border with the future Albania. 
But Thallóczy said that it was then too late, because the negotiations for 
the armistice between the fighting parties seemed to be successful: such 
a decision should have been made earlier.316  
Later emperor Francis Joseph pointed out that if the Serbs did not 
withdraw from Durazzo, it would mean war, but Austria-Hungary did 
not want to initiate preventive war without any Serbian insult that 
could serve as a good pretext.317 Such a good occasion occured for the 
showdown, when the Serbian troops insulted Prohaska, consul of 
Austria-Hungary. Thallóczy mentioned that the Russian tsar had 
written a letter to Francis Joseph, in which he pointed out that such an 
insult would require a revenge and in that case Russia would not 
intervene.318 In Thallóczy’s opinion this was the moment when the 
bombardment of Belgrade would not cause a diplomatic incident. But 
after this opportunity slipped away an intimidation of Serbs without 
serious reasons would have been equal with aggression – analysed the 
situation Krobatin, the new Joint Minister of War. As most of the high-
ranked military officers wanted trialism,319 Thallóczy, who represented 
Hungarian interests, deeply despised them.  
The war and peace parties of Austria were unable to reach an 
agreement on foreign political questions. When the Ottomans wanted to 
smuggle 30 thousand weapons to Albania through Zef Zurani, an agent 
of Thallóczy, the authorities of Austria-Hungary were hesitating to 
                                                          
315 Ibid. XI/1. 311. November 7, 1912. 
316 Ibid. VIII/8. 380–81. 
317 Ibid. 383. 
318 Ibid. 358. December 10, 1912.  
319 Ibid. XI/1. 406. 
150 
 
forward them, because they received contradictory orders from the two 
parties, however this amount of weapons would have kept off 
Montenegrins from Scutari and would have promoted the positions of 
Austria-Hungary in Albania.320 The same situation – even more 
ridiculous – took place, when Hasan Prishtina managed to escape from 
his Serbian prison in Belgrade, but the Hungarian authorities denied 
him to enter the country without papers – however he could have 
mobilized Albanians in Kosova, thus creating difficulties for the Serbs. 
Finally, Austria-Hungary decided to declare her demands against 
Serbia – which had never been realized.321 This proposal was elaborated 
by Bilinski, Joint Minister of Finance, chief of Thallóczy, who also 
wanted to push Berchtold toward a more active foreign policy, like 
Burián, who did the same when Aehrenthal was in charge. But 
Berchtold resisted to execute the plan, because the Germans refused to 
give support (contrary to their earlier promises)322 as it could weaken 
German economic influence in the region.  
Thallóczy clearly recognised the problem of the Romanian 
compensation and the hesitation of the Bulgarians early in 1913 – he 
claimed that the Romanians would penetrate into Bulgaria, if they lost 
their patience (nonetheless they would not try it without Russian 
encouragement – contrary to Thallóczy’s belief).323 He also recognised 
that Greece and Serbia would be a natural enemy of Bulgaria, therefore 
if the Serbs refused the Austrian demands, Austria-Hungary should 
promote the interests of Bulgaria,324 as it would be also a good 
instrument to balance the Russian influence on the peninsula. Romania 
                                                          
320 Ibid. 430. February 10, 1913. 
321 This included (1) official Serbian renouncement from Bosnia, (2) full-scale prohibition of the 
activity of the Narodna Odbrana, (3) recompensation of Austria-Hungary in the sanjak of 
Novipazar (Plevlje, Priepolje), (4) joint shipping on river Drina, (5) the acquisition of Mt. 
Lovčen from Montenegro, (6) building of Užice-Vardište line by Serbia that connects Bosnia 
with Serbia, creating a link towards river Morava, (7) free trade till 1917, then customs 
union with Serbia and Montenegro, (8) the creation of a Sarajevo-Mitrovica-Saloniki 
railroad by Austrian entrepreneurs within 6 years without Serbian objection. Thallóczy, XI/1. 
398–400. January 9, 1913. 
322 After the death of Kiderlen followed by Jagow, the German policy changed. 
323 Ibid. XI/1. 432. February 12, 1913. 
324 Ibid. 455. 
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had shown Russophile tendencies by then, since Russians promised 
them Transylvania in 1912 – which the Hungarian political elit knew 
well.325 This raised a serious problem, as the Germans wanted to keep 
the benevolent alliance of Romania (and also tried to convince the 
Hungarians to give southern Transylvania to Romania) and Berchtold 
started to balance between the two concepts. Tarnowski, ambassador to 
Sofia added further that the Bulgarians would be the natural enemies of 
Serbia, even if their dreams about Macedonia remained unfulfilled, 
therefore the realization of Greater Bulgaria was not essential.326 Thus, 
Austria-Hungary offered Serbia to obtain Macedonian territories as 
compensation for their withdrawal from the Adriatic. That was one of 
reasons for the weak Austrian support of Bulgarian claims during the 
peace negotiations in Bucharest (1913), another one was that Romania 
was backed both by Russia and Germany, and the latter simply did not 
take into consideration Hungarian interests. It was Germany indeed – 
claimed Thallóczy –, that gave free hand to Romania,327 while Bulgaria 
was reluctant to give any concessions – although Berchtold had been 
convincing them for 8 weeks–, thus thwarting the policy of Austria-
Hungary. 
The diary contains an important element that throws different light 
on the Bulgarian attack against Serbia during the second Balkan War. 
Reading Thallóczy’s diary one may come to the conclusion that the 
statements in early works, that Tsar Ferdinand attacked Serbia, as he 
was expecting Austrian intervention, are not completely groundless.328 
Thallóczy wrote that Austria-Hungary promised the Bulgarians to 
intervene in case of a Serbian-Bulgarian war, if the Bulgarians were 
defeated,329 and in that case Serbia would be dismembered between 
                                                          
325 Ibid. XI/2. 557. June 6, 1913. 
326 For Tarnowski’s opinion see: Ö-U.A. VI. Nr. 7133. 
327 Thallóczy, XI/2. 578–80. 
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Romania, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. 330 This was a repetition of the 
offer made by Tsar Ferdinand in 1908 towards Austria-Hungary. 
Although officially published documents deny the possibility of an 
Austrian military intervention (only admitting an offer of 50 million 
francs), even if this was an unofficial rumour, it could have influenced 
the behavior of Tsar Ferdinand (as did in 1908 during the annexation 
crisis).331 Thallóczy was quite sceptic regarding a Serbo-Bulgarian war,332 
and he wrote that neither Serbia, nor Bulgaria would do such a favour 
for Austria-Hungary to benefit from this event, anyway, neither parties 
had enough money to fight.333 However, he also added that for Balkan 
states money is not essential to fight a war (29 May, 1913).334  
In a talk to Bilinski on July 4th, 1913 (after the outbreak of hostilities) 
the possibility of an Austro-Hungarian military intervention was 
mentioned again, if war broke out and Bulgaria was defeated and the 
Romanians crossed the line officially given to them in Dobruja.335 If 
these conditions fulfilled, Austria-Hungary would intervene and attack 
Serbia in order to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar, thus creating a 
common border between Bosnia and Albania.336 Although neither 
Berchtold, nor Francis Joseph was convinced by Bilinski, the above 
mentioned combinations were confirmed by Conrad von Hötzendorf337 
and appeared in Baernreither’s the diary too. The latter wrote that 
Berchtold had told these ideas to the German ambassador, 
Tschirschky,338 who usually (dis)informed the Bulgarian ambassador to 
Vienna, Salabashev (see previous chapter).  
                                                          
330 Burián did not count on Russian intervention, because he supposed that Russia would never 
oppose Bulgaria as it is a Slavic state – wrote Thallóczy. 
331 Thallóczy called this a policy of adventurers – but from the text it is not clear whether he 
meant the Austrian offer, or the Bulgarian behavior towards Serbia. 
332 Thallóczy, XI/1. 531–32. 
333 Ibid. 536–37. 
334 Ibid. 542. 
335 Thallóczy also pointed out that Romania had betrayed the Triple Alliance by his attack on 
Bulgaria. Ibid. 581. 
336 Thallóczy, XI/2. 581. July 4, 1913. 
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Therefore the thesis, that Tsar Ferdinand attacked Serbia without 
any (Austrian) encouragement is flawed, and documents put the 






Thallóczy, IX/1. 500–01. 
                                                                                                                                
bestärkt Serbien anzugreifen, und Bulgarien habe Gründe gehabt auf österreichische Hilfe zu 
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